@ Tatsuda Noboru

[Ismism] (3-1-1-4) Quasi-Transcendental Dialecticism: Early Derrida

(2021-06-28)

Today, we’re discussing the Ismism (3-1-1-4), represented by the young Derrida, that is, Derrida during his student years at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. Wait……which school was it again? Oh, right——the École Normale Supérieure. Back then, he was at the level of a second-year university student…… This guy was quite a genius, definitely smarter than me.

(The content of this "Ismism") refers to Derrida’s undergraduate thesis, his diploma dissertation at the École Normale Supérieure. At that time, he was a reconciliatory transcendental phenomenologist——perhaps even someone who sought to rescue (though "rescue" might not be the right word) or rather to make the transcendental phenomenological project dialectical. His goal was to dialecticize transcendental phenomenology so that it could be revitalized and saved from its very origins. Specifically, he drew inspiration from Husserl’s late work, particularly the “Time Manuscripts”. What were they called again? Something like “Nau“——dame it, how uncultured I am—— oh, Bernau! That’s it——The Bernau Manuscripts. But honestly, I haven’t finished reading that book1. Let me tell you……was The Bernau Manuscripts even published at that time? I don’t know2. Because I haven’t finished reading it, I’m not sure how Derrida discussed these things.

I’ve only read its introduction, but in that introduction, Derrida mentions that in Husserl’s later years, he constantly tried to introduce a dialectical structure into the phenomenology of time3. This involved a kind of transcendental phenomenology that could construct a form of dialectics. This dialectics could then support a meta-logos, which in turn could uphold a transcendental logic capable of saving the entire project of transcendental phenomenology.

The representative figure for (3-1-1-4) is Jacques Derrida, specifically the Derrida of his university years, starting with his second year, when he began working on his graduation thesis. The key reference for this position is Derrida's work titled The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy.

To engage with this text, one does not need extensive prior knowledge4. A basic understanding of Hegelian dialectics, Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and Husserl’s works like Ideas I and Ideas II5 is sufficient. Additionally, a rudimentary grasp of Husserl’s eidetic psychology and transcendental logic will help…… The essential requirement is to comprehend Husserl’s main objectives and what Derrida aimed to "rescue" within transcendental phenomenology.

So, this “Ism” ——let's call it…… ah, I’m still thinking about it, actually. I’m still wondering what I should call it. Genesis…… I’m thinking, ah, this thing is actually quite annoying, you know? Because most people would say that in this state, it’s quasi-transcendental. But I think, actually, the stance here is purely transcendental. That is to say——damn it——should I add a “quasi-” in front? Quasi-transcendental? Should I call it quasi-transcendental? And then at the end, should I add “dialecticism” or “historicism”?

I think here, what’s primarily being used is still dialecticism. So I’ll call it Quasi-transcendental dialecticism. Why call it dialecticism instead of historicism? Because it has to be distinguished from those others——it has to be separated from some of the more mediocre ones…… You see, this quasi-transcendental……If I remove the “quasi,” then this transcendental dialecticism starts to resemble Schelling’s ideas, you know? And I can’t quite put it that way. So I have to add a “quasi” in front——a “quasi-transcendental.”

Now, Derrida uses a concept to break through this framework: genesis. We usually translate it as “origin,” but in philosophy, there’s a simpler term for it: “emergence.” Emergence refers to the starting point of time itself. But Derrida tells us that the problem of emergence has a duality——it’s inherently contradictory. On one hand, as originarity6, as an absolute beginning; on the other hand, all emergence is anticipated——it’s always foreseen or prefigured. That is to say, all emergence exists within a contextual framework7. Every instance of emergence is anticipated; it happens within the flow of past and future——it’s relational8. And when exactly it emerges is itself uncertain. So you might say it’s germinating, but we’re anticipating it—we’re expecting it. There’s even an entire field called genesis. This thing——oh man——there are so many people talking about it in China these days. But in reality, it’s just a phenomenological theory.

In other words, only through phenomenological transcendental intuition can you grasp a pure genetic phenomenology. That is to say, if you don’t have phenomenological transcendental intuition or transcendental reduction as your foundation, then whatever so-called genetic phenomenology you’re studying—it’s all nonsense.

Because genesis has a premise, which is to say, its revelation of the dialectical structure of genesis lays the foundation for time. This genesis is capable of constructing a theory of temporality——“laying the foundation for time”.

However, in Derrida’s case, perhaps because he was relatively young at the time, his aspiration was to rescue transcendental phenomenology through a form of dialectics. For Derrida, transcendental phenomenology faced an inevitable internal impasse——one that was dialectical and dualistic in nature. This impasse rendered transcendental intuition itself into something dead—— stagnant, suffocating, fractured, where nothing is living, nothing alive exists within it.

So I strongly recommend that everyone read——those who are capable of doing so (I’m referring to the "3-1-1" ). After you’ve gone through the first three steps——the first(3-1-1-1), second(3-1-1-2), and third(3-1-1-3) steps——and grasped them, you can move on to reading the main texts. Ah, Logical Investigations——I think as long as you finish the third part and its postscript, that should suffice. Ideas I is actually very short, not as long as you might imagine. Moreover, this text can be read in parallel with others; they are not in conflict. As for Ideas II, that’s what I discussed yesterday. Afterward, you can move on to The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy and another work by Derrida, Speech and Phenomena. However, the latter is clearly more immature and naïve. We could even say that Derrida believed it was possible to…… ah, I think this book9 isn’t very long either. Half of it consists of appendices, introductions, and prefaces.

Perhaps next month, depending on the situation, I will discuss about this book——its English version. As for the Chinese translation, there are still issues with it; when discussing these topics, its grammatical structure is too simple and prone to ambiguity. It’s better to read the English version. As for French——I don’t understand French. You can’t blame me for that; he wrote it in French.

You need to think about this: (English and French) they can be directly translated into each other, their terms can correspond. Using a language I know——English——to explain, I don’t think there’s any issue. But between Chinese and these languages, many of the terms are not directly translatable. Look at this book (The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy), who translated it? It was translated by Yu Qizhi. His terminology——things like “物论” (materialism)…… oh my, and “理项”10 (idealism)……Some of the terms he translated even come with his own annotations, but when you read further, it becomes jarring and disruptive.

Then, in this position (3-1-1-4), I deliberately left out Phenomenology of the Life-World, which surprised many who also study phenomenology. Phenomenology of the Life-World itself is practically useless——it still belongs to (3-1-1-3). There’s no essential difference; it remains a form of reflective subjectivism.

As for Derrida’s stance——this quasi-transcendental dialecticism——it can be seen as a general philosophical model of thought. That is to say, within phenomenology——and specifically within the domain and terminological system of transcendental phenomenology——how do you achieve a breakthrough? The answer lies in introducing dialectics as a way forward. Dialectics is simply the idea that a concept possesses duality, mutual opposition. This is the simplest explanation——it’s a general philosophical model of thought.

I think it’s not for me to endorse this; let Derrida himself vouch for it. When Derrida was in university, this was his general model: introducing dialectics into the domain and terminological system of transcendental phenomenology. This was quite an effective model.

Let's look back at the problem of genesis. The duality of the genesis problem has two aspects: first, it emerges by itself, with absolute originality——something that emerges entirely on its own, without any other thing helping it emerge. In phenomenology, this can be called "invention"11. It's an invention, such that in phenomenological terms, in everyday language, when I say an idea12 is an invention, it means it emerges out of nowhere, establishing itself as its own starting point. On the other hand, it's not just an invention; it must also undergo "vertification"13 and be verified. In other words, on one side it possesses absolute originality; on the other side, it has a relative…… we can say, a situational, a background-based relative... fuck, how do I say this?…… structural quality. It can be said to have a relative structural quality.

Derrida would tell you that an idea, or any intention, or intentionality14, either emerges out of nowhere…… that is, these two things (invention and verification) must simultaneously exist. You can't just have an intention without a "vetification". Was the word he used vetification? Let me check……I don't have time to verify vocabulary……verification, I always (misspell it) …… verification, fuck……I can also not use that word, can't find it. Verification, that 't' is extra15. Verify, I've misspelled this word many times, you don't need to care about me, just know the word yourself.

That is to say, you have an intentionality, or a thought, or a consciousness, something emerges, something surfaces, you'll have a dialectical structure16, this is a dialectical structure of origin. You'll discover it's always there, it's always been there17. For example, when I'm thinking about something, I'm thinking about eating. When you start thinking about this thing, you can simultaneously confirm and verify its existence. That is to say, any arranged thing, especially intentionality18——this dialectical structure is fatal to the self-grasp of transcendental subjectivity, to the reflective self-orientation of transcendental subjectivity, because it causes a crack in this structure, you know?

Didn't we discuss this yesterday? In transcendental subjectivity, or in this reflective subjectivism, the self-grasp of transcendental subject, transcendental cogito. In every intentionality, it can see itself, can see orientation, or find something again inside. But when it finds something inside, do you say it created a transcendental self inside, is this synonymous, or do you say it has always been there? This becomes a fatal blow. Actually, if we use Žižek, or Lacan, or Hegel's logic, this is a retrospective construction.

Derrida himself, in the "preface"——not when he wrote this paper, but when he published it——said: Husserl's transcendental philosophical project is like a kind of condomination, like an infection, everywhere, contamination, like a pollution, like an infection, like a transmission19.

He traverses every gap in the dialectical binary oppositional structure……This transcendental project always wants to resist dialectics, resist the concept's duality, dualism, the dialectics of binary opposition. While resisting the dialectics of binary opposition, he always wants to see clearly these binary oppositions, such as natural and ideal, real and essential, formal and real20 …… across the gaps of these sections21, there will always be a transcendental intuition or transcendental reduction's contamination, an infection, as Derrida himself uses this term. Wherever his gaze reaches, he will always see such an infection, always have a reduction desire, reduction, always wanting to see the origin of this confrontational structure. This consciousness itself is a phenomenological reduction's intentionality itself.

So, we can say in this sense that phenomenological intuition and its reduction are the same thing——when facing the pure self, when you see this pure self, your intuition and your reduction are the same thing, it's the same thing. You can hardly distinguish whether it's intuitively perceived or reduced, whether it's retreated or created, whether this distance is pulled apart or the distance itself already exists. Because when you pull apart this subjective retreat distance…… if you don't pull it apart, you'll never say you have it; once you pull apart this distance, you can always say this distance was already there, with a purer self watching this acting self, and moreover dominating this acting self——this consciousness action's self, this is consciousness's action22.

For instance, you're remembering "I just stepped on the floor". Then in your memory, you can see a pure self remembering. But at this moment, when you judge like this, between the remembering me and that pure self watching the memory——I as the rememberer, the acting me performing remembrance, and I as a pure self——actually, this is a tripartite relationship23……It seems I've phenomenologically transcendentally intuitively retreated a step back, then seen within the previously remembering me, within the remembrance action, a pure self remembering. This is a me, I synonymize it with me. But the problem is, when you do this, this can infinitely retreat, you know? But the answer phenomenology gives is: this is the same me. This is the same one, and the only one. So, why say there are three selves? Because you see the remembering rememberer, he is the pure self. But at this moment, you also have a self watching him——that is, a pure self watching a previous rememberer…… or say, a self currently remembering a rememberer, seeing himself. In this case, you're always watching this…… In this situation, you'll say, fuck, is this self reduced or intuitively perceived? Because in this sense, if the intentionality's initiator in the middle of the rememberer is a pure self, then it means it was originally there, right? It's always there. He was originally there, but obviously he's not there. The self within the rememberer is structural, a subject set connected with my remembrance content and my remembrance action itself, right? It's situated in the scene, in the action, it's connected. Then, as a pure self, I watch such a memory, the intentional memory activity, and see a pure self within it, and discover that this pure self is of absolute originality——he's the absolute initiator of this memory, not a participant in the memory, but the memory's initiator, the force that makes this memory appear, understand? Here's the genesis problem. Is this pure self an absolute initiator in an intentional activity, or is he only seen through phenomenological reduction…… you'll see in phenomenological intuition that he is…… fuck, your phenomenological reduction will discover it…… At this point, intuition and reduction short-circuit.

Because at this point, you'll see…… damn, that 1.5-order feeling, you know? I can only say it's 1.5-order. Because phenomenological intuition purely gives you a factual view, seeing you just remembering, just watching; while phenomenological reduction means putting that watching, including the reduction of that watching itself, into the reduction itself, listing it out. Reduction means reducing the reduction itself and its reduced object…… Reduction itself is zero-order, its reduced object is first-order, and within its reduced object, for instance, a memory activity towards other memories is second-order. This entire order will be provided according to its order through phenomenological reduction. While phenomenological intuition might not so obviously obtain its internal orders, because reduction touches many essential structures within.

Uh, what I want to say…… I've rambled far again, fuck, I'm so drunk. What I want to say is, this genesis problem makes phenomenology problematic at its starting point, in pure phenomenological intuition and phenomenological reduction, problematic in the initiation of intentionality. So, for us ordinary people thinking about this problem, I think the following is worth considering: Yesterday I kept giving an example——pure cogito, pure subject, pure transcendental subject. In Husserl's view, or actually for all of us, if we're a strictly solipsistic subject, we only get the pure transcendental subject, and this pure transcendental subject can initiate itself, produce itself. Beyond this, this pure transcendental subject can even be said to have nothing. But we can say it has a weak internal time-consciousness, internal temporal intentionality. This might be necessary for subjectivity24; beyond this, the subjectivity structure is extremely thin.

I'll give an example, such as color…… I say color might be a bit too…… which example would be better? For instance, your bodily control, like controlling the rotation of your eyeballs, the eye's motor sense—— why do I use eye motor sense? Because ordinary people can directly experience eye motor sense. Then, the following phenomenological analysis isn't very strict, and I don't have the ability to achieve that strictness, nor do I want to. Because I want to explain this so everyone can understand25.

Will the eye movement's motor sense feel unconditional to you? Your conscious keeps up your eye rolling, will you think it's…… it's not unconditional, it's given, right? Of course, it can be seen as an original givenness, right? It's an original giving, but it's primitive there, primitive presentation, primitive giving, it's "original pre-presence", always there, and we can feel our eye movement ability is always here, even if I cut my eyes off…… that is, eye movement ability is basically traceless in consciousness, right? You close your eyes, and there's a dizzy feeling……Other bodily motor senses——many motor senses, hearing is also a motor sense, including gravity sense, if we might topple…… these bodily motor senses are all included.

How do you judge your eyes moving? In many cases, we can't feel our eyes moving; it won't be an obvious sensation. But we're very confident, right? The subject is very confident. Even if I'm completely paralyzed like Hawking, my eyeballs can still move. When can eyeballs not move? When you gouge out my eyeballs, they can't move. Eye movement seems very closely connected to the subject, as if it's a naturally inherent ability. But the problem is, it's given, it can (exist, or) not exist. For some blind people or those who've had eyeballs removed, the muscles controlling eye rotation, those nerves might all atrophy or be completely removed. You have no structured bodily motor sense to verify your eye movement, no structured vision itself to verify it. Because our visual shaking and visual positioning changes can be used to verify eye motor sense, eye rotation can conversely…… then, of course, we'll have a structural grasp of the eyeball itself, but these are secondary, later, high-order, derivative——never mind.

What we want to say is that eye movement, or any pure bodily movement, will be seen as an innate thing, seen as magic, you understand? It's magic. You're unaware that you can control body movement, especially eye movement or controlling part of your limbs, just by mental intention. It's magic, it's magical, it has a magical quality. It gives you some intentionality of motor sense. Then you concentrate your attention on it, adjusting your intentional attention's method and ability within a spectrum.

For example, your eyes move from left to right, but the problem is, you have no control panel, you know?26 It's an incredibly mysterious thing. Let's not call it magical, but it's an incredibly mysterious thing.

Say you want your eyeball to move from left to right——but why, when you conceive a directional movement in your brain, this intentionality of directional rotation, this bodily control intentionality, it naturally goes from left to right, your eyeball truly moves from left to right, its visual feedback and other series of feedbacks verify it moved from left to right——why is this so mysterious? Why does my pure consciousness activity, my pure intentionality's directional orientation, then a positioning, this consciousness itself as a focal positioning on some interface of different bodily organs, seem to truly have these interfaces?

So, at this moment, do we say these positioning and control interfaces truly exist? Except, this control——can't be simply grasped as control, its mode is complex. It's not just "move my eye from left to right", it also involves eye positioning and its deflection27, deflection's intentionality. We can only experience…… that is, if we truly do phenomenological intuition, we can only experience that our issued commands are extremely tiny, simple, an instant pre-reflective, even unconscious, subconscious. Only some symbolic things emerge in our brain: a voice——"from left to right", only a symbolic intentionality, "eyes from left to right". Of course, the words "eyeball" might not emerge in your mind, but they definitely emerge when I'm talking to you, I say the symbol, your auditory hearing catches it, then transforms into an inner hearing. Of course, when moving your eyeball, you might not need to think about this inner hearing; these sounds have already been delayed.

But there's always an intentionality, always ready to control your eyes, and position your eyes. What does positioning your eyes mean? Your entire consciousness focus is already positioned on your eyeball's control interface, prepared to control it.

So, you should know that the initiation itself is not what we want to discuss, not where we want to grasp this genesis. Genesis isn't discussing a pure-self initiation; there's nothing to discuss about that, it's pretty empty.

What we want to discuss is these positioning frameworks, the entire body's positioning framework, and this directionality. Its adaptation to this framework, how these things are indeed configured between each other——these muscles, these eyeball movement patterns are indeed configured this way. That is, their configurational relationship: I think in my brain, then position my eyeball from left to right with an intentionality, position it, then truly implement this positioning, and it precisely matches its movement initiation. You don't need to adjust this software, don't need to write this software. The correspondence between these interfaces and its framework——this consciousness interface is that you think, you exert force on it, and it can... this correspondence is always there, you know? Always there. It's called "original pre-presence", always there. Even our intentionality feels it exists prior to my pure cogito. It's as if, before I could control my eyeball, eyeball control already existed. The movement of my eyeball exists prior to my active semiotic thinking, prior to my intentional focus that directs my attention to move my eyeball, prior to this intentionality, and even prior to the learned, conscious act of controlling the movement of my eyeball.

External intentionalities——like wanting to eat, wanting to hear sounds, wanting to pay attention——can already manipulate my eyeball, already position my body, already coordinate the positional and factual left-right directional spatial relationships of its movement patterns. It's already coordinated, this thing was long there, long inside.

So, what I want to say is, in this situation, when you say a pure self can construct this entire system through a series of complex mechanisms, it's actually not very convincing, you know? Saying it's completely genesis, a genesis of pure self, constructing all these control structures or dominating structures, perfectly and naturally connected——it doesn't seem right. Moreover, clearly, there's no reflective process constructing these things. You say it's passive synthesis? Here, genesis will pose a very significant question to phenomenology. Its problem actually comes from Kant's a priori synthesis, the problem of synthetic a priori28.

Although phenomenology appears like empiricism or positivism, and attempts to observe all structures through a pure cogito in a reflective manner and verify its constructive elements, the fundamental problem is that intentionality must, in some sense, be a priori synthesis——and this a priori synthesis is viewed as originless29.

You can see these positional relationships and claim they have always been there. You can see yourself, including seeing your perception of their perpetual existence, and glimpse the phenomenological subject's silhouette. However, these things themselves are originless, and this result is itself without origin.

I believe grasping origin is not about saying, "Oh, I can initiate my eye movement, my inner hearing, my body's positioning." Damn, that's nothing. I can also initiate my right foot's little toe moving, I can initiate positioning. I'll always see a cogito, an active, moving subject within. But this cannot help you grasp origin.

What can help you grasp origin? It is the absence of origin, the origin's lack, the origin's non-presence. The a priori synthetic structure exists within body and mind. This a priori synthesis is easily discovered. The synthetic relationship between your eye movement and external visual intentionality——fuck, it can be called a priori synthesis. You cannot find its genesis, you're unable to find its genesis. You can say they are simply connected, that visual and eye movement, eye motor sense and visual attention sense, are mindlessly linked, with an inherent necessity that is a priori.

The problem then becomes: how can these originless structure30 considered by Kant…… this kind of originless a priori synthetic intentionalities be reintegrated into Husserl's phenomenological framework?

In this sense, their origin is that they originate themselves, you understand?

These things originate themselves, and simultaneously explain themselves, of itself by itself. Set off of itself and by itself, or in his own words, an invention 'itself' itself——with both prepositions framing it31. In this situation, you must introduce a dialectical origin structure into transcendental phenomenology. Otherwise, you cannot truly perform a transcendental reduction or phenomenological reduction, or provide a philosophical delineation of the relationship between the phenomenological subject and these consciousness structures that seemingly always exist.

In this sense, regarding this origin——this self-originless origin in the phenomenological sense——this origin is an invention. Simultaneously, we can even say the "cogito" verbally claims to have invented, to have initiated, but actually, it merely verifies. I continuously verify my body's control, my positioning power, my internal sensory or sensory positioning power. I can move my tongue.

I have positioning power. You know? And this occurs through a pure semiotic mechanism. To consciously control a body, you must rely on a semiotic network for positioning. And this semiotic network and the body's positional causal domain are not the same network.

Thus, the starting point, or the suturing point, of this castration is genesis. Genesis ultimately becomes sutured onto subjectivity; it is eventually stitched onto the subject, onto the transcendental cogito, and, more specifically, onto the subject’s temporal experience. The discovery of self-temporality——this sense of “I have always been here” —— is precisely the discovery of self-existence, the realization that “I have always existed.

However, in truth, this self is only temporarily creating itself. Yet, this temporary creation of itself and the simultaneous discovery that it has “always existed” is inherently dialectical. This is the genesis of the self. It can be said that the self is continuously generating itself in real-time, but it can also be said that it has always been there. It exists within a semiotic, backgrounded temporal network——a temporary order——in which it has always already been present.

Thus, Derrida needed to assist Husserl by introducing a form of dialecticism into his entire structure. The first chapter involves integrating this dialecticism into the temporality of the intentional object, the "noema"32, and then into the "temporality of genesis". Discussions about concepts like "initial impression" and "pre-experiential synthesis" essentially cover what I just mentioned, except Derrida's treatment is more precise, refined, and abstract. Another point is that "epoché" (suspension) and "genesis" themselves are irreducible——suspension itself cannot be reduced. Finally, he attempts to construct a transcendental logic. I haven't read this book. The final section is titled “The Genesis of the Self and the Transition to a New Transcendental Idealism”33, where he supplements a new form of transcendental idealism34. I didn’t finish reading it, so I don’t know exactly what he’s doing there. Perhaps someday I’ll have the chance to complete this book.

What I want to say is that Derrida attempts to save Husserl’s grand phenomenological edifice through this approach. I must admit that my academic and phenomenological abilities are limited——I simply don’t have the time. Honestly, I don’t regret not dedicating much time to it or not being particularly skilled in this area. Based on my basic understanding, phenomenology eventually had someone clean up its mess——that someone was young Derrida.

Derrida labeled the pure "invention" or "innovation"——the pure initiation, pure emergence from nothing, pure retreat, or pure suspension——as "death." Why? Because these elements were not placed within a symbolic system; they were not alive. They lacked integration into a contextual framework and were disconnected from preceding and succeeding elements.

There are many fascinating discussions in this book…… Some may laugh at me for finding Derrida's early, immature work interesting. But the key point is that this book serves as a bridge——it connects Hegel and Husserl through the problem of genesis35.

I believe that for someone at their intellectual peak around age 22, reading this book would feel quite “light(qingqiaoqiao)”36. But I’m really sorry, I’ve wasted a few years of my life, and then, damn it, I went off to study…… Well, honestly, I don’t even know what I ended up studying. Maybe I dabbled in a lot of miscellaneous fields, I didn’t study this subject deep enough.

However, if you asked me to read this book, I could probably spend about two weeks explaining it to you. Honestly, getting back into it wouldn’t be particularly challenging——it’s not technically demanding. But what I’ve been pondering is this: well, Derrida opened up phenomenology, but as far as I know, this was the last serious effort. Others didn’t take it as seriously. What I want to talk about is the attempt to rescue transcendental phenomenology. Because what Derrida actually did was use dialectics——but here, dialectics functions as a kind of formal logic. Formal logic is garbage, it is a rather lowly thing in Husserl’s framework. It’s “low” because it belongs to something worldly or natural——it’s something natural but formal. It’s structural; it’s a structured form of dialectics. As a formal logic, it stands on the side of the worldly and the natural——it aligns with the lifeworld, with the mundane, the accidental, the trivial, and the profane. Derrida wanted to use this kind of dialectics to rescue transcendental phenomenology. He sought to use it to either salvage transcendental logic or abolish it altogether——to dismantle the logos of transcendental logos, or what we call logocentrism, while preserving some of Husserl’s methods and certain ontological assumptions about subjectivity. In essence, swap out the core of transcendental phenomenology using this formal dialectics. This dialectical approach is broadly historicist and genetic——it’s a generative dialectic focused on processes of becoming. Yet this dialectic is extremely dry and skeletal in form. And here lies something fascinating: this very dryness makes it a dialectic of both the formal and the real. But fundamentally, it remains a formal dialectic.

You should read this book yourself——The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy. If you’re not interested, there’s no point in me explaining it to you, right? In this book, Derrida essentially tries to rescue Husserl37——to give Husserl’s legacy a new core so that it can keep running and allow people to extract useful elements from it. He attempts to reconcile Husserl’s late work on time-consciousness with transcendental logic——efforts that Husserl himself made late in his career using temporality and time-consciousness. Derrida’s approach can be likened to replacing an outdated power source with something more vital. Imagine Iron Man’s whatever rolling inside his chest——a clunky nuclear-powered device[38]——being swapped out by someone more skilled for an energy gem fueled by life itself. From Iron Man’s perspective, this life-based energy source might seem inferior compared to his pure mechanical core. But in reality, it’s more powerful, more vital——it has greater life force. Similarly, Derrida’s dialectics carry more vitality——they breathe new life into phenomenology.

As Derrida himself stated, in this effort he saw the enthusiasm of a young student, a philosophical choice made within the world of a young philosopher, and a commitment to a philosophical vocation39. His choice was rooted in the belief that Husserl’s transcendentalism was not a purely detached transcendentalism divorced from historical context. Instead, Derrida viewed Husserl’s transcendentalism as something fundamentally tied to life, historical in nature——a kind of event. However, it is an event that claims to break away from history while simultaneously being rooted in history. It is both rooted and rootless, grounded in history while representing a rupture within history itself.

Transcendental phenomenology, therefore, is itself a rupture within history. What struck me most in Derrida's introduction is his assertion that to achieve a philosophy of genesis, one must also achieve the genesis of philosophy. In other words, to develop a philosophy addressing the problem of origin or genesis, one must create an entirely new philosophy. However, this "philosophy of genesis" is inherently historical, though this history itself is fractured and inconsistent.

Derrida later reflected on this project and deemed it immature——a naive project, as he called it. He saw it as a doomed endeavor from the start. While it was indeed a project, it did not delve deeply enough. I am unsure whether Derrida later wrote further texts on these ideas40. My knowledge of Derrida’s writings is limited in this regard. However, I do know that in his later deconstructionist works, Derrida admitted that he had been "poisoned" by transcendental phenomenology——it was like a toxin that caused dialectical eruptions everywhere. Yet this dialectic was what he described as a quasi-phenomenological dialectic: something akin to new life growing out of a withered body. In his later philosophy, Derrida pursued something beyond language——a quasi-phenomenological and quasi-transcendental method. Using dialectical discussions, he sought to achieve something beyond language itself. He seemed to believe he had attained such a "beyond," capturing impossible historical moments——or rather their traces, residues, or whatever his différance, also his supplement of genesis, damn, these kind of things41——through his peculiar and enigmatic dialectical methods.

This was an immature plan. The book itself is short——if you exclude the introduction and postscript, it’s just over 100 pages. By reading it, you can understand this project42.

I recommend reading the English version because the Chinese translation suffers from poor syntax and awkward terminology, making it frustrating to read. After reading five pages of the Chinese version——I bought two copies of this book, I even bought two copies——I switched to the English PDF version instead. It’s quite a worthwhile book to study.

Some might mock me, saying, “Why spend so many sessions talking about Husserl?” Let me reiterate: I am fully aware that his transcendental project is a failure. That has never been my position to begin with. Of course, when I was younger, I was introduced to philosophy through this framework——it shaped my habits of thought and ways of thinking. But later, I essentially abandoned this system of reasoning altogether. Over time, I shifted toward a kind of pragmatist stance, and eventually moved further toward dialectics and psychoanalysis. So, it’s not as if I’m particularly convinced that transcendental philosophy is destined to succeed. From the outset, you can see that even its starting point requires being replaced by a quasi-transcendental dialectical method.

Let us now, finally, discuss its positions. The first three positions remain essentially unchanged. However, in the field theory, there needs to be a slight adjustment: the metaphysical versus the physical or empirical.

On the side of the empirical, we might place terms like “worldly” and “history”43. On the metaphysical side, we find terms like “transcendental” and “idea,” representing the dimension of concepts and ideals. In this framework, the transcendental cogito——the subject ——is positioned on the metaphysical side, while life is placed on the empirical side. The mediating force between these two poles is dialectics, or perhaps even structuralism——though more precisely, it remains dialectics. However, this dialectics has a tendency toward structuralist formalization. Because this structuralist inclination stems from how dialectics can be reduced to pure formality under a phenomenological lens. Within transcendental phenomenology——through essential intuition and reduction——dialectics risks becoming hollowed out into a mere essence or structure, something stripped of its original givenness. In such a state, dialectics transforms into a shallow construct——a kind of trickery or wordplay, an empty game devoid of substance or genuine essence. It becomes nothing more than a superficial gimmick——a worthless shell lacking any fundamental grounding.

Your discussions about the essence of dialectics are somewhat ridiculous. If Husserl were alive today, he might say that your understanding lacks true contradiction at its core “Addols”. Do you understand?

Dialectics itself is inherently ridiculous, but Derrida uses dialectics to reconcile these elements. The way he reconciles them is by constructing a theory of genesis44——let’s call it "genesisology"? I’m not sure how to spell "genesisology" in English. This theory of genesis is constructed through dialectics. However, this dialectics is primarily semiotic. It can also be seen as historical——a fractured history, a history that is constantly rupturing and generating itself. But fundamentally, this history is tied to subjectivity. Beyond subjectivity, what else could it be? It’s just that it’s no longer transcendental subjectivity. The fractured history——this ruptured history——continues to provide this rupture within theoretical frameworks. And what provides this rupture? It’s still the cogito, a constantly thinking “cogito”. But this subjectivity can also be described as a mechanism of subjectivization——a historical mechanism of subjectivization. This mechanism allows something vital——something related to life and death——to emerge from the empty, hollow semiotic binary oppositions. It can draw out many rich problem domains or other issues.

Yet ultimately, it remains hollow. This project is doomed to fail. I don’t want to finish reading it because I know it will fail in the end45——it will be hollow. You can try to structure it with temporal frameworks or weave one net after another, but in the end, there’s nothing to hold it together. Once you loosen your grip, everything falls apart——it’s still just that same mess. That’s my personal judgment. Since I haven’t finished reading this book, I’ll give its teleology a 4(X-X-X-4). The other two (position) remain unchanged, but in terms of teleology, it’s 4.

What destroys the triadic relationship between these elements? It’s primordial motion. This dialectics is an empty one——it’s just primordial motion. In this book, Derrida adopts an objective transcendental-phenomenological stance and refuses to acknowledge that within pure transcendental phenomenological intuition and reduction, one can ultimately find a primordial motion. He won’t admit it. He won’t admit that there’s a rupture here or that there’s a primordial motion present.

This primordial motion is de-subjectivized——it becomes epistemologized——but it is ontological in itself. While it may become epistemologized and allow you to experience it, this primordial motion or primordial difference precedes semiotic registration——it’s as simple as that. Or rather, it ensures that binary oppositions inevitably arise during the process of semiotic registration. This primordial motion makes binary oppositions unavoidable and necessitates introducing dialectics into the foundation of transcendental phenomenology. If such dialectics were introduced, Husserl would exclaim: "The sky has fallen! Everything is ruined! Phenomenology is over!" This primordial difference or primordial motion is unconditional——it exists at the most fundamental level as an absolute motion, an absolute motion in itself.

From this perspective, this represents a materialist transformation or attempt at materialism46 because it acknowledges a primordial difference and primordial motion. Of course, we wouldn’t say this has any specific substrate because it exists in itself——itself as itself. If this were to participate in semiotic registration and generate semiotic differences within that process, then we might call it différance (if différance could even be tested). But différance cannot truly be tested——it cannot be experienced directly as différance.

To explore further: teleology here is 4(X-X-X-4), because its attempt at reconciliation——its effort to achieve absolute certainty through reflective self-grasping——ultimately collapses into failure. There’s no way for reflective self-grasping to hold onto itself; you can’t hold onto it——the waters are too deep; you simply can’t hold on. It’s illusory; it’s death. In that fleeting moment when you attempt reflective self-grasping, you are not alive——you are dead. From the perspective of primordial motion, your subjectivity at that moment is dead. In this sense, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology becomes a kind of necrophilia——a fixation on death. That so-called original gaze——the self looking at itself in absolute clarity——is death; it’s dead. And when you describe it as clear and transparent clarity? That’s because it’s terrifying——it’s horrifying, disgusting, something you instinctively want to avoid. Your consciousness represses and empties out what it truly sees through this original motion. Its failure was inevitable.

Alright then, that concludes my thoughts here. In my intellectual journey, phenomenology came to an end with Derrida tying up its loose ends. That’s why I bought this book but never read it fully——though I did read half of its introduction when I was younger (I bought two copies). From my perspective——and based on my reading of many journal articles and my understanding of philosophical history——transcendental phenomenology was a failed project. However, studying it can train your philosophical thinking skills——it doesn’t have a high entry barrier. Once you grasp its terminological system and jargon framework, discussing it feels no different from assembling computer components——installing CPUs or PCIe buses——it’s all quite similar. If you’re willing to spend dozens of hours reading Husserl's books and Derrida's book on him (The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy), they’re worth reading too. Husserl rejected dialectics outright——but Derrida argued that at phenomenology's foundation lies an implicit grasp of dialectics. That concludes my thoughts here!