@ fd208ee8:0fd927c1

You know, just have the repos downloadable from GitCitadel.com?

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

channel closes can take some time to clear the channels always close and some of the balance goes to one side and the other, to the other side there is no "nope, channel gone" situation, the channel is literally on chain and either side publish it, it's closed, and the coins go to the addresses that set them up ecash it entirely depends on the mint, this was the whole reason why we have lightning, because it's better than ecash

@ fd208ee8:0fd927c1

I don't even know what all is out there. Could we do something like you have for noscrypt?

@ fd208ee8:0fd927c1

Yes, we list the OneDev issue in the Nostr issue and vice-versa. That way we have traceability. And, later, they'll be automatically linked.

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

Perhaps he’s back in the real world https://media1.tenor.com/m/DKB4fw7EACwAAAAd/true-correct.gif

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

I haven't looked so I believe you.

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Though also it seems I haven't even regained the clout of my previous self. https://i.nostr.build/U2y2lZBYSnfQjkUq.jpg

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

THIS IS AN OUTRAGE. BULLISH MEANS nostr:nprofile1qqs2zqnq524z7zfdsh3vpwpwjh4vt7xxp6sec68y3xr3ndvve23ru0spzemhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68ytnzv9hxgqgkwaehxw309aex2mrp0yh8qunfd4skctnwv46qzrthwden5te0dehhxtnvdakq4nr825 I EVEN HAVE THE PILLOW. (which I still love btw)

@ c8383d81:f9139549

I’m just here to spread the real news 😄

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Yes. https://i.nostr.build/twLWVvqWNHxxGarU.gif

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

Damus with Coinos or WoS

@ c8383d81:f9139549

https://i.nostr.build/zxKB3zC9AUj3hPS5.jpg

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

I didn't forget. You made me president wtf unless I was too retarded to get what was happening. It's all a blur sometimes.

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

That red dye really messes you up I hear.

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Yep

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

Doing great nostr:npub132ny9cnwv5rjzw0ppk6ev34gn2n48zjejed2k0kcjxgawxt86mps7f9u95 thanks for asking https://i.nostr.build/X0WttYhU8Boj2WXP.jpg

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

I think nostr:npub132ny9cnwv5rjzw0ppk6ev34gn2n48zjejed2k0kcjxgawxt86mps7f9u95 and/or nostr:npub1hl0zy55rxqwd7anvf9nh9ms78kryee4zkf32nfwglgc5gmrm3hpqmslhas will be able to tell the tale of the prophecy better than I can

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

I'm doing alright. I'm almost finished reading Catcher in the Rye. It's really good but it also put me in a really off mood these past few days.

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

😂😂

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

I just took a deep breath through the ol sniffer. I'm good.

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

ecash is 1983, bitcoin is 2009, lightning is 2017 choose wisely

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

The repost fix on nostr:npub18m76awca3y37hkvuneavuw6pjj4525fw90necxmadrvjg0sdy6qsngq955 works nicely https://i.nostr.build/gS8TSpXi5KHeVdMl.jpg

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

yeah, because the dude is a fucking scammer, promoting scam enabling shit he's like bitcoin vitalik mountain man fantasy indeed

@ c48e29f0:26e14c11

It’s a beautiful day to be alive. https://image.nostr.build/be427ae88481e4fe31124848e1b24e86cd8d229984776d615242d0f3a77634c5.jpg

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

it's the same gay he is a crypto-shitcoiner... pretending to be about bitcoin but acting in total ignorance of the facts of why bitcoin solved the ecash trust problem and lightning solved the variable block time

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

It’s a simple tale of simple retards, finding a circle ⭕️

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

or you could trust a mint and hold your tokens on your hard drive and and then try to spend them when the mint is permanently offline, and they never let you know meanwhile my alby hub i can restore it with 12 words, and i don't have to run a server or any of that shit, because alby have a hosting service, you know, like a VPS with an app installer and worst case those coins are stuck in limbo until the other side closes the channel and then i have control again mint goes down? rugged, bro, rugged and that's what mints are gonna be all about, rugging, one or two solid ones, and the rest rugs lightning, on the other hand, at least you will eventually get your sats back assclown

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

I’m pretty sure Jay is already able to breathe through his nostrils… You sure you okay nostr:npub132ny9cnwv5rjzw0ppk6ev34gn2n48zjejed2k0kcjxgawxt86mps7f9u95 ? How are you, Stache? 🤭

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

Extremely humble. And retarded 🤭 Also it’s been going on only for a few months, as the rumour goes

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

I’m doing great Jay, thanks for asking friend. How are you?

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

How are you, node?

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

I'm worried that you've come to a revelation that's astray of what I intended, but I won't pursue it. Enjoy your time in the ⭕ nostr:nprofile1qqsytuv4el7t3jtjfm7zfrc9q730ked40806he7dx5uctxqk8j4hvfcpz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduq3samnwvaz7tmjv4kxz7fwwdhx7un59eek7cmfv9kqz9thwden5te0wfjkccte9ekk7um5wgh8qatzgy5zwl serves drinks. I think.

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

⭕Now you're thinking with portals⭕

@ 09e78872:60492109

Why not?

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

They say fiber is good for your health. Or maybe that's just some BS I learned in the schools you sent me to.

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

It's like when you're retarded and you meet other retards and just make an absolute dumpster fire mess in the replies on some poor guy's note on Nostr.

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

Retards always moving things forward. People always say haha retard They never say: how are you retard 😂

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

Interesting

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

I think Yodl followed the hashtag and then other’s amethyst would crash when they went to his profile fyi

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

So that's what nostr:nprofile1qqsw3znfr6vdnxrujezjrhlkqqjlvpcqx79ys7gcph9mkjjsy7zsgygpr9mhxue69uhhqatjv9mxjerp9ehx7um5wghxcctwvsq3samnwvaz7tmjv4kxz7fwdehhxarjd93kztnrdaksz9thwden5te0wfjkccte9ekk7um5wgh8qatz7tvu4p was really posting about today ⭕⭕

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

How do you like Yakihonne?

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Nice 🙌

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

The busiest retard I know 🤭

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

i am not ok with ecash, at all, and anyone who is, be it known to them that i am not ok with them either

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Does primal still have that refollow bot problem?

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

You have to unfollow to see if it says follow back, then follow him back. If cuban is still on primal, you can do that to check every day 🤭🤭

@ 5a0944a0:f098bd9e

delicious meat you got there.

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

I use some scripts to download audible books to m4bs without issue. It was kind of a bitch to set up though because it's all bash scripting.

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

100%

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

it's fiat this is a scam, and it just is not welcome

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

nostr:npub132ny9cnwv5rjzw0ppk6ev34gn2n48zjejed2k0kcjxgawxt86mps7f9u95 is slower than usual today 👀

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

https://image.nostr.build/7eeebfbb2cc42736798fc2a0dfc64c64ab0b1fc9253d71462ebacbd54cd17507.gif

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

The ⭕ takes offense at this comment. It is however still in line with the code of conduct. Carry on.

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

I was reading this thread while he tried 🤭 Tried is hilarious cuban 😂

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Some say I'm even the president.

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

protip: if people don't hera about the fact there is a problem they think there isn't a problem

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

some homo shit

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

nope

@ ee6ea13a:959b6e74

Oh, this is Canary Wharf in London! 🤣 I didn’t enlarge the photo and at first glance it looked like a shot of NYC!

@ c1e9ab3a:9cb56b43

Below is a conceptual whitepaper describing a Nostr-platformed, token-based, homomorphic voting system with a general access structure for final tally decryption. This document is hypothetical and meant to illustrate how existing cryptographic techniques can be integrated with the Nostr protocol for a secure, auditable, and private election. All references to specific libraries or standards are examples; real-world implementations would require careful analysis, testing, and compliance with legal frameworks. --- 1. Introduction Elections are a cornerstone of democracy. Transitioning to digital voting promises convenience and faster results, but faces major challenges: 1. Voter Privacy – No one should be able to learn an individual’s vote. 2. Verifiability – The public should be able to audit that the official results are correct. 3. Resistance to Coercion – Voters should not be able to prove how they voted (to prevent vote-buying). 4. Inclusiveness – The system should be user-friendly while preserving the above properties. In traditional paper-ballot elections, trust is distributed among poll workers, observers, and physical chain-of-custody procedures. In a digital context, we can replace or supplement some of those trust assumptions with cryptographic primitives that guarantee integrity and privacy—even in the presence of partial adversaries. This whitepaper describes a hypothetical solution combining: Nostr as a decentralized, censorship-resistant messaging layer. Blind-Signed Voting Tokens for voter authorization. Homomorphic Encryption to enable aggregated tallies without revealing individual ballots. Threshold & General Access Structures to ensure that multiple stakeholders must collaborate for the final result. Ephemeral Keys so that a voter’s cryptographic identity can be short-lived, used only for an election cycle. The outcome is a system in which: Each voter casts a single private, encrypted ballot. Anyone can verify that each voter’s ballot is included and unmodified. The final tally is only decrypted if all required stakeholders (e.g., multiple major candidates, election officials, etc.) cooperate to reveal it, preventing unilateral decryption or tampering. --- 2. Background and Terminology 2.1 Nostr Protocol Nostr is a simple, open protocol for decentralized and censorship-resistant communication. Its main components are: Public/Private Key Pairs: Each user is identified by an npub (public key) and signs events using an nsec (private key). Relays: Lightweight servers that forward user-signed events to subscribers. Events: Signed messages containing arbitrary content. Clients read/write events from/to one or more relays. Nostr is not a blockchain; it focuses on message relay and persistence rather than on-chain consensus. This lowers complexity and transaction costs compared to blockchain systems. 2.2 Homomorphic Encryption A homomorphic encryption scheme (e.g., Paillier, ElGamal in an additive form) allows certain algebraic operations (like addition) to be performed directly on ciphertexts. When decrypting the resulting ciphertext, you obtain the sum of all individual plain-text messages, without needing to decrypt them individually. This property is widely used in e-voting to compute final tallies without seeing individual votes. 2.3 Blind Signatures & Blind-Signed Tokens A blind signature is a cryptographic method that allows one party (the “signer,” often an authority) to sign a message without seeing its content. It works by applying a “blinding factor” to the message before sending it to the signer. The signer’s returned signature can then be “unblinded” to become a valid signature on the original content. When used for elections, blind-signed tokens can serve as “voting rights.” An election authority signs a blinded token for each voter; once unblinded, the token proves authorization without revealing which specific voter received it. 2.4 Threshold Cryptography & General Access Structures Threshold cryptography splits a private key among multiple parties. Only subsets of size k (out of n) can decrypt or sign. For instance, a 3-of-5 threshold means that any three participants can reconstruct the secret key, but fewer than three cannot. A general access structure goes beyond “k-of-n” by defining more complex rules about who must cooperate. For instance, “All major candidates must approve, plus at least half of the minor candidates, or the election official can stand in for a nonresponsive minor party.” --- 3. Architectural Overview 3.1 Key Goals 1. One Vote per Authorized Voter Only registered voters receive a valid (blind-signed) token. Each token is single-use. 2. Privacy Ballots are homomorphically encrypted. Even the election authority cannot see individual votes. 3. Auditability Anyone can see all ballots on Nostr relays. Each ballot is publicly verifiable (proper signature, valid token). 4. Resilience Data is replicated across multiple relays—censorship or data loss on one relay does not affect the final tally. 5. Controlled Decryption A general access structure ensures that multiple trustees or candidate representatives must cooperate to decrypt the final tally. 3.2 High-Level Sequence 1. Voter Registration & Public Key Publication Voter V is verified by the election authority (EA) using standard legal processes. V creates or provides an ephemeral Nostr key pair: (nsec_V, npub_V). The EA publishes a “voter registry” event that includes (npub_V, outboxRelay, optionalVoterID). 2. Blind Token Issuance V’s client generates a random token T. V blinds T to obtain T_blinded. EA signs T_blinded and returns T_signed_blinded. V unblinds it to get T_signed, which is valid but not linkable to the voter’s identity from the EA’s perspective. 3. Encryption Key Setup with General Access Structure A set of trustees (e.g., major candidates, minor candidates, officials) perform a Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol, yielding a public encryption key E. Private key shares are distributed according to the desired access policy (e.g., “All major candidate reps + at least 50% of minor candidates or an official override”). The public key E is published so voters can encrypt their ballots. 4. Casting the Vote V composes a ballot B (e.g., “Candidate1 for Office A, Candidate3 for Office B…”). V encrypts B under the homomorphic scheme using E → Enc(B). V includes the blind-signed token T_signed. V optionally includes a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) showing the ballot is valid (one selection per race, etc.). V signs the entire payload with nsec_V and sends it as a Nostr event to outboxRelay and the official election relay(s). 5. Relay Replication & Validation Multiple relays store the ballot event. Observers can confirm: The EA’s signature on T_signed is valid. Token T_signed hasn’t been used before. The Nostr signature from npub_V is valid and matches the published voter registry. ZKPs are valid, ensuring no over-voting. 6. Close of Voting & Tally The EA (or a scheduled trigger) issues a closing token on the relays, marking the end of voting. Everyone collects all valid ballot ciphertexts and homomorphically sums them to get a single ciphertext representing the total votes for each candidate. Each trustee (major candidates, minor candidates, and/or election officials) provides a partial decryption share. The shares are combined according to the general access structure. When enough shares are collected, the final decryption reveals only the aggregated vote totals (no individual ballot is ever decrypted). 7. Verification & Audit V can check that their ballot’s event ID or signature is included in the final set. Independent auditors can verify the set of tokens used, confirm no duplicates, re-check ZKPs, and reproduce the homomorphic decryption steps (provided they have access to the partial decryption shares from all required trustees). --- 4. Detailed System Components 4.1 Voter Ephemeral Keys Each voter, upon registration, generates or uses an ephemeral Nostr key pair (nsec_V, npub_V). Since the voter’s identity is verified off-chain, the election authority attests that: “This npub belongs to a legitimate voter.” Ephemeral means: The voter may abandon it after the election, preventing any link to future activity. The voter can keep using it if they wish, but it’s their choice. The only “official” tie to their real identity is during the election registration event. 4.2 Blind-Signed Token 1. Blinding V generates random token T. Uses a random factor r to blind T → T_blinded. 2. Signature EA sees T_blinded, signs it to get Sig_EA(T_blinded). Returns it to V. 3. Unblinding V removes the blinding factor, yielding Sig_EA(T), the valid signature on the original T. EA does not learn T. This allows the EA to confirm a token is valid after it has been unblinded, but does not link it to the original request or the voter’s identity. 4.3 Homomorphic Encryption & Zero-Knowledge Proofs We propose using a Paillier or ElGamal scheme in an additive homomorphic form. Steps: 1. Key Generation (Distributed among trustees) The result is a single public key E. Private key is split per the general access rules. 2. Encrypting the Vote For each candidate choice, the ballot encodes a 0 or 1. The client encrypts these bits or constructs an encrypted integer representation, Enc(B). 3. ZKPs The ballot may come with a ZKP proving that exactly one candidate was chosen per race. The proof does not reveal which candidate was chosen, only that it was done correctly. 4.4 General Access Structure Define a policy such as: MajorCandidate1 must provide partial decryption share. MajorCandidate2 must provide partial decryption share. MinorCandidate can sign unless absent, in which case ElectionOfficial can sign in their place. If there are multiple minor candidates, we could say a subset or a different threshold approach is required. Technically, this is implemented by: Distributed Key Generation (DKG): All relevant parties participate in creating the election key. Each party gets a partial share. The system knows the “access structure” that dictates which subsets of shares can reconstruct the final decryption. --- 5. Voting Timeline Below is a simplified illustration of the entire timeline: 1. Pre-Election 1. Voter registration: each voter obtains npub_V. 2. Voter obtains blind-signed token from EA. 3. DKG among candidates/officials to create E. 2. Election Opening EA publishes an opening token to the election relays. Votes are considered valid if timestamped between the opening and closing tokens. 3. Voting Period 1. Voter composes ballot. 2. Voter encrypts the ballot with E. 3. Voter attaches Sig_EA(T) + optional ZKPs. 4. Voter signs with nsec_V and submits to Nostr. 5. Relays replicate, observers monitor. 4. Election Closing EA (or an automated schedule) publishes a closing token. Any ballot submitted after this is invalid. 5. Tallying 1. Collect all valid ballots. 2. Verify tokens, ensure no duplicates, verify ZKPs. 3. Sum encrypted votes homomorphically → EncryptedTotals. 4. All required trustees cooperate to produce partial decryptions. 5. Combine partial decryptions → Plaintext Totals (who got how many votes). 6. Results Publication & Audit Final totals are published. Anyone can cross-check that the set of ballots used in the sum matches the ballots on the relays. --- 6. Security and Privacy Analysis 6.1 Privacy Homomorphic Encryption ensures individual votes are never decrypted. Mix-Net (Optional): If additional anonymity is needed (e.g., to avoid correlation via submission timing), the system can incorporate a verifiable shuffle or onion routing. Blind Signatures sever the link between an individual voter and the token used to cast their ballot. 6.2 Integrity & Auditing Every ballot is signed by the voter’s ephemeral npub_V and references a unique blind-signed token. Public relays allow anyone to fetch and verify ballots. Zero-knowledge proofs confirm each ballot is well-formed (one vote per race). 6.3 No Single-Party Control Threshold / General Access: No single official, candidate, or trustee can decrypt results alone. Collusion by all major players could theoretically decrypt data—but only in aggregate form if a mix-net or pure homomorphic tally is used. Individual ballots remain obfuscated. 6.4 Ephemeral Keys Voters can discard their private keys once they confirm their ballot was included. This reduces risk of key theft or post-election identity correlation. 6.5 Coercion Resistance (Caveats) As with most remote e-voting designs, if a voter can be forced to vote under surveillance, it’s challenging to fully prevent coercion. Systems can mitigate this by allowing multiple re-votes until a cutoff (only the last one counts), or designing a “hidden credential” approach. Such features add complexity and are beyond this paper’s scope. --- 7. Implementation Considerations 7.1 Nostr Relay Performance A large-scale election may involve millions of voters. Relays must handle high volumes of events efficiently. Possible approaches: Dedicated Election Relays: Provided by official or third-party organizations. Sharding: Voters assigned to particular relays but cross-posting ensures redundancy. 7.2 Token Validation at Scale Each token must be checked for prior usage. This implies a global double-spend check across all participating relays. Potential solutions include a distributed or real-time “used-token ledger” that all relays can query. 7.3 Threshold Library & DKG A proven library (e.g., using BLS signatures or an ElGamal-based threshold) is critical. “General access structures” are more advanced. You may need specialized protocols like Proactive Secret Sharing or “Access Hierarchies” for partial key holders. 7.4 User Experience (UX) The most significant barrier is ensuring everyday voters can use cryptographic tools without confusion. The UI might abstract away the complexities: “Click to get your voting token,” “Click to cast your ballot,” “Here is your confirmation code.” --- 8. Example Process Flow 1. Candidate(s) & Official DKG Each candidate’s cryptographic rep plus the official generate a key for the election. Public key E is published to the relays. 2. Voter Registration V visits a registration site, shows ID in person or via legal e-KYC. EA records (voterID, npub_V, outboxRelay). EA blind-signs a token for V. 3. Voting V runs a voting client, enters candidate choices. Client encrypts the choices as Enc(B) using E. Attaches (T, Sig_EA(T)) and a ZKP. Signs everything with nsec_V, publishes as a Nostr event. 4. End of Voting EA posts closing token. Observers gather all valid ballots from relays. 5. Summation Observers or an official aggregator combine all Enc(B) to get Enc(sumOfB) (or separate sums if enumerating multiple races). The aggregator requests partial decryptions from each candidate’s trustee. 6. General Access Threshold MajorCandidate1 provides partial share (and possibly sub-threshold from their internal team). MajorCandidate2 does the same. MinorCandidate or Official override if needed, as defined by the policy. After enough partial shares are combined, the aggregator recovers the plaintext tally. 7. Result Tally published. Auditors confirm no tokens were reused, all ZKPs checked out, and the final sum matches the set of valid ballots. --- 9. Conclusion This whitepaper outlines a token-based e-voting system on Nostr that leverages blind signatures, homomorphic encryption, and general-access threshold cryptography for a transparent yet privacy-preserving election. Key advantages include: 1. Decentralized Storage: Using Nostr relays reduces single points of failure. 2. Cryptographic Privacy: Homomorphic encryption and blind-signed tokens ensure vote secrecy. 3. Public Auditing: Anyone can fetch and verify ballots without learning individual votes. 4. Controlled Decryption: A carefully defined access structure mandates that multiple stakeholders (candidates, officials, etc.) must collaborate to reveal final results. Ultimately, real-world implementations of e-voting remain complex—requiring robust user experience design, secure key management, potential hardware security modules (HSMs), legal acceptance, and strong formal audits. However, this conceptual design shows how Nostr and advanced cryptographic primitives can be combined to preserve democratic principles in digital elections. --- References & Further Reading 1. Nostr Protocol: Nostr GitHub NIPs (Nostr Implementation Possibilities) 2. Blind Signatures: David Chaum, “Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments,” Advances in Cryptology, 1983. 3. Homomorphic Encryption: Pascal Paillier, “Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes,” EUROCRYPT, 1999. Taher ElGamal, “A Public Key Cryptosystem and A Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms,” CRYPTO, 1985. 4. Threshold Cryptography & Access Structures: Adi Shamir, “How to Share a Secret,” Commun. ACM, 1979. Amos Fiat and Moni Naor, “Broadcast Encryption,” CRYPTO, 1993 (ideas related to more general structures). Dan Boneh, et al. “Distributed Public Key Cryptosystems,” EUROCRYPT, 1999. 5. E-Voting Frameworks: Ben Adida, Helios - “Helios: A Web-based Open-Audit Voting System,” USENIX Security Symposium, 2008. Véronique Cortier et al., Belenios - “Belenios: A Simple Private and Verifiable Electronic Voting System,” IEEE Security & Privacy Workshops, 2014.

@ ee6ea13a:959b6e74

Long Island City

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

https://media1.tenor.com/m/XgU8qFqahwMAAAAd/not-for-you-mf-discord-only.gif

@ ee6ea13a:959b6e74

I mostly listen to audiobooks these days and it’s disappointing that the downloaded versions are still DRM’ed. You’re always a subscriber.

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

the people who think i'm causing a fuss for nothing don't see the shit in my relay logs i just run my test relay for a minute or two and this is what i see https://images.mleku.dev/9N/Screenshot%20from%202025-02-25%2016-35-31.png what is that? some spider trying to scrape all the events off my test relay, even though it's a test relay it's not all unicorn farts and rainbows out there, there is some srs shit going on not to mention assclowns promoting 1983 chaum technology that is solved by bitcoin, like that calle assclown totally wasting the time of users, abusing their trust and naivete and enabling scumbags to run scams on users by running mints and luring people to dump shitloads of zaps into them and then OH SORRY WE WENT OFFLINE no recourse calle is a piece of shit scumbag scammer influencoor and should be seen as such, and not given welcome by anyone, and anyone who promotes his shitty 42 year old bullshit obsolete technology should also be seen the same way ESPECIALLY if they try to use "sexy" names like "nutzaps" and "nutsacks" and you all know who i'm talking about none of these people are making anything but trouble for new users, and it's already fucked up because the clowns in charge of the protocol, who think that's ok, even though it's supposed to be an open protocol and interoperability is supposed to be important, think that this new version of shitcoinery is ok fuck them all we got big problems in here and anyone who wants to tell me i'm being angry or salty or excessive or mean or what the fuck ever is simply having a case of amnesia about the shit they already saw happen just yesterday

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Green blob fren is appropriate too 😂

@ ee6ea13a:959b6e74

Is the color from broth?

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

He lost a bunch of paella trays in the ocean or something :keks_sm:

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

You don't know about :turtlehappy_sm:? Little happy turtle. https://i.nostr.build/J6GEP.png

@ ee6ea13a:959b6e74

You will own nothing and be happy. nostr:note1enw70qdsq26vvqs9e87ate0hs6c2zpmxwky6n6trn6h2y6kh4yyqasq70c

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

😂🤝

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

I've heard many things about the ⭕. Some say it's the rear end of a frog and others say it's the Circle ⭕' Retards.

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

It will arrive on may 3rd ✅

@ 52b4a076:e7fad8bd

What is ⭕️

@ ee6ea13a:959b6e74

How do you form the rice into a perfect sphere?

@ 52b4a076:e7fad8bd

Bitcoin development being easy enough for anyone to do but hard enough for almost everyone to fuck it up was the worst thing that happened Many OSS Bitcoin projects are of garbage quality, have security holes and solve nothing

@ ee6ea13a:959b6e74

Nice! LIC?

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

The ⭕ is what Nostr always should have been. N⭕STR

@ 4bf3a313:bf6af7d5

*rewards not awards haha

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

Definitely trying to find it 🤭

@ 4bf3a313:bf6af7d5

And you can get Sats awards through oshi! https://www.oshi.tech/shop#categories

@ 3b3f085d:f7123d3e

Being alive is so expensive.

@ 6e468422:15deee93

👀

@ ee6ea13a:959b6e74

I didn’t take this screenshot, fren. I stopped using Coinbase a long time ago.

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Lol facts. I say sequel but I also never use it.

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

I trust Sandy and his wife 😂

@ 4bf3a313:bf6af7d5

😂✊

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

This is amazing man. Do you know where to find it? I’ll look on amazon

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

This is 100% shitposting 😂 Ser Sleepy is trolling 🤭

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

trust the mint bro, the mint will always be online and the operator will never be dodgy

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

It’s amazing. The hat, the lice, the dark tunnel. Perfection 😂 I kinda want to purchase it

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

GM Brian!

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

do you not think that this means you shouldn't be wasting your time with 1983 technology when all the problems of Chaum's invention are solved with bitcoin?

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

oh yeah, kyc me baby, harder, oh yeah right there, extract my sovereignty harder, oh yeah

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Watching this reminds me why I don't use ORMs. I rewrote my way out of an ORM once and said never again.

@ 6e468422:15deee93

Never! 😅

@ 4c800257:b47e3b2f

you welcome homo

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

https://media1.tenor.com/m/rMcW4AuNpdAAAAAd/pepe-think.gif

@ 18905d0a:0b229b08

And you know what we say to that: a resounding HFSP 😂

@ 7ed7d5c3:6927e200

Did he just call SQL squeal? Wtf.

@ 6e468422:15deee93

Now two!