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# Reasons for miners to not steal See [Drivechain](nostr:naddr1qq9xgunfwejkx6rpd9hqzythwden5te0ve5kzar2v9nzucm0d5pzqwlsccluhy6xxsr6l9a9uhhxf75g85g8a709tprjcn4e42h053vaqvzqqqr4gumtjfnp) for an introduction. Here we'll just have a list of reasons why miners would not steal: - they will lose future fees from that specific drivechain: you can discount all future fees and condense them into a single present number in order to do some mathematical calculation. - they may lose future fees from all other Drivechains, if the users assume they will steal from those too. - Bitcoin will be devalued if they steal, because: - Bitcoin is worth more if it has Drivechains working, because it is more useful, has more use-cases, more users. Without Drivechains it necessarily has to be worth less. - Bitcoin has more fee revenue if has Drivechains working, which means it has a bigger chance of surviving going forward and being more censorship-resistant and resistant to State attacks, therefore it has to worth more if Drivechains work and less if they don't. - Bitcoin is worth more if the public perception is that Bitcoin miners are friendly and doing their work peacefully instead of being a band of revolted peons that are constantly threating to use their 75% hashrate to do evil things such as: - double-spending attacks; - censoring of transactions for a certain group of people; - selfish mining. - if Bitcoin is devalued its price is bound to fall, meaning that miners will lose on - their future mining rewards; - their ASIC investiment; - the same coins they are trying to steal from the drivechain. - if a mining pool tries to steal, they will risk losing their individual miners to other pools that don't. - whenever a steal attempt begins, the coins in the drivechain will lose value (if the steal attempt is credible their price will drop quite substantially), which means that if a coalition of miners really try to steal, there is an incentive for another coalition of miners to buy some devalued coins and then stop the steal.