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# Nostr is not decentralized nor censorship-resistant Peter Todd has been [saying this](nostr:nevent1qqsq5zzu9ezhgq6es36jgg94wxsa2xh55p4tfa56yklsvjemsw7vj3cpp4mhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mqpr4mhxue69uhkummnw3ez6ur4vgh8wetvd3hhyer9wghxuet5qy8hwumn8ghj7mn0wd68ytnddaksz9rhwden5te0dehhxarj9ehhsarj9ejx2aspzfmhxue69uhk7enxvd5xz6tw9ec82cspz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduq3vamnwvaz7tmjv4kxz7fwdehhxarj9e3xzmnyqy28wumn8ghj7un9d3shjtnwdaehgu3wvfnsz9nhwden5te0wfjkccte9ec8y6tdv9kzumn9wspzpn92tr3hexwgt0z7w4qz3fcch4ryshja8jeng453aj4c83646jxvxkyvs4) for a long time and all the time I've been thinking he is misunderstanding everything, but I guess a more charitable interpretation is that he is right. Nostr _today_ is indeed centralized. Yesterday I published two harmless notes with the exact same content at the same time. In two minutes the notes had a noticeable difference in responses:  The top one was published to `wss://nostr.wine`, `wss://nos.lol`, `wss://pyramid.fiatjaf.com`. The second was published to the relay where I generally publish all my notes to, `wss://pyramid.fiatjaf.com`, and that is announced on my [NIP-05 file](https://fiatjaf.com/.well-known/nostr.json) and on my [NIP-65](https://nips.nostr.com/65) relay list. A few minutes later I published that screenshot again in two identical notes to the same sets of relays, asking if people understood the implications. The difference in quantity of responses can still be seen today:  These results are skewed now by the fact that the two notes got rebroadcasted to multiple relays after some time, but the fundamental point remains. What happened was that a huge lot more of people saw the first note compared to the second, and if Nostr was really censorship-resistant that shouldn't have happened at all. Some people implied in the comments, with an air of obviousness, that publishing the note to "more relays" should have predictably resulted in more replies, which, again, shouldn't be the case if Nostr is really censorship-resistant. What happens is that most people who engaged with the note are _following me_, in the sense that they have instructed their clients to fetch my notes on their behalf and present them in the UI, and clients are failing to do that despite me making it clear in multiple ways that my notes are to be found on `wss://pyramid.fiatjaf.com`. If we were talking not about me, but about some public figure that was being censored by the State and got banned (or shadowbanned) by the 3 biggest public relays, the sad reality would be that the person would immediately get his reach reduced to ~10% of what they had before. This is not at all unlike what happened to dozens of personalities that were banned from the corporate social media platforms and then moved to other platforms -- how many of their original followers switched to these other platforms? Probably some small percentage close to 10%. In that sense Nostr today is similar to what we had before. Peter Todd is right that if the way Nostr works is that you just subscribe to a small set of relays and expect to get everything from them then it tends to get very centralized very fast, and this is the reality today. Peter Todd is wrong that Nostr is _inherently_ centralized or that it needs a _protocol change_ to become what it has always purported to be. He is in fact wrong today, because what is written above is not valid for all clients of today, and if we [drive in the right direction](nostr:naddr1qqykycekxd3nxdpcvgq3zamnwvaz7tmxd9shg6npvchxxmmdqgsrhuxx8l9ex335q7he0f09aej04zpazpl0ne2cgukyawd24mayt8grqsqqqa2803ksy8) we can successfully make Peter Todd be more and more wrong as time passes, instead of the contrary. --- See also: - [Censorship-resistant relay discovery in Nostr](nostr:naddr1qqykycekxd3nxdpcvgq3zamnwvaz7tmxd9shg6npvchxxmmdqgsrhuxx8l9ex335q7he0f09aej04zpazpl0ne2cgukyawd24mayt8grqsqqqa2803ksy8) - [A vision for content discovery and relay usage for basic social-networking in Nostr](nostr:naddr1qqyrxe33xqmxgve3qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cywwjvq)

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# Censorship-resistant relay discovery in Nostr In [Nostr is not decentralized nor censorship-resistant](nostr:naddr1qqyrsdmpxgcrsepeqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c4n8rw6) I said Nostr is centralized. Peter Todd thinks it is centralized by design, but I disagree. Nostr wasn't designed to be centralized. The idea was always that clients would follow people in the relays they decided to publish to, even if it was a single-user relay hosted in an island in the middle of the Pacific ocean. But the Nostr explanations never had any guidance about how to do this, and the protocol itself never had any enforcement mechanisms for any of this (because it would be impossible). My original idea was that clients would use some undefined combination of relay hints in reply tags and the (now defunct) `kind:2` relay-recommendation events plus some form of manual action ("it looks like Bob is publishing on relay X, do you want to follow him there?") to accomplish this. With the expectation that we would have a better idea of how to properly implement all this with more experience, Branle, my first working client didn't have any of that implemented, instead it used a stupid static list of relays with read/write toggle -- although it did publish relay hints and kept track of those internally and supported `kind:2` events, these things were not really useful. [Gossip](https://github.com/mikedilger/gossip) was the first client to implement a [truly censorship-resistant relay discovery mechanism](https://mikedilger.com/gossip-relay-model.mp4) that used NIP-05 hints (originally proposed by [Mike Dilger](nprofile1qqswuyd9ml6qcxd92h6pleptfrcqucvvjy39vg4wx7mv9wm8kakyujgua442w)) relay hints and `kind:3` relay lists, and then with the simple insight of [NIP-65](https://nips.nostr.com/65) that got much better. After seeing it in more concrete terms, it became simpler to reason about it and the approach got popularized as the "gossip model", then implemented in clients like [Coracle](https://coracle.social) and [Snort](https://snort.social). Today when people mention the "gossip model" (or "outbox model") they simply think about NIP-65 though. Which I think is ok, but too restrictive. I still think there is a place for the NIP-05 hints, `nprofile` and `nevent` relay hints and specially relay hints in event tags. All these mechanisms are used together in [ZBD Social](nostr:naddr1qqyxgvek8qmryc3eqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823chekfst), for example, but I believe also in the clients listed above. I don't think we should stop here, though. I think there are other ways, perhaps drastically different ways, to approach content propagation and relay discovery. I think manual action by users is underrated and could go a long way if presented in a nice UX (not conceived by people that think users are dumb animals), and who knows what. Reliance on third-parties, hardcoded values, social graph, and specially a mix of multiple approaches, is what Nostr needs to be censorship-resistant and what I hope to see in the future.

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# Nostr: a quick introduction, attempt #1  Nostr doesn't have a material existence, it is not a website or an app. Nostr is just a description what kind of messages each computer can send to the others and vice-versa. It's a very simple thing, but the fact that such description exists allows different apps to connect to different servers automatically, without people having to talk behind the scenes or sign contracts or anything like that. When you use a Nostr _client_ that is what happens, your _client_ will connect to a bunch of servers, called _relays_, and all these _relays_ will speak the same "language" so your _client_ will be able to publish notes to them all and also download notes from other people. That's basically what Nostr is: this communication layer between the _client_ you run on your phone or desktop computer and the _relay_ that someone else is running on some server somewhere. There is no central authority dictating who can connect to whom or even anyone who knows for sure where each note is stored. If you think about it, Nostr is very much like the internet itself: there are millions of websites out there, and basically anyone can run a new one, and there are websites that allow you to store and publish your stuff on them. The added benefit of Nostr is that this unified "language" that all Nostr _clients_ speak allow them to switch very easily and cleanly between _relays_. So if one _relay_ decides to ban someone that person can switch to publishing to others _relays_ and their audience will quickly follow them there. Likewise, it becomes much easier for _relays_ to impose any restrictions they want on their users: no _relay_ has to uphold a moral ground of "absolute free speech": each _relay_ can decide to delete notes or ban users for no reason, or even only store notes from a preselected set of people and no one will be entitled to complain about that. There are some bad things about this design: on Nostr there are no guarantees that _relays_ will have the notes you want to read or that they will store the notes you're sending to them. We can't just assume all _relays_ will have everything — much to the contrary, as Nostr grows more _relays_ will exist and people will tend to publishing to a small set of all the _relays_, so depending on the decisions each _client_ takes when publishing and when fetching notes, users may see a different set of replies to a note, for example, and be confused. Another problem with the idea of publishing to multiple servers is that they may be run by all sorts of malicious people that may edit your notes. Since no one wants to see garbage published under their name, Nostr fixes that by requiring notes to have a cryptographic signature. This signature is attached to the note and verified by everybody at all times, which ensures the notes weren't tampered (if any part of the note is changed even by a single character that would cause the signature to become invalid and then the note would be dropped). The fix is perfect, except for the fact that it introduces the requirement that each user must now hold this 63-character code that starts with "nsec1", which they must not reveal to anyone. Although annoying, this requirement brings another benefit: that users can automatically have the same identity in many different contexts and even use their Nostr identity to login to non-Nostr websites easily without having to rely on any third-party. To conclude: Nostr is like the internet (or the internet of some decades ago): a little chaotic, but very open. It is better than the internet because it is structured and actions can be automated, but, like in the internet itself, nothing is guaranteed to work at all times and users many have to do some manual work from time to time to fix things. Plus, there is the cryptographic key stuff, which is painful, but cool.

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# Anglicismos estúpidos no português contemporâneo Palavras e expressões que ninguém deveria usar porque não têm o sentido que as pessoas acham que têm, são apenas aportuguesamentos de palavras inglesas que por nuances da história têm um sentido ligeiramente diferente em inglês. Cada erro é acompanhado também de uma sugestão de como corrigi-lo. ### Palavras que existem em português com sentido diferente - _submissão_ (de trabalhos): **envio**, **apresentação** - _disrupção_: **perturbação** - _assumir_: **considerar**, **pressupor**, **presumir** - _realizar_: **perceber** - _endereçar_: **tratar de** - _suporte_ (ao cliente): **atendimento** - _suportar_ (uma idéia, um projeto): **apoiar**, **financiar** - _suportar_ (uma função, recurso, característica): **oferecer**, **ser compatível com** - _literacia_: **instrução**, **alfabetização** - _convoluto_: **complicado**. - _acurácia_: **precisão**. - _resiliência_: **resistência**. ### Aportuguesamentos desnecessários - _estartar_: **iniciar**, **começar** - _treidar_: **negociar**, **especular** ### Expressões - _"não é sobre..."_: **"não se trata de..."** ## Ver também - [Algumas expressões e ditados excelentes da língua portuguesa, e outras não tão excelentes assim](https://fiatjaf.alhur.es/expressões-e-ditados.txt)

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# Pequenos problemas que o Estado cria para a sociedade e que não são sempre lembrados - **vale-transporte**: transferir o custo com o transporte do funcionário para um terceiro o estimula a morar longe de onde trabalha, já que morar perto é normalmente mais caro e a economia com transporte é inexistente. - **atestado médico**: o direito a faltar o trabalho com atestado médico cria a exigência desse atestado para todas as situações, substituindo o livre acordo entre patrão e empregado e sobrecarregando os médicos e postos de saúde com visitas desnecessárias de assalariados resfriados. - **prisões**: com dinheiro mal-administrado, burocracia e péssima alocação de recursos -- problemas que empresas privadas em competição (ou mesmo sem qualquer competição) saberiam resolver muito melhor -- o Estado fica sem presídios, com os poucos existentes entupidos, muito acima de sua alocação máxima, e com isto, segundo a bizarra corrente de responsabilidades que culpa o juiz que condenou o criminoso por sua morte na cadeia, juízes deixam de condenar à prisão os bandidos, soltando-os na rua. - **justiça**: entrar com processos é grátis e isto faz proliferar a atividade dos advogados que se dedicam a criar problemas judiciais onde não seria necessário e a entupir os tribunais, impedindo-os de fazer o que mais deveriam fazer. - **justiça**: como a justiça só obedece às leis e ignora acordos pessoais, escritos ou não, as pessoas não fazem acordos, recorrem sempre à justiça estatal, e entopem-na de assuntos que seriam muito melhor resolvidos entre vizinhos. - **leis civis**: as leis criadas pelos parlamentares ignoram os costumes da sociedade e são um incentivo a que as pessoas não respeitem nem criem normas sociais -- que seriam maneiras mais rápidas, baratas e satisfatórias de resolver problemas. - **leis de trãnsito**: quanto mais leis de trânsito, mais serviço de fiscalização são delegados aos policiais, que deixam de combater crimes por isto (afinal de contas, eles não querem de fato arriscar suas vidas combatendo o crime, a fiscalização é uma excelente desculpa para se esquivarem a esta responsabilidade). - **financiamento educacional**: é uma espécie de subsídio às faculdades privadas que faz com que se criem cursos e mais cursos que são cada vez menos recheados de algum conhecimento ou técnica útil e cada vez mais inúteis. - **leis de tombamento**: são um incentivo a que o dono de qualquer área ou construção "histórica" destrua todo e qualquer vestígio de história que houver nele antes que as autoridades descubram, o que poderia não acontecer se ele pudesse, por exemplo, usar, mostrar e se beneficiar da história daquele local sem correr o risco de perder, de fato, a sua propriedade. - **zoneamento urbano**: torna as cidades mais espalhadas, criando uma necessidade gigantesca de carros, ônibus e outros meios de transporte para as pessoas se locomoverem das zonas de moradia para as zonas de trabalho. - **zoneamento urbano**: faz com que as pessoas percam horas no trânsito todos os dias, o que é, além de um desperdício, um atentado contra a sua saúde, que estaria muito melhor servida numa caminhada diária entre a casa e o trabalho. - **zoneamento urbano**: torna ruas e as casas menos seguras criando zonas enormes, tanto de residências quanto de indústrias, onde não há movimento de gente alguma. - **escola obrigatória + currículo escolar nacional**: emburrece todas as crianças. - **leis contra trabalho infantil**: tira das crianças a oportunidade de aprender ofícios úteis e levar um dinheiro para ajudar a família. - **licitações**: como não existem os critérios do mercado para decidir qual é o melhor prestador de serviço, criam-se comissões de pessoas que vão decidir coisas. isto incentiva os prestadores de serviço que estão concorrendo na licitação a tentar comprar os membros dessas comissões. isto, fora a corrupção, gera problemas reais: __(i)__ a escolha dos serviços acaba sendo a pior possível, já que a empresa prestadora que vence está claramente mais dedicada a comprar comissões do que a fazer um bom trabalho (este problema afeta tantas áreas, desde a construção de estradas até a qualidade da merenda escolar, que é impossível listar aqui); __(ii)__ o processo corruptor acaba, no longo prazo, eliminando as empresas que prestavam e deixando para competir apenas as corruptas, e a qualidade tende a piorar progressivamente. - **cartéis**: o Estado em geral cria e depois fica refém de vários grupos de interesse. o caso dos taxistas contra o Uber é o que está na moda hoje (e o que mostra como os Estados se comportam da mesma forma no mundo todo). - **multas**: quando algum indivíduo ou empresa comete uma fraude financeira, ou causa algum dano material involuntário, as vítimas do caso são as pessoas que sofreram o dano ou perderam dinheiro, mas o Estado tem sempre leis que prevêem multas para os responsáveis. A justiça estatal é sempre muito rígida e rápida na aplicação dessas multas, mas relapsa e vaga no que diz respeito à indenização das vítimas. O que em geral acontece é que o Estado aplica uma enorme multa ao responsável pelo mal, retirando deste os recursos que dispunha para indenizar as vítimas, e se retira do caso, deixando estas desamparadas. - **desapropriação**: o Estado pode pegar qualquer propriedade de qualquer pessoa mediante uma indenização que é necessariamente inferior ao valor da propriedade para o seu presente dono (caso contrário ele a teria vendido voluntariamente). - **seguro-desemprego**: se há, por exemplo, um prazo mínimo de 1 ano para o sujeito ter direito a receber seguro-desemprego, isto o incentiva a planejar ficar apenas 1 ano em cada emprego (ano este que será sucedido por um período de desemprego remunerado), matando todas as possibilidades de aprendizado ou aquisição de experiência naquela empresa específica ou ascensão hierárquica. - **previdência**: a previdência social tem todos os defeitos de cálculo do mundo, e não importa muito ela ser uma forma horrível de poupar dinheiro, porque ela tem garantias bizarras de longevidade fornecidas pelo Estado, além de ser compulsória. Isso serve para criar no imaginário geral a idéia da __aposentadoria__, uma época mágica em que todos os dias serão finais de semana. A idéia da aposentadoria influencia o sujeito a não se preocupar em ter um emprego que faça sentido, mas sim em ter um trabalho qualquer, que o permita se aposentar. - **regulamentação impossível**: milhares de coisas são proibidas, há regulamentações sobre os aspectos mais mínimos de cada empreendimento ou construção ou espaço. se todas essas regulamentações fossem exigidas não haveria condições de produção e todos morreriam. portanto, elas não são exigidas. porém, o Estado, ou um agente individual imbuído do poder estatal pode, se desejar, exigi-las todas de um cidadão inimigo seu. qualquer pessoa pode viver a vida inteira sem cumprir nem 10% das regulamentações estatais, mas viverá também todo esse tempo com medo de se tornar um alvo de sua exigência, num estado de terror psicológico. - **perversão de critérios**: para muitas coisas sobre as quais a sociedade normalmente chegaria a um valor ou comportamento "razoável" espontaneamente, o Estado dita regras. estas regras muitas vezes não são obrigatórias, são mais "sugestões" ou limites, como o salário mínimo, ou as 44 horas semanais de trabalho. a sociedade, porém, passa a usar esses valores como se fossem o normal. são raras, por exemplo, as ofertas de emprego que fogem à regra das 44h semanais. - **inflação**: subir os preços é difícil e constrangedor para as empresas, pedir aumento de salário é difícil e constrangedor para o funcionário. a inflação força as pessoas a fazer isso, mas o aumento não é automático, como alguns economistas podem pensar (enquanto alguns outros ficam muito satisfeitos de que esse processo seja demorado e difícil). - **inflação**: a inflação destrói a capacidade das pessoas de julgar preços entre concorrentes usando a própria memória. - **inflação**: a inflação destrói os cálculos de lucro/prejuízo das empresas e prejudica enormemente as decisões empresariais que seriam baseadas neles. - **inflação**: a inflação redistribui a riqueza dos mais pobres e mais afastados do sistema financeiro para os mais ricos, os bancos e as megaempresas. - **inflação**: a inflação estimula o endividamento e o consumismo. - **lixo:** ao prover coleta e armazenamento de lixo "grátis para todos" o Estado incentiva a criação de lixo. se tivessem que pagar para que recolhessem o seu lixo, as pessoas (e conseqüentemente as empresas) se empenhariam mais em produzir coisas usando menos plástico, menos embalagens, menos sacolas. - **leis contra crimes financeiros:** ao criar legislação para dificultar acesso ao sistema financeiro por parte de criminosos a dificuldade e os custos para acesso a esse mesmo sistema pelas pessoas de bem cresce absurdamente, levando a um percentual enorme de gente incapaz de usá-lo, para detrimento de todos -- e no final das contas os grandes criminosos ainda conseguem burlar tudo.

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# `bitcoind` decentralization It is better to have multiple curator teams, with different vetting processes and release schedules for `bitcoind` than a single one. "More eyes on code", "Contribute to Core", "Everybody should audit the code". All these points repeated again and again fell to Earth on the day it was discovered that Bitcoin Core developers merged a variable name change from "blacklist" to "blocklist" without even discussing or acknowledging the fact that that innocent pull request opened by a sybil account was a social attack. After a big lot of people manifested their dissatisfaction with that event on Twitter and on GitHub, most Core developers simply ignored everybody's concerns or even personally attacked people who were complaining. The event has shown that: 1) Bitcoin Core ultimately rests on the hands of a couple maintainers and they decide what goes on the GitHub repository[^pr-merged-very-quickly] and the binary releases that will be downloaded by thousands; 2) Bitcoin Core is susceptible to social attacks; 2) "More eyes on code" don't matter, as these extra eyes can be ignored and dismissed. ## Solution: `bitcoind` decentralization If usage was spread across 10 different `bitcoind` flavors, the network would be much more resistant to social attacks to a single team. This has nothing to do with the question on if it is better to have multiple different Bitcoin node implementations or not, because here we're basically talking about the same software. Multiple teams, each with their own release process, their own logo, some subtle changes, or perhaps no changes at all, just a different name for their `bitcoind` flavor, and that's it. Every day or week or month or year, each flavor merges all changes from Bitcoin Core on their own fork. If there's anything suspicious or too leftist (or perhaps too rightist, in case there's a leftist `bitcoind` flavor), maybe they will spot it and not merge. This way we keep the best of both worlds: all software development, bugfixes, improvements goes on Bitcoin Core, other flavors just copy. If there's some non-consensus change whose efficacy is debatable, one of the flavors will merge on their fork and test, and later others -- including Core -- can copy that too. Plus, we get resistant to attacks: in case there is an attack on Bitcoin Core, only 10% of the network would be compromised. the other flavors would be safe. ## Run Bitcoin Knots The first example of a `bitcoind` software that follows Bitcoin Core closely, adds some small changes, but has an independent vetting and release process is [Bitcoin Knots][knots], maintained by the incorruptible Luke DashJr. Next time you decide to run `bitcoind`, run Bitcoin Knots instead and contribute to `bitcoind` decentralization! --- ### See also: - [How to attack Bitcoin, Anthony Towns' take](nostr:naddr1qqyrywphxdskzwp5qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cwx779x) [^pr-merged-very-quickly]: See [PR 20624](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20624), for example, a very complicated change that [could be introducing bugs or be a deliberate attack](http://www.erisian.com.au/wordpress/2021/01/07/bitcoin-in-2021), merged in 3 days without time for discussion. [knots]: https://bitcoinknots.org/

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# Drivechain Understanding Drivechain requires a shift from the paradigm most bitcoiners are used to. It is not about "trustlessness" or "mathematical certainty", but game theory and incentives. (Well, Bitcoin in general is also that, but people prefer to ignore it and focus on some illusion of trustlessness provided by mathematics.) Here we will describe the basic mechanism (simple) and incentives (complex) of ["hashrate escrow"](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0300.mediawiki) and how it enables a 2-way peg between the mainchain (Bitcoin) and various sidechains. The full concept of "Drivechain" also involves blind merged mining (i.e., the sidechains mine themselves by publishing their block hashes to the mainchain without the miners having to run the sidechain software), but this is much easier to understand and can be accomplished either by [the BIP-301 mechanism](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0301.mediawiki) or by [the Spacechains mechanism](https://gist.github.com/RubenSomsen/5e4be6d18e5fa526b17d8b34906b16a5). ## How does hashrate escrow work from the point of view of Bitcoin? A new address type is created. Anything that goes in that is locked and can only be spent if all miners agree on the _Withdrawal Transaction_ (`WT^`) that will spend it for 6 months. There is one of these special addresses for each sidechain. To gather miners' agreement `bitcoind` keeps track of the "score" of all transactions that could possibly spend from that address. On every block mined, for each sidechain, the miner can use a portion of their coinbase to either increase the score of one `WT^` by 1 while decreasing the score of all others by 1; or they can decrease the score of all `WT^`s by 1; or they can do nothing. Once a transaction has gotten a score high enough, it is published and funds are effectively transferred from the sidechain to the withdrawing users. If a timeout of 6 months passes and the score doesn't meet the threshold, that `WT^` is discarded. ## What does the above procedure _mean_? It means that people can transfer coins from the mainchain to a sidechain by depositing to the special address. Then they can withdraw from the sidechain by making a special withdraw transaction in the sidechain. The special transaction somehow freezes funds in the sidechain while a transaction that aggregates all withdrawals into a single mainchain `WT^`, which is then submitted to the mainchain miners so they can start voting on it and finally after some months it is published. Now the crucial part: _the validity of the `WT^` is not verified by the Bitcoin mainchain rules_, i.e., if Bob has requested a withdraw from the sidechain to his mainchain address, but someone publishes a wrong `WT^` that instead takes Bob's funds and sends them to Alice's main address there is no way the mainchain will know that. What determines the "validity" of the `WT^` is the miner vote score and only that. It is the job of miners to vote correctly -- and for that they may want to run the sidechain node in SPV mode so they can attest for the existence of a reference to the `WT^` transaction in the sidechain blockchain (which then ensures it is ok) or do these checks by some other means. ## What? 6 months to get my money back? Yes. But no, in practice anyone who wants their money back will be able to use an atomic swap, submarine swap or other similar service to transfer funds from the sidechain to the mainchain and vice-versa. The long delayed withdraw costs would be incurred by few liquidity providers that would gain some small profit from it. ## Why bother with this at all? Drivechains solve many different problems: ### It enables experimentation and new use cases for Bitcoin Issued assets, fully private transactions, stateful blockchain contracts, turing-completeness, decentralized games, some "DeFi" aspects, prediction markets, futarchy, decentralized and yet meaningful human-readable names, big blocks with a ton of normal transactions on them, a chain optimized only for Lighting-style networks to be built on top of it. These are some ideas that may have merit to them, but were never _actually_ tried because they couldn't be tried with real Bitcoin or inferfacing with real bitcoins. They were either relegated to the shitcoin territory or to custodial solutions like Liquid or RSK that may have failed to gain network effect because of that. ### It solves conflicts and infighting Some people want fully private transactions in a UTXO model, others want "accounts" they can tie to their name and build reputation on top; some people want simple multisig solutions, others want complex code that reads a ton of variables; some people want to put all the transactions on a global chain in batches every 10 minutes, others want off-chain instant transactions backed by funds previously locked in channels; some want to spend, others want to just hold; some want to use blockchain technology to solve all the problems in the world, others just want to solve money. With Drivechain-based sidechains all these groups can be happy simultaneously and don't fight. Meanwhile they will all be using the same money and contributing to each other's ecosystem even unwillingly, it's also easy and free for them to change their group affiliation later, which reduces cognitive dissonance. ### It solves "scaling" Multiple chains like the ones described above would certainly do a lot to accomodate many more transactions that the current Bitcoin chain can. One could have special Lightning Network chains, but even just big block chains or big-block-mimblewimble chains or whatnot could probably do a good job. Or even something less cool like 200 independent chains just like Bitcoin is today, no extra features (and you can call it "sharding"), just that would already multiply the current total capacity by 200. Use your imagination. ### It solves the blockchain security budget issue The calculation is simple: you imagine what security budget is reasonable for each block in a world without block subsidy and divide that for the amount of bytes you can fit in a single block: that is the price to be paid in _satoshis per byte_. In reasonable estimative, the price necessary for every Bitcoin transaction goes to very large amounts, such that not only any day-to-day transaction has insanely prohibitive costs, but also Lightning channel opens and closes are impracticable. So without a solution like Drivechain you'll be left with only one alternative: pushing Bitcoin usage to trusted services like Liquid and RSK or custodial Lightning wallets. With Drivechain, though, there could be thousands of transactions happening in sidechains and being all aggregated into a sidechain block that would then pay a very large fee to be published (via blind merged mining) to the mainchain. Bitcoin security guaranteed. ### It keeps Bitcoin decentralized Once we have sidechains to accomodate the normal transactions, the mainchain functionality can be reduced to be only a "hub" for the sidechains' comings and goings, and then the maximum block size for the mainchain can be reduced to, say, 100kb, which would make running a full node very very easy. ## Can miners steal? Yes. If a group of coordinated miners are able to secure the majority of the hashpower and keep their coordination for 6 months, they can publish a `WT^` that takes the money from the sidechains and pays to themselves. ## Will miners steal? No, because the incentives are such that they won't. Although it may look at first that stealing is an obvious strategy for miners as it is free money, there are many costs involved: 1. The cost of **ceasing blind-merged mining returns** -- as stealing will kill a sidechain, all the fees from it that miners would be expected to earn for the next years are gone; 2. The cost of **Bitcoin price going down**: If a steal is successful that will mean Drivechains are not safe, therefore Bitcoin is less useful, and miner credibility will also be hurt, which are likely to cause the Bitcoin price to go down, which in turn may kill the miners' businesses and savings; 3. The cost of **coordination** -- assuming miners are just normal businesses, they just want to do their work and get paid, but stealing from a Drivechain will require coordination with other miners to conduct an immoral act in a way that has many pitfalls and is likely to be broken over the months; 4. The cost of **miners leaving your mining pool**: when we talked about "miners" above we were actually talking about mining pools operators, so they must also consider the risk of miners migrating from their mining pool to others as they begin the process of stealing; 5. The cost of **community goodwill** -- when participating in a steal operation, a miner will suffer a ton of backlash from the community. Even if the attempt fails at the end, the fact that it was attempted will contribute to growing concerns over exaggerated miners power over the Bitcoin ecosystem, which may end up causing the community to agree on a hard-fork to change the mining algorithm in the future, or to do something to increase participation of more entities in the mining process (such as development or cheapment of new ASICs), which have a chance of decreasing the profits of current miners. Another point to take in consideration is that one may be inclined to think a newly-created sidechain or a sidechain with relatively low usage may be more easily stolen from, since the blind merged mining returns from it (point 1 above) are going to be small -- but the fact is also that a sidechain with small usage will also have less money to be stolen from, and since the other costs besides 1 are less elastic at the end it will not be worth stealing from these too. All of the above consideration are valid only if miners are stealing from _good sidechains_. If there is a sidechain that is doing things wrong, scamming people, not being used at all, or is full of bugs, for example, that will be perceived as a bad sidechain, and then miners can and will safely steal from it and kill it, which will be perceived as a good thing by everybody. ## What do we do if miners steal? Paul Sztorc has suggested in the past that a user-activated soft-fork could prevent miners from stealing, i.e., most Bitcoin users and nodes issue a rule [similar to this one](https://twitter.com/LukeDashjr/status/1126221228182843398) to invalidate the inclusion of a faulty `WT^` and thus cause any miner that includes it in a block to be relegated to their own Bitcoin fork that other nodes won't accept. This suggestion has made people think Drivechain is a sidechain solution _backed by user-actived soft-forks for safety_, which is very far from the truth. Drivechains must not and will not rely on this kind of soft-fork, although they are possible, as the coordination costs are too high and no one should ever expect these things to happen. If even with all the incentives against them (see above) miners do still steal from a _good sidechain_ that will mean _the failure of the Drivechain experiment_. It will very likely also mean _the failure of the Bitcoin experiment_ too, as it will be proven that miners can coordinate to act maliciously over a prolonged period of time regardless of economic and social incentives, meaning they are probably in it just for attacking Bitcoin, backed by nation-states or something else, and therefore no Bitcoin transaction in the mainchain is to be expected to be safe ever again. ## Why use this and not a full-blown trustless and open sidechain technology? Because it is impossible. If you ever heard someone saying "just use a sidechain", "do this in a sidechain" or anything like that, be aware that these people are either talking about "federated" sidechains (i.e., funds are kept in custody by a group of entities) or they are talking about Drivechain, or they are disillusioned and think it is possible to do sidechains in any other manner. ### No, I mean a trustless 2-way peg with correctness of the withdrawals verified by the Bitcoin protocol! That is not possible unless Bitcoin verifies all transactions that happen in all the sidechains, which would be akin to drastically increasing the blocksize and expanding the Bitcoin rules in tons of ways, i.e., a terrible idea that no one wants. ### What about the Blockstream sidechains whitepaper? Yes, that was a way to do it. The Drivechain hashrate escrow is a conceptually simpler way to achieve the same thing with improved incentives, less junk in the chain, more safety. ## Isn't the hashrate escrow a very complex soft-fork? Yes, but it is much simpler than SegWit. And, unlike SegWit, it doesn't force anything on users, i.e., it isn't a mandatory blocksize increase. ## Why should we expect miners to care enough to participate in the voting mechanism? Because it's in their own self-interest to do it, and it costs very little. Today over half of the miners mine RSK. It's not blind merged mining, it's a [very convoluted process that requires them to run a RSK full node](https://developers.rsk.co/rsk/architecture/mining/implementation-guide/). For the Drivechain sidechains, an SPV node would be enough, or maybe just getting data from a block explorer API, so much much simpler. ## What if I still don't like Drivechain even after reading this? That is the entire point! You don't have to like it or use it as long as you're fine with other people using it. The hashrate escrow special addresses will not impact you at all, validation cost is minimal, and you get the benefit of people who want to use Drivechain migrating to their own sidechains and freeing up space for you in the mainchain. See also the point above about infighting. ## See also * [Podcast episode with Ruben Somsen and Aaron van Wirdum explaining Drivechain](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhU6nsB5Z-0) * [Alternatives to Drivechain](nostr:naddr1qqyrqenzvvukvcfkqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823csjg2t6) * [Drivechain comparison with Ethereum](nostr:naddr1qqyx2dp58qcx2wpjqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cane7px)

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# Parallel Chains We want merged-mined blockchains. We want them because it is possible to do things in them that aren't doable in the normal Bitcoin blockchain because it is rightfully too expensive, but there are other things beside the world money that could benefit from a "distributed ledger" -- just like people believed in 2013 --, like issued assets and domain names (just the most obvious examples). On the other hand we can't have -- like people believed in 2013 -- a copy of Bitcoin for every little idea with its own native token that is mined by proof-of-work and must get off the ground from being completely valueless into having some value by way of a miracle that operated only once with Bitcoin. It's also not a good idea to have blockchains with custom merged-mining protocol (like Namecoin and Rootstock) that require Bitcoin miners to run their software and be an active participant and miner for that other network besides Bitcoin, because it's too cumbersome for everybody. Luckily [Ruben Somsen invented this protocol for blind merged-mining](https://gist.github.com/RubenSomsen/5e4be6d18e5fa526b17d8b34906b16a5) that solves the issue above. Although it doesn't solve the fact that each parallel chain still needs some form of "native" token to pay miners -- or it must use another method that doesn't use a native token, such as trusted payments outside the chain. ## How does it work With the `SIGHASH_NOINPUT`/`SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT` soft-fork[^eltoo] it becomes possible to create presigned transactions that aren't related to any previous UTXO. Then you create a long sequence of transactions (sufficient to last for many many years), each with an `nLockTime` of 1 and each spending the next (you create them from the last to the first). Since their `scriptSig` (the unlocking script) will use `SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT` you can obtain a transaction id/hash that doesn't include the previous TXO, you can, for example, in a sequence of transactions `A0-->B` (B spends output 0 from A), include the signature for "spending A0 on B" inside the `scriptPubKey` (the locking script) of "A0". With the contraption described above it is possible to make that long string of transactions everybody will know (and know how to generate) but each transaction can only be spent by the next previously decided transaction, no matter what anyone does, and there always must be at least one block of difference between them. Then you combine it with `RBF`, `SIGHASH_SINGLE` and `SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY` so parallel chain miners can add inputs and outputs to be able to compete on fees by including their own outputs and getting change back while at the same time writing a hash of the parallel block in the change output and you get everything working perfectly: everybody trying to spend the same output from the long string, each with a different parallel block hash, only the highest bidder will get the transaction included on the Bitcoin chain and thus only one parallel block will be mined. ## See also - [Drivechain](nostr:naddr1qq9xgunfwejkx6rpd9hqzythwden5te0ve5kzar2v9nzucm0d5pzqwlsccluhy6xxsr6l9a9uhhxf75g85g8a709tprjcn4e42h053vaqvzqqqr4gumtjfnp) [^eltoo]: The same thing used in [Eltoo](nostr:naddr1qqyxvenyvejnwdejqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c6qlqxc).

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# Comprimido desodorante No episódio sei-lá-qual de Aleixo FM Bruno Aleixo diz que os bêbados sempre têm as melhores idéias e daí conta uma idéia que ele teve quando estava bêbado: um comprimido que funciona como desodorante. Ao invés de passar o desodorante spray ou roll-on a pessoa pode só tomar o comprimido e pronto, é muito mais prático e no tempo de frio a pessoa pode vestir a roupa mais rápido, sem precisar ficar passando nada com o tronco todo nu. Quando o Busto lhe pergunta sobre a possibilidade de algo assim ser fabricado ele diz que não sabe, que não é cientista, só tem as idéias. Essa passagem tão boba de um programa de humor esconde uma verdade sobre a doutrina cientística que permeia a sociedade. A doutrina segundo a qual é da ciência que vêm as inovações tecnológicas e de todos os tipos, e por isso é preciso que o Estado tire dinheiro das pessoas trabalhadoras e dê para os cientistas. Nesse ponto ninguém mais sabe o que é um cientista, foi-se toda a concretude, ficou só o nome: "cientista". Daí vão procurar o tal cientista, é um cara que se formou numa universidade e está fazendo um mestrado. Pronto, é só dar dinheiro pra esse cara e tudo vai ficar bom. Tirando o problema da desconexão entre realidade e a tese, existe também, é claro, o problema da tese: não faz sentido, que um cientista fique procurando formas de realizar uma idéia, que não se sabe nem se é possível nem se é desejável, que ele ou outra pessoa tiveram, muito pelo contrário (mas não vou dizer aqui o que é que era para o cientista fazer porque isso seria contraditório e eu não acho que devam nem existir cientistas). O que eu queria dizer mesmo era: todo o aparato científico da nossa sociedade, todos os departamentos, universidades, orçamentos e bolsas e revistas, tudo se resume a um monte de gente tentando descobrir como fazer um comprimido desodorante.

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# `OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY` and the "covenants" drama There are many ideas for "covenants" (I don't think this concept helps in the specific case of examining proposals, but fine). Some people think "we" (it's not obvious who is included in this group) should somehow examine them and come up with the perfect synthesis. It is not clear what form this magic gathering of ideas will take and who (or which ideas) will be allowed to speak, but suppose it happens and there is intense research and conversations and people (ideas) really enjoy themselves in the process. What are we left with at the end? Someone has to actually commit the time and put the effort and come up with a concrete proposal to be implemented on Bitcoin, and whatever the result is it will have trade-offs. Some great features will not make into this proposal, others will make in a worsened form, and some will be contemplated very nicely, there will be some extra costs related to maintenance or code complexity that will have to be taken. Someone, a concreate person, will decide upon these things using their own personal preferences and biases, and many people will not be pleased with their choices. That has already happened. Jeremy Rubin has already conjured all the covenant ideas in a magic gathering that lasted more than 3 years and came up with a synthesis that has the best trade-offs he could find. CTV is the result of that operation. --- The fate of CTV in the popular opinion illustrated by the thoughtless responses it has evoked such as "can we do better?" and "we need more review and research and more consideration of other ideas for covenants" is a preview of what would probably happen if these suggestions were followed again and someone spent the next 3 years again considering ideas, talking to other researchers and came up with a new synthesis. Again, that person would be faced with "can we do better?" responses from people that were not happy enough with the choices. And unless some famous Bitcoin Core or retired Bitcoin Core developers were personally attracted by this synthesis then they would take some time to review and give their blessing to this new synthesis. To summarize the argument of this article, the actual question in the current CTV drama is that there exists hidden criteria for proposals to be accepted by the general community into Bitcoin, and no one has these criteria clear in their minds. It is not as simple not as straightforward as "do research" nor it is as humanly impossible as "get consensus", it has a much bigger social element into it, but I also do not know what is the exact form of these hidden criteria. This is said not to blame anyone -- except the ignorant people who are not aware of the existence of these things and just keep repeating completely false and unhelpful advice for Jeremy Rubin and are not self-conscious enough to ever realize what they're doing.

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# Flowi.es At the time I thought [Workflowy][workflowy] had the ideal UI for everything. I wanted to implement my [custom app maker](nostr:naddr1qqyxgcejv5unzd33qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cz3va32) on it, but ended up doing this: a platform for enhancing Workflowy with extra features: - An email reminder based on dates input in items - A website generator, similar to [Websites For Trello](nostr:naddr1qqyrydpkvverwvehqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c9d4yku), also based on [Classless Templates](nostr:naddr1qqyxyv35vymk2vfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cqwgdau) Also, I didn't remember this was also based on CouchDB and had some _couchapp_ functionalities.  - <https://flowi.es> - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/flowies> [workflowy]: <https://workflowy.com/>

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# A big Ethereum problem that is fixed by Drivechain While reading the following paragraphs, assume Drivechain itself will be a "smart contract platform", like Ethereum. And that it won't be used to launch an Ethereum blockchain copy, but instead **each different Ethereum contract could be turned into a different sidechain** under [BIP300](https://bips.xyz/300) rules. ## A big Ethereum problem Anyone can publish any "contract" to Ethereum. Often people will come up with somewhat interesting ideas and publish them. Since they want money they will add an unnecessary token and use that to bring revenue to themselves, gamify the usage of their contract somehow, and keep some control over the supposedly open protocol they've created by keeping a majority of the tokens. They will use the profits on marketing and branding, have a visual identity, a central website and a forum with support personnel and so on: their _somewhat interesting idea_ have become a full-fledged company. If they have success then another company will appear in the space and copy the idea, launch it using exactly the same strategy with a tweak, then try to capture the customers of the first company and new people. And then another, and another, and another. Very often these contracts require some network effect to work, i.e., they require people to be using it so others will use it. The fact that the market is now split into multiple companies offering roughly the same product hurts that, such that none of these protocols get ever enough usage to become _really_ useful in the way they were first conceived. At this point it doesn't matter though, they get some usage, and they use that in their marketing material. It becomes a race to pump the value of the tokens and the current usage is just another point used for that purpose. The company will even start giving out money to attract new users and other weird moves that have no relationship with the initial somewhat intereting idea. Once in a lifetime it happens that the first implementer of these things is not a company seeking profits, but some altruistic developer or company that believes in Ethereum and wants to see it grow -- or more likely someone financed by the Ethereum Foundation, which allegedly doesn't like these token schemes and would prefer everybody to use the token they issued first, the ETH --, but that's a fruitless enterprise because someone else will copy that idea anyway and turn it into a company as described above. ## How Drivechain fixes it In the [Drivechain](nostr:naddr1qq9xgunfwejkx6rpd9hqzythwden5te0ve5kzar2v9nzucm0d5pzqwlsccluhy6xxsr6l9a9uhhxf75g85g8a709tprjcn4e42h053vaqvzqqqr4gumtjfnp) world, if someone had an idea, they would -- as it happens all the time with Bitcoin things -- publish it in a public forum. Other members of the community would evaluate that idea, add or remove things, all interested parties would contribute to make it the best possible incarnation of that idea. Once the design was settled, someone would volunteer to start writing the code to turn that idea into a sidechain. Maybe some company would fund those efforts and then more people would join. It's not a perfect process and one that often involves altruism, but Bitcoin inspires people to do these things. Slowly, the thing would get built, tested, activated as a sidechain on testnet, tested more, and at this point luckily the entire community of interested Bitcoin users and miners would have grown to like that idea and see its benefits. It could then be proposed to be activated according to [BIP300](https://bips.xyz/300) rules. Once it was activated, the entire pool of interested users would join it. And it would be impossible for someone else to create a copy of that because everybody would instantly notice it was a copy. There would be no token, no one profiting directly from the operations of that "smart contract". And everybody would be incentivized to join and tell others to join that same sidechain since the network effect was already the biggest there, they will know more network effect would only be good for everybody involved, and there would be no competing marketing and free token giveaways from competing entities. ## See also - [Upgrading 'Smart Contracts' to 'Wise Contracts'](https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/wise-contracts/), by Paul Sztorc - [Drivechain](nostr:naddr1qq9xgunfwejkx6rpd9hqzythwden5te0ve5kzar2v9nzucm0d5pzqwlsccluhy6xxsr6l9a9uhhxf75g85g8a709tprjcn4e42h053vaqvzqqqr4gumtjfnp) - [Drivechain comparison with Ethereum](nostr:naddr1qqyx2dp58qcx2wpjqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cane7px) - [Alternatives to Drivechain](nostr:naddr1qqyrqenzvvukvcfkqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823csjg2t6)

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# Using Spacechains and Fedimint to solve scaling What if instead of trying to create complicated "layer 2" setups involving noveau cryptographic techniques we just did the following: - we take that Fedimint source code and remove the "mint" stuff, and just use their federation stuff secure coins with multisig; - then we make a spacechain; - and we make the federations issue multisig-btc tokens on it; - and then we put some uniswap-like thing in there to allow these tokens to be exchanged freely. ## Why? The recent spike in fees caused by Ordinals and BRC-20 shitcoinery has shown that Lightning isn't a silver bullet. Channels are too fragile, it costs a lot to open a channel under a high fee environment, to run a routing node and so on. People who want to keep using Lightning are instead flocking to the big Lightning custodial providers: WalletofSatoshi, ZEBEDEE, OpenNode and so on. We could leverage that trust people have in these companies (and individuals) operating shadow Lightning providers and turn each of these into a btc-token issuer. Each issue their own token, transactions flow freely. Each person can hold only assets from the issuers they trust more.

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# contratos.alhur.es A website that allowed people to fill a form and get a standard _Contrato de Locação_. Better than all the other "templates" that float around the internet, which are badly formatted `.doc` files. It was fully programmable so other templates could be added later, but I never did. This website made maybe one dollar in Google Ads (and Google has probably stolen these like so many other dollars they did with their bizarre requirements). - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/contratos> - <http://contratos.alhur.es>

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# Just malinvestiment Traditionally the Austrian Theory of Business Cycles has been explained and reworked in many ways, but the most widely accepted version (or the closest to the Mises or Hayek views) view is that banks (or the central bank) cause the general interest rate to decline by creation of new money and that prompts entrepreneurs to invest in projects of longer duration. This can be confusing because sometimes entrepreneurs embark in very short-time projects during one of these bubbles and still contribute to the overall cycle. The solution is to think about the "longer term" problem is to think of the entire economy going long-term, not individual entrepreneurs. So if one entrepreneur makes an investiment in a thing that looks simple he may actually, knowingly or not, be inserting himself in a bigger machine that is actually involved in producing longer-term things. Incidentally this thinking also solves the biggest criticism of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory: that of the rational expectations people who say: "oh but can't the entrepreneurs know that the interest rate is artificially low and decide to not make long-term investiments?" ("and if they don't know they should lose money and be replaced like in a normal economy flow blablabla?"). Well, the answer is that they are not really relying on the interest rate, they are only looking for profit opportunities, and this is the key to another confusion that has always followed my thinkings about this topic. If a guy opens a bar in an area of a town where many new buildings are being built during a "housing bubble" he may not know, but he is inserting himself right into the eye of that business cycle. He expects all these building projects to continue, and all the people involved in that to be getting paid more and be able to spend more at his bar and so on. That is a bet that may or may not end up paying. Now what does that bar investiment has to do with the interest rate? Nothing. It is just a guy who saw a business opportunity in a place where hungry people with money had no bar to buy things in, so he opened a bar. Additionally the guy has made some calculations about all the ending, starting and future building projects in the area, and then the people that would live or work in that area afterwards (after all the buildings were being built with the expectation of being used) and so on, there is no interest rate calculations involved. And yet that may be a malinvestiment because some building projects will end up being canceled and the expected usage of the finished ones will turn out to be smaller than predicted. This bubble may have been caused by a decline in interest rates that prompted some people to start buying houses that they wouldn't otherwise, but this is just a small detail. The bubble can only be kept going by a constant influx of new money into the economy, but the focus on the interest rate is wrong. If new money is printed and used by the government to buy ships then there will be a boom and a bubble in the ship market, and that involves all the parts of production process of ships and also bars that will be opened near areas of the town where ships are built and new people are being hired with higher salaries to do things that will eventually contribute to the production of ships that will then be sold to the government. It's not interest rates or the length of the production process that matters, it's just printed money and malinvestiment.

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# neuron.vim I started using this [neuron][neuron] thing to create an update this same [zettelkasten](nostr:naddr1qqyrwwfh8yurgefnqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c7qmjrw), but the [existing vim plugin](https://github.com/ihsanturk/neuron.vim) had too many problems, so I forked it and ended up changing almost everything. Since the upstream repository was somewhat abandoned, most users and people who were trying to contribute upstream migrate to my fork too. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/neuron.vim> [neuron]: https://github.com/srid/neuron

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# Reasons why Lightning is not that great Some Bitcoiners, me included, were fooled by hyperbolic discourse that presented Lightning as some magical scaling solution with no flaws. This is an attempt to list some of the actual flaws uncovered after 5 years of experience. The point of this article is not to say Lightning is a complete worthless piece of crap, but only to highlight the fact that Bitcoin needs to put more focus on developing and thinking about other scaling solutions (such as [Drivechain](nostr:naddr1qq9xgunfwejkx6rpd9hqzythwden5te0ve5kzar2v9nzucm0d5pzqwlsccluhy6xxsr6l9a9uhhxf75g85g8a709tprjcn4e42h053vaqvzqqqr4gumtjfnp), less crappy and more decentralized trusted channels networks and [statechains](https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/statechains-sending-keys-not-coins-to-scale-bitcoin-off-chain)). ## Unbearable experience Maintaining a node is cumbersome, you have to deal with closed channels, allocating funds, paying fees unpredictably, choosing new channels to open, storing channel state backups -- or you'll have to delegate all these decisions to some weird AI or third-party services, it's not feasible for normal people. ## Channels fail for no good reason all the time Every time nodes disagree on anything they close channels, there have been dozens, maybe hundreds, of bugs that lead to channels being closed in the past, and implementors have been fixing these bugs, but since these node implementations continue to be worked on and new features continue to be added we can be quite sure that new bugs continue to be introduced. ## Trimmed (fake) HTLCs are not sound protocol design What would you tell me if I presented a protocol that allowed for transfers of users' funds across a network of channels and that these channels would pledge to send the money to miners while the payment was in flight, and that these payments could never be recovered if a node in the middle of the hop had a bug or decided to stop responding? Or that the receiver could receive your payment, but still claim he didn't, and you couldn't prove that at all? These are the properties of "trimmed HTLCs", HTLCs that are uneconomical to have their own UTXO in the channel presigned transaction bundles, therefore are just assumed to be there while they are not (and their amounts are instead added to the fees of the presigned transaction). Trimmed HTLCs, like any other HTLC, have timelocks, preimages and hashes associated with them -- which are properties relevant to the redemption of actual HTLCs onchain --, but unlike actual HTLCs these things have no actual onchain meaning since there is no onchain UTXO associated with them. This is a game of make-believe that only "works" because (1) payment proofs aren't worth anything anyway, so it makes no sense to steal these; (2) channels are too expensive to setup; (3) all Lightning Network users are honest; (4) there are so many bugs and confusion in a Lightning Network node's life that events related to trimmed HTLCs do not get noticed by users. Also, so far these trimmed HTLCs have only been used for very small payments (although very small payments probably account for 99% of the total payments), so it is supposedly "fine" to have them. But, as fees rise, more and more HTLCs tend to become fake, which may make people question the sanity of the design. Tadge Dryja, one of the creators of the Lightning Network proposal, has been critical of the fact that these things were allowed to creep into the BOLT protocol. ## Routing Routing is already very bad today even though most nodes have a basically 100% view of the public network, the reasons being that some nodes are offline, others are on Tor and unreachable or too slow, channels have the balance shifted in the wrong direction, so payments fail a lot -- which leads to the (bad) solution invented by professional node runners and large businesses of probing the network constantly in order to discard bad paths, this creates unnecessary load and increases the risk of channels being dropped for no good reason. As the network grows -- if it indeed grow and not centralize in a few hubs -- routing tends to become harder and harder. While each implementation team makes their own decisions with regard to how to best way to route payments and these decisions may change at anytime, it's worth noting, for example, that CLN will use MPP to split up any payment in any number of chunks of 10k satoshis, supposedly to improve routing success rates. While this often backfires and causes payments to fail when they should have succeeded, it also contributes to making it so there are proportionally more fake HTLCs than there should be, as long as the threshold for fake HTLCs is above 10k. ## Payment proofs are somewhat useless Even though payment proofs were seen by many (including me) as one of the great things about Lightning, the sad fact is that they do not work as proofs if people are not aware of the fact that they are proofs. Wallets do all they can to hide these details from users because it is considered "bad UX" and low-level implementors do not care very much to talk about them at all. There have been attempts from Lightning Labs to get rid of the payment proofs entirely (which at the time to me sounded like a terrible idea, but now I realize they were not wrong). Here's a piece of anecdote: I've personally witnessed multiple episodes in which Phoenix wallet released the preimage without having actually received the payment (they did receive a minor part of the payment, but the payment was split in many parts). That caused my service, _@lntxbot_, to mark the outgoing payment as complete, only then to have to endure complaints from the users because the receiver side, Phoenix, had not received the full amount. In these cases, if the protocol and the idea of preimages as payment proofs be respected, should I have been the one in charge of manually fixing user balances? Another important detail: when an HTLC is sent and then something goes wrong with the payment the channel has to be closed in order to redeem that payment. When the redeemer is on the receiver side, the very act of redeeming should cause the preimage to be revealed and a proof of payment to be made available for the sender, who can then send that back to the previous hop and the payment is proven without any doubt. But when this happens for fake HTLCs (which is the vast majority of payments, as noted above) there is no place in the world for a preimage and therefore there are no proofs available. A channel is just closed, the payer loses money but can't prove a payment. It also can't send that proof back to the previous hop so he is forced to say the payment failed -- even if it wasn't him the one who declared that hop a failure and closed the channel, which should be a prerequisite. I wonder if this isn't the source of multiple bugs in implementations that cause channels to be closed unnecessarily. The point is: preimages and payment proofs are mostly a fiction. Another important fact is that the proofs do not really prove anything if the keypair that signs the invoice can't be provably attached to a real world entity. ## LSP-centric design The first Lightning wallets to show up in the market, LND as a desktop daemon (then later with some GUIs on top of it like Zap and Joule) and Anton's BLW and Eclair wallets for mobile devices, then later LND-based mobile wallets like Blixt and RawTX, were all standalone wallets that were self-sufficient and meant to be run directly by consumers. Eventually, though, came Breez and Phoenix and introduced the "LSP" model, in which a server would be trusted in various forms -- not directly with users' funds, but with their privacy, fees and other details -- but most importantly that LSP would be the primary source of channels for all users of that given wallet software. This was all fine, but as time passed new features were designed and implemented that assumed users would be running software connected to LSPs. The very idea of a user having a standalone mobile wallet was put out of question. The entire argument for implementation of the bolt12 standard, for example, hinged on the assumption that mobile wallets would have [LSPs capable of connecting to Google messaging services and being able to "wake up" mobile wallets](https://twitter.com/hampus_s/status/1442493786110705668) in order for them to receive payments. Other ideas, like a complicated standard for allowing mobile wallets to receive payments without having to be online all the time, just [assume LSPs always exist](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-October/003307.html); and changes to the expected BOLT spec behavior with regards to, for example, [probing of mobile wallets](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/pull/4785). Ark is another example of a kind of LSP that got so enshrined that it become a new protocol that depends on it entirely. ## Protocol complexity Even though the general idea of how Lightning is supposed to work can be understood by many people (as long as these people know how Bitcoin works) the Lightning protocol is not really easy: it will take a long time of big dedication for anyone to understand the details about the BOLTs -- this is a bad thing if we want a world of users that have at least an idea of what they are doing. Moreover, with each new cool idea someone has that gets adopted by the protocol leaders, it increases in complexity and some of the implementors are kicked out of the circle, therefore making it easier for the remaining ones to proceed with more and more complexity. It's the same process by which Chrome won the browser wars, kicked out all competitors and proceeded to make a supposedly open protocol, but one that no one can implement as it gets new and more complex features every day, all envisioned by the Chrome team. ## Liquidity issues? I don't believe these are a real problem if all the other things worked, but still the old criticism that Lightning requires parking liquidity and that has a cost is not a complete non-issue, specially given the LSP-centric model.

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# Multi-service Graph Reputation protocol ## The problem 1. Users inside centralized services need to know reputations of other users they're interacting with; 2. Building reputation with ratings imposes a big burden on the user and still accomplishes nothing, can be faked, no one cares about these ratings etc. ## The ideal solution Subjective reputation: reputation based on how you rated that person previously, and how other people you trust rated that person, and how other people trusted by people you trust rated that person and so on, in a web-of-trust that actually can give you some insight on the trustworthiness of someone you never met or interacted with. ## The problem with the ideal solution 1. Most of the times the service that wants to implement this is not as big as Facebook, so it won't have enough people in it for such graphs of reputation to be constructed. 2. It is not trivial to build. ## My proposed solution: I've drafted a protocol for an open system based on services publishing their internal reputation records and indexers using these to build graphs, and then serving the graphs back to the services so they can show them to users when it is needed (as HTTP APIs that can be called directly from the user client app or browser). Crucially, these indexers will gather data from multiple services and cross-link users from these services so the graph is better. <https://github.com/fiatjaf/multi-service-reputation-rfc> The first and single actionable and useful feedback I got, from [@bootstrapbandit](https://twitter.com/bootstrapbandit) was that services shouldn't share email addresses in plain text (email addresses and other external relationships users of a service may have are necessary to establish links from users accross services), but I think it is ok if services publish hashes of these email addresses instead. At some point I will update the spec draft and that may have been before the time you're reading this. Another issue is that services may lie about their reputation records and that will hurt other services and users in these other services that are relying on that data. Maybe indexers will have to do some investigative job here to assert service honesty. Or maybe this entire protocol is just failed and we will actually need a system in which users themselves will publish their own records. ## See also * [P2P reputation thing](nostr:naddr1qqyrqv3cxumnydfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cnjc88q) * [idea: Graph subjective reputation as a service](nostr:naddr1qqyrjdehxymrsdpkqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cal60d8) * <https://github.com/jangerritharms/reputation_systems>

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# doulas.club A full catalog of all Brazilian doulas with data carefully scrapped from many websites that contained partial catalogs and some data manually included. All this packaged as a _Couchapp_ and served directly from **Cloudant**. This was done because the idea of doulas was good, but I spotted an issue: pregnant womwn should know many doulas before choosing one that would match well, therefore a full catalog with a lot of information was necessary. This was a huge amount of work mostly wasted. Many doulas who knew about this didn't like it and sent angry and offensive emails telling me to remove them. This was information one should know before choosing a doula. ### See also - [About CouchDB](nostr:naddr1qqyrwepevf3n2wf5qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c0jq39e)

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# Idéia de um sistema jurídico centralizado, mas com um pouco de lógica um processo, é, essencialmente, imagino eu na minha ingenuidade leiga, um apelo que se faz ao juiz para que este reconheça certos fatos como probantes de um certo fenômeno tipificado por uma certa lei. imagino então o seguinte: uma petição não é mais um enorme documento escrito numa linguagem nojenta com referências a leis e a evidências factuais espalhadas segundo a (in) capacidade ensaística do advogado, mas apenas um esquema lógico - talvez até um diagrama desenhado (ou talvez quem sabe uma série de instruções compreensíveis por um computador?) - mostrando a ligação entre a lei e os fatos e os pedidos, por exemplo: 1. a lei tal diz que ninguém pode vender 2. fulano vendeu cigarros 3. é prova de que fulano vendeu cigarros ia foto tirada na rua tal no dia tal que mostra fulano vendendo cigarros 4. a mesma lei pede que fulano pague uma multa este exemplo está ainda muito verborrágico, mas é só um exemplo simples. coisas mais complicadas precisariam de outras formas de expressão caso queiramos evitar as longas dissertações jurídicas em voga. a idéia é que o esquema acima vale por si. um proto-juiz pode julgá-lo como válido ou inválido apenas pela sua lógica interna. a outra parte do julgamento seria a ligação desse esquema com a realidade externa: anexados à petição viriam as evidências. no caso, anexada ao ponto 3 viria uma foto do fulano. ao ponto 1 também precisa ser anexado o texto da lei referida, mas isto pode ser feito automaticamente pelo número da lei. uma vez que tenhamos um esquema lógico válido um outro proto-juiz, ou vários outros, pode julgar individualmente cada evidência: ver se o texto da lei confere com a interpretação feita no ponto 1, e se a foto anexada ao ponto 3 é mesmo a foto do réu vendendo cigarro e não a de um urso comendo laranjas. cada um desses julgamentos pode ser feito sem que o proto-juiz tenha conhecimento do resto das coisas do processo: o primeiro proto-juiz não precisa ver a foto ou a lei, o segundo não precisa ver o esquema lógico ou a foto, o terceiro não precisa ver a lei nem o esquema lógico, e mesmo assim teríamos um julgamento de procedência ou não da petição ao final, o mais impessoal e provavelmente o mais justo possível. a defesa consistiria em apontar erros no esquema lógico ou falhas no nexo entre a realidade é o esquema. por exemplo: 3. uma foto assim não é uma prova de que fulano vendeu, ele podia estar só passando lá perto. * ele estava de fato só passando lá perto. do que é prova este documento mostrando seu comparecimento a uma aula do curso de direito da UFMG no mesmo horário. --- perdoem-me se estiver falando besteira, mas são 5h e estou ainda dormindo. obviamente há vários pontos problemáticos aí, e quero entendê-los, mas a forma geral me parece bem razoável. o que descrevi acima é uma proposta, digamos, de sistema jurídico que não se diferencia em nada do nosso sistema jurídico atual, exceto na forma (não no sentido escolástico). é também uma tentativa de compreender sua essência. as vantagens desse formato ao atual são muitas: - menos papel, coisas pra ler, repetição infinita de citações legais e longuíssimas dissertações escritas por advogados analfabetos que destroem a língua e a inteligência de todos - diminuição drástica do tempo gasto por cada juiz em cada processo - diminuição do poder de cada juiz (se cada ato de julgamento humano necessário em cada processo pode ser feito por qualquer juiz, sem conhecimento dos outros aspectos do mesmo processo, tudo é muito mais rápido, e cada julgamento desses pode ser feito por vários juízes diferentes, escolhidos aleatoriamente) - diminuição da pomposidade de casa juiz: com menos poder e obrigações maus simples, um juiz não precisa ser mais uma pessoa especial que ganha milhões, pode ser uma pessoa comum, um proto-juiz, ganhando menos (o que possibilitaria até ter mais desses e aumentar a confiabilidade de cada julgamento) - os juízes podem trabalhar da casa deles e a qualquer momento - passa a ter sentido a existência de um sistema digital de processos (porque é ridículo que o sistema digital atual seja só uma forma de passar documentos do Word de um lado para o outro) - o fim das audiências de conciliação, que são uma monstruosidade criada apenas pela necessidade de diminuir a quantidade de processos em tramitação e acabam retirandobo sentido da justiça (as partes são levemente pressionadas a ignorar a validade ou não das suas posições e fazer um acordo, sob pena de o juiz ficar com raiva delas depois) milhares de precauções devem ser tomadas caso um sistema desses vá ser implantado (ahahah), talvez manter uma forma de julgamento tradicional, de corpo presente e com um juiz ou júri que tem conhecimento de toda situação, mas apenas para processos que chegarem até certo ponto, e assim por diante. ## Ver também * [P2P reputation thing](nostr:naddr1qqyrqv3cxumnydfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cnjc88q) para um fundamento de um sistema jurídico anárquico.

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# Why I don't like NIP-26 as a solution for key management NIP-26 was created out of the needs of the Nostr integration at https://minds.com/. They wanted Minds users to be able to associate their "custodial" Nostr key with an external self-owned key. [NIP-26](https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nips/blob/master/26.md) looked like a nice fit for the job, because it would allow supporting clients to associate the two identities _statelessly_ (i.e. by just seeing one event published by Minds but with a delegation tag on it the client would be able to associate that with the self-owned external key without anything else[^1]). The big selling point of NIP-26 (to me) was that it was fully _optional_. Clients were free to not implement it and they would not suffer much. They would just see "bob@minds.com" published this, and "bob-self-owned" published that. They would probably know intuitively that these two were the same person, or not, but it wouldn't be an issue. Both would still be identified as Bob and have a picture, a history and so on. Moreover, this wasn't expected to happen a lot, it would be mostly for the small intersection of people that wanted to have their own keys and also happened to be using one of these "custodial Nostr" platforms like Minds. At some point, though, NIP-26 started to be seen as _the solution for key management_ on Nostr. The idea is that someone will generate a very safe key on a hardware device and guard it as their most precious treasure without it ever touching the internet, and use it just to sign delegation tags. Then use multiple of these delegation tags, one for each different Nostr app, and maybe rotate them every month or so, details are unclear. This breaks the previous expectations I had for NIP-26 entirely, as now these keys become faceless entities that can't be associated with anything _except their "master" key_ (the one that is in cold storage). So in a world in which most Nostr users are using NIP-26 for everything, clients that do not implement NIP-26 become completely useless, as all they will see is a constant stream of random keys. They won't be able to follow anyone or interact with anyone, as these keys will not identify any concrete person on their back, they will vanish all the time and new keys will show up and the world will be chaotic. So now every client must implement NIP-26 to become usable at all, it is not _optional_ anymore. You may argue that making NIP-26 a de facto mandatory NIP isn't a bad thing and is worth the cost, but I think it breaks a lot of the simplicity of the protocol. It would probably be worth the cost if we knew NIP-26 was an actual complete solution, but it definitely is not, it is partial, and not the most elegant thing in the world. I think key management can be solved in multiple different ways that can all work together or not, but most importantly they can all remain optional. More thoughts on these multiple ways can be found at [Thoughts on Nostr key management](nostr:naddr1qqyrwvnxx4jrzef5qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cchlq3c). If I am wrong about all this and we really come to the conclusion that we need a _de facto mandatory **key delegation**_ method for Nostr, so be it -- but in that case, considering that we will break backwards-compatibility anyway, I think there might be a better design than NIP-26, more optimized and easier to implement, I don't know how exactly. But I really think we shouldn't rush that. [^1]: as opposed to other suggestions that would also work, but that would require dealing with multiple events -- for example, the external user could publish a new replaceable event -- or use `kind:0` -- to say they wanted to grandfather the Minds key into their umbrella, while the Minds key would also need to signal its acceptance of that. This also had the problem of requiring changes every time a new replaceable event of such kind was found. Although I am unsure now, at the time me and William agreed this was worse than NIP-26 with the delegation tag.

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# Splitpages The simplest possible service: it splitted PDF pages in half. Created specially to solve the problem of those scanned books that come with two pages side-by-side as if they were a single page and are much harder to read on Kindle because of that.  It required me to learn about Heroku Buildpacks though, and fork or contribute to a Heroku Buildpack that embedded a [mupdf][mupdf] binary. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/splitpages> - <https://splitpages.herokuapp.com/> [mupdf]: <https://mupdf.com/>

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# Criteria for activating Drivechain on Bitcoin [Drivechain](nostr:naddr1qq9xgunfwejkx6rpd9hqzythwden5te0ve5kzar2v9nzucm0d5pzqwlsccluhy6xxsr6l9a9uhhxf75g85g8a709tprjcn4e42h053vaqvzqqqr4gumtjfnp) is, in essence, just a way to give Bitcoin users the option to deposit their coins in a hashrate escrow. If Bitcoin is about coin ownership, in theory there should be no objection from anyone on users having the option to do that: my keys, my coins etc. In other words: even if you think hashrate escrows are a terrible idea and miners will steal all coins from that, you shouldn't care about what other people do with their own money. There are only two reasonable objections that could be raised by normal Bitcoin users against Drivechain: 1. Drivechain adds code complexity to `bitcoind` 2. Drivechain perverts miner incentives of the Bitcoin chain If these two objections can be reasonably answered there remains no reason for not activating the Drivechain soft-fork. ## 1 To address **1** we can just take a look at the code once it's done (which I haven't) but from my understanding the extra validation steps needed for ensuring hashrate escrows work are very minimal and self-contained, they shouldn't affect anything else and the risks of introducing some catastrophic bug are roughly zero (or the same as the risks of any of the dozens of refactors that happen every week on Bitcoin Core). For the BMM/BIP-301 part, again the surface is very small, but we arguably do not need that at all, since [anyprevout](https://anyprevout.xyz/) (once that is merged) enables blind merge-mining in way that is probably better than BIP-301, and that soft-fork is also very simple, plus already loved and accepted by most of the Bitcoin community, implemented and reviewed on Bitcoin Inquisition and is live on the official Bitcoin Core signet. ## 2 To address **2** we must only point that BMM ensures that Bitcoin miners don't have to do any extra work to earn basically all the fees that would come from the sidechain, as competition for mining sidechain blocks would bid the fee paid to Bitcoin miners up to the maximum economical amount. It is irrelevant if there is MEV on the sidechain or not, everything that reaches the Bitcoin chain does that in form of fees paid in a single high-fee transaction paid to any Bitcoin miner, regardless of them knowing about the sidechain or not. Therefore, there are no centralization pressure or pervert mining incentives that can affect Bitcoin land. Sometimes it's argued that Drivechain may facilitate the ocurrence of a transaction paying a fee so high it would create incentives for reorging the Bitcoin chain. There is no reason to believe Drivechain would make this more likely than an actual attack than anyone can already do today or, as has happened, some rich person typing numbers wrong on his wallet. In fact, if a drivechain is consistently paying high fees on its BMM transactions that is an incentive for Bitcoin miners to keep mining those transactions one after the other and not harm the users of sidechain by reorging Bitcoin. Moreover, there are many factors that exist today that can be seen as centralization vectors for Bitcoin mining: arguably one of them is non-blind merge mining, of which we have [a (very convoluted) example on the Stacks shitcoin](https://twitter.com/fiatjaf/status/1684171939298803712), and introducing the possibility of blind merge-mining on Bitcoin would basically remove any reasonable argument for having such schemes, therefore reducing the centralizing factor of them.

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# "Você só aprendeu mesmo uma coisa quando consegue explicar para os outros" Mentira. Tá certo que existe um ponto em que você acha que sabe algo mas não consegue explicar, mas não necessariamente isso significa não saber. Conseguir explicar não depende de saber, mas de verbalizar. Podemos saber muitas coisas sem as conseguir verbalizar. Aliás, para a maior parte das experiências humanas verbalizar é que é a parte difícil. Por último, é importante dizer que a verbalização é uma abstração e portanto quando alguém tenta explicar algo e se força a fazer uma abstração está arriscando substituir a experiência concreta ou mesmo o conhecimento difuso de algo por aquela abstração e com isso ficar mais burro -- me parece que esse é risco é maior quanto mais prematura for a tentativa de explicação e quando mais sucesso a abstração improvisada fizer.

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# There's a problem with using Git concepts for everything We've been seeing a surge in applications that use Git to store other things than code, or that are based on Git concepts and so enable "forking, merging and distributed collaboration" for things like blogs, recipes, literature, music composition, normal files in a filesystem, databases. The problem with all this is they will either: 1. assume the user will commit manually and expect that commit to be composed by a set of meaningful changes, and the commiter will also add a message to the commit, describing that set of meaningful, related changes; or 2. try to make the committing process automatic and hide it from the user, so will producing meaningless commits, based on random changes in many different files (it's not "files" if we are talking about a recipe or rows in a table, but let's say "files" for the sake of clarity) that will probably not be related and not reduceable to a meaningful commit message, or maybe the commit will contain only the changes to a single file, and its commit message would be equivalent to "updated `<name of the file>`". Programmers, when using Git, _think in Git_, i.e., they work with version control in their minds. They try hard to commit together only sets of meaningful and related changes, even when they happen to make unrelated changes in the meantime, and that's why there are commands like `git add -p` and many others. Normal people, to whom many of these git-based tools are intended to (and even programmers when out of their code-world), are much less prone to _think in Git_, and that's why another kind of abstraction for fork-merge-collaborate in non-code environments must be used.

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# Custom spreadsheets The idea was to use it to make an app that would serve as [_custom database for everything_](nostr:naddr1qqyxgcejv5unzd33qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cz3va32) and interact with the spreadsheet so people could play and calculate with their values after they were created by the custom app, something like an MS Access integrated with Excel? My first attempt that worked (I believe there was an attempt before but I have probably deleted it from everywhere) was this `react-microspreadsheet` thing (at the time called `react-spreadsheet` before I donated the npm name to someone who asked): - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/react-microspreadsheet> This was a very good spreadsheet component that did many things current "react spreadsheet" components out there don't do. It had formulas; support for that handle thing that you pulled with the mouse and it autofilled cells with a pattern; it had keyboard navigation with Ctrl, Shift, Ctrl+Shift; it had that thing through which you copy-pasted formulas and they would change their parameters depending on where you pasted them (implemented in a very poor manner because I was using and thinking about Excel in [baby mode][you-suck-at-excel] at the time). Then I tried to make it into "a small sheet you can share" kind of app through assemblymade.com, and eventually as I tried to add more things bugs began to appear. Then there was `cycle6-spreadsheet`: - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/spreadsheet-cycle6> If I remember well this was very similar to the other one, although made almost 2 years after. Despite having the same initial goal of the other (the multi-app custom database thing) it only yielded: - [Sidesheet](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/sidesheet/iheklhbgdljkmijlfajakikbgemncmf), a Chrome extension that opened a spreadsheet on the side of the screen that you could use to make calculations and so on. It worked, but had too many bugs that probably caused me to give up entirely. I'm not sure which of the two spreadsheets above powers <http://sheets.alhur.es>. [you-suck-at-excel]: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nbkaYsR94c>

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# Democracia na América Alexis de Tocqueville escreveu um livro só elogiando o sistema político dos Estados Unidos. E mesmo tendo sido assim, e mesmo tendo escrito o seu livro quase 100 anos antes do mais precoce sinal de decadência da democracia na América, percebeu coisas que até hoje quase ninguém percebe: o mandato da suprema corte é um enorme poder, uma força centralizadora, imune ao voto popular e com poderes altamente indefinidos e por isso mesmo ilimitados. Não sei se ele concluiu, porém, que não existe nem pode existir balanço perfeito entre poderes. Sempre haverá furos. De qualquer maneira, o homem é um gênio apenas por ter percebido isso e outras coisas, como o fato da figura do presidente, também obviamente um elemento centralizador, não ser tão poderosa quanto a figura de um rei da França, por exemplo. Mas ao mesmo tempo, por entre o véu de elogios (sempre muito sóbrios) deixou escapar que provavelmente também achava que não poderia durar para sempre a fraqueza do cargo de presidente. - [Democracy as a failed open-network protocol](nostr:naddr1qqyrxvtxxf3nse3sqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ccyra4y) - [Família e propriedade](nostr:naddr1qqyrwwpnxesnqvmrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c4s2ruz) - [Liberalismo oitocentista](nostr:naddr1qqyr2wfev5uxgwpsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c2z2jc9)

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# P2P reputation thing Each node shares a blob of the reputations they have, which includes a confidence number. The number comes from the fact that reputations are inherited from other nodes they trust and averaged by their confidence in these. Everything is mixed for plausible deniability. By default a node only shares their stuff with people they manually add, to prevent government from crawling everybody's database. Also to each added friend nodes share a different identity/pubkey (like giving a new Bitcoin address for every transaction) (derived from hip32) (and since each identity can only be contacted by one other entity the node filters incoming connections to download their database: "this identity already been used? no, yes, used with which peer?"). ## Network protocol Maybe the data uploader/offerer initiates connection to the receiver over Tor so there's only a Tor address for incoming data, never an address for a data source, i.e. everybody has an address, but only for requesting data. How to request? Post an encrypted message in an IRC room or something similar (better if messages are stored for a while) targeted to the node/identity you want to download from, along with your Tor address. Once the node sees that it checks if you can download and contacts you. The encrypted messages could have the target identity pubkey prefix such that the receiving node could try to decrypt only some if those with some probability of success. Nodes can choose to share with anyone, share only with pre-approved people, share only with people who know one of their addresses/entities (works like a PIN, you give the address to someone in the street, that person can reach you, to the next person you give another address etc., you can even have a public address and share limited data with that). ## Data model Each entry in a database should be in the following format: ``` internal_id : real_world_identifier [, real_world_identifier...] : tag ``` Which means you can either associate one or multiple real world identifier with an internal id and associate the real person designated by these identifiers with a tag. the tag should be part of the standard or maybe negotiated between peers. it can be things like `scammer`, `thief`, `tax collector` etc., or `honest`, `good dentist` etc. defining good enough labels may be tricky. `internal_id` should be created by the user who made the record about the person. At first this is not necessary, but additional bloat can be added to the protocol if the federated automated message posting boards are working in the sense that each user can ask for more information about a given id and the author of that record can contact the person asking for information and deliver free text to them with the given information. For this to work the internal id must be a public key and the information delivered must be signed with the correspondent private key, so the receiver of the information will know it's not just some spammer inventing stuff, but actually the person who originated that record.

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# Token-Curated Registries ## So you want to build a TCR? TCRs (Token Curated Registries) are a construct for maintaining registries on Ethereum. Imagine you have lots of scissor brands and you want a list with only the good scissors. You want to make sure only the good scissors make into that list and not the bad scissors. For that, people will tell you, you can just create a TCR of the best scissors! It works like this: some people have the token, let's call it Scissor Token. Some other person, let's say it's a scissor manufacturer, wants to put his scissor on the list, this guy must acquire some Scissor Tokens and "stake" it. Holders of the Scissor Tokens are allowed to vote on "yes" or "no". If "no", the manufactures loses his tokens to the holders, if "yes" then its tokens are kept in deposit, but his scissor brand gets accepted into the registry. Such a simple process, they say, have strong incentives for being the best possible way of curating a registry of scissors: consumers have the incentive to consult the list because of its high quality; manufacturers have the incentive to buy tokens and apply to join the list because the list is so well-curated and consumers always consult it; token holders want the registry to accept good and reject bad scissors because that good decisions will make the list good for consumers and thus their tokens more valuable, bad decisions will do the contrary. It doesn't make sense, to reject everybody just to grab their tokens, because that would create an incentive against people trying to enter the list. Amazing! How come such a simple system of voting has such enourmous features? Now we can have lists of everything so well-curated, and for that we just need Ethereum tokens! Now let's imagine a different proposal, of my own creation: SPCR, Single-person curated registries. Single-person Curated Registries are equal to TCR, except they don't use Ethereum tokens, it's just a list in a text file kept by a single person. People can apply to join, and they will have to give the single person some amount of money, the single person can reject or accept the proposal and so on. Now let's look at the incentives of SPCR: people will want to consult the registry because it is so well curated; vendors will want to enter the registry because people are consulting it; the single person will want to accept the good and reject the bad applicants because these good decisions are what will make the list valuable. Amazing! How such a single proposal has such enourmous features! SPCR are going to take over the internet! ## What TCR enthusiasts get wrong? TCR people think they can just list a set of incentives for something to work and assume that something will work. Mix that with Ethereum hype and they think theyve found something unique and revolutionary, while in fact they're just making a poor implementation of "democracy" systems that fail almost everywhere. The life is not about listing a set of "incentives" and then considering the problems solved. Almost everybody on the Earth has the incentive for being rich: being rich has a lot of advantages over being poor, however not all people get rich! Why are the incentives failing? Curating lists is a hard problem, it involves a lot of knowledge about the problem that just holding a token won't give you, it involves personal preferences, politics, it involves knowing where is the real limit between "good" and "bad". The Single Person list may have a good result if the single person doing the curation is knowledgeable and honest (yes, you can game the system to accept your uncle's scissors and not their competitor that is much better, for example, without losing the entire list reputation), same thing for TCRs, but it can also fail miserably, and it can appear to be good but be in fact not so good. In all cases, the list entries will reflect the preferences of people choosing and other things that aren't taken into the incentives equation of TCR enthusiasts. ## We don't need lists The most important point to be made, although unrelated to the incentive story, is that we don't need lists. Imagine you're looking for a scissor. You don't want someone to tell if scissor A or B are "good" or "bad", or if A is "better" than B. You want to know if, for your specific situation, or for a class of situations, A will serve well, and do that considering A's price and if A is being sold near you and all that. Scissors are the worst example ever to make this point, but I hope you get it. If you don't, try imagining the same example with schools, doctors, plumbers, food, whatever. Recommendation systems are badly needed in our world, and TCRs don't solve these at all.

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# Lightning and its fake HTLCs Lightning is terrible but can be very good with two tweaks. ## How Lightning would work without HTLCs In a world in which HTLCs didn't exist, Lightning channels would consist only of balances. Each commitment transaction would have two outputs: one for peer `A`, the other for peer `B`, according to the current state of the channel. When a payment was being attempted to go through the channel, peers would just trust each other to update the state when necessary. For example: 1. Channel `AB`'s balances are `A[10:10]B` (in sats); 2. `A` sends a 3sat payment through `B` to `C`; 3. `A` asks `B` to route the payment. Channel `AB` doesn't change at all; 4. `B` sends the payment to `C`, `C` accepts it; 5. Channel `BC` changes from `B[20:5]C` to `B[17:8]C`; 6. `B` notifies `A` the payment was successful, `A` acknowledges that; 7. Channel `AB` changes from `A[10:10]B` to `A[7:13]B`. This in the case of a success, everything is fine, no glitches, no dishonesty. But notice that `A` could have refused to acknowledge that the payment went through, either because of a bug, or because it went offline forever, or because it is malicious. Then the channel `AB` would stay as `A[10:10]B` and `B` would have lost 3 satoshis. ## How Lightning would work with HTLCs HTLCs are introduced to remedy that situation. Now instead of commitment transactions having always only two outputs, one to each peer, now they can have HTLC outputs too. These HTLC outputs could go to either side dependending on the circumstance. Specifically, the peer that is sending the payment can redeem the HTLC after a number of blocks have passed. The peer that is receiving the payment can redeem the HTLC if they are able to provide the preimage to the hash specified in the HTLC. Now the flow is something like this: 1. Channel `AB`'s balances are `A[10:10]B`; 2. `A` sends a 3sat payment through `B` to `C`: 3. `A` asks `B` to route the payment. Their channel changes to `A[7:3:10]B` (the middle number is the HTLC). 4. `B` offers a payment to `C`. Their channel changes from `B[20:5]C` to `B[17:3:5]C`. 5. `C` tells `B` the preimage for that HTLC. Their channel changes from `B[17:3:5]C` to `B[17:8]C`. 6. `B` tells `A` the preimage for that HTLC. Their channel changes from `A[7:3:10]B` to `A[7:13]B`. Now if `A` wants to trick `B` and stop responding `B` doesn't lose money, because `B` knows the preimage, `B` just needs to publish the commitment transaction `A[7:3:10]B`, which gives him 10sat and then redeem the HTLC using the preimage he got from `C`, which gives him 3 sats more. `B` is fine now. In the same way, if `B` stops responding for any reason, `A` won't lose the money it put in that HTLC, it can publish the commitment transaction, get 7 back, then redeem the HTLC after the certain number of blocks have passed and get the other 3 sats back. ## How Lightning doesn't really work The example above about how the HTLCs work is very elegant but has a fatal flaw on it: transaction fees. Each new HTLC added increases the size of the commitment transaction and it requires yet another transaction to be redeemed. If we consider fees of 10000 satoshis that means any HTLC below that is as if it didn't existed because we can't ever redeem it anyway. In fact the Lightning protocol explicitly dictates that if HTLC output amounts are below the fee necessary to redeem them they shouldn't be created. What happens in these cases then? Nothing, the amounts that should be in HTLCs are moved to the commitment transaction miner fee instead. So considering a transaction fee of 10000sat for these HTLCs if one is sending Lightning payments below 10000sat that means they operate according to the _unsafe protocol_ described in the first section above. It is actually worse, because consider what happens in the case a channel in the middle of a route has a glitch or one of the peers is unresponsive. The other node, thinking they are operating in the _trustless protocol_, will proceed to publish the commitment transaction, i.e. close the channel, so they can redeem the HTLC -- only then they find out they are actually in the _unsafe protocol_ realm and there is no HTLC to be redeemed at all and they lose not only the money, but also the channel (which costed a lot of money to open and close, in overall transaction fees). One of the biggest features of the _trustless protocol_ are the payment proofs. Every payment is identified by a hash and whenever the payee releases the preimage relative to that hash that means the payment was complete. The incentives are in place so all nodes in the path pass the preimage back until it reaches the payer, which can then use it as the proof he has sent the payment and the payee has received it. This feature is also lost in the _unsafe protocol_: if a glitch happens or someone goes offline on the preimage's way back then there is no way the preimage will reach the payer because no HTLCs are published and redeemed on the chain. The payee may have received the money but the payer will not know -- but the payee will lose the money sent anyway. ## The end of HTLCs So considering the points above you may be sad because in some cases Lightning doesn't use these magic HTLCs that give meaning to it all. But the fact is that no matter what anyone thinks, HTLCs are destined to be used less and less as time passes. The fact that over time Bitcoin transaction fees tend to rise, and also the fact that multipart payment (MPP) are increasedly being used on Lightning for good, we can expect that soon no HTLC will ever be big enough to be actually worth redeeming and we will be at a point in which not a single HTLC is real and they're all fake. Another thing to note is that the current _unsafe protocol_ kicks out whenever the HTLC amount is below the Bitcoin transaction fee would be to redeem it, but this is not a reasonable algorithm. It is not reasonable to lose a channel and then pay 10000sat in fees to redeem a 10001sat HTLC. At which point does it become reasonable to do it? Probably in an amount many times above that, so it would be reasonable to even increase the threshold above which real HTLCs are made -- thus making their existence more and more rare. These are good things, because we don't actually need HTLCs to make a functional Lightning Network. ## We must embrace the _unsafe protocol_ and make it better So the _unsafe protocol_ is not necessarily very bad, but the way it is being done now is, because it suffers from two big problems: 1. Channels are lost all the time for no reason; 2. No guarantees of the proof-of-payment ever reaching the payer exist. The first problem we fix by just stopping the current practice of closing channels when there are no real HTLCs in them. That, however, creates a new problem -- or actually it exarcebates the second: now that we're not closing channels, what do we do with the expired payments in them? These payments should have either been canceled or fulfilled before some block x, now we're in block x+1, our peer has returned from its offline period and one of us will have to lose the money from that payment. That's fine because it's only 3sat and it's better to just lose 3sat than to lose both the 3sat and the channel anyway, so either one would be happy to eat the loss. Maybe we'll even split it 50/50! No, that doesn't work, because it creates an attack vector with peers becoming unresponsive on purpose on one side of the route and actually failing/fulfilling the payment on the other side and making a profit with that. So we actually need to know who is to blame on these payments, even if we are not going to act on that imediatelly: we need some kind of arbiter that both peers can trust, such that if one peer is trying to send the preimage or the cancellation to the other and the other is unresponsive, when the unresponsive peer comes back, the arbiter can tell them they are to blame, so they can willfully eat the loss and the channel can continue. Both peers are happy this way. If the unresponsive peer doesn't accept what the arbiter says then the peer that was operating correctly can assume the unresponsive peer is malicious and close the channel, and then blacklist it and never again open a channel with a peer they know is malicious. Again, the differences between this scheme and the current Lightning Network are that: a. In the current Lightning we always close channels, in this scheme we only close channels in case someone is malicious or in other worst case scenarios (the arbiter is unresponsive, for example). b. In the current Lightning we close the channels without having any clue on who is to blame for that, then we just proceed to reopen a channel with that same peer even in the case they were actively trying to harm us before. ## What is missing? An arbiter. The Bitcoin blockchain is the ideal arbiter, it works in the best possible way if we follow the _trustless protocol_, but as we've seen we can't use the Bitcoin blockchain because it is expensive. Therefore we need a new arbiter. That is the hard part, but not unsolvable. Notice that we don't need an absolutely perfect arbiter, anything is better than nothing, really, even an unreliable arbiter that is offline half of the day is better than what we have today, or an arbiter that lies, an arbiter that charges some satoshis for each resolution, anything. Here are some suggestions: - random nodes from the network selected by an algorithm that both peers agree to, so they can't cheat by selecting themselves. The only thing these nodes have to do is to store data from one peer, try to retransmit it to the other peer and record the results for some time. - a set of nodes preselected by the two peers when the channel is being opened -- same as above, but with more handpicked-trust involved. - some third-party cloud storage or notification provider with guarantees of having open data in it and some public log-keeping, like Twitter, GitHub or a [Nostr](https://github.com/fiatjaf/nostr) relay; - peers that get paid to do the job, selected by the fact that they own some token (I know this is stepping too close to the shitcoin territory, but could be an idea) issued in a [Spacechain](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2ow4Q34Jeg); - a Spacechain itself, serving only as the storage for a bunch of `OP_RETURN`s that are published and tracked by these Lightning peers whenever there is an issue (this looks wrong, but could work). ## Key points 1. Lightning with HTLC-based routing was a cool idea, but it wasn't ever really feasible. 2. HTLCs are going to be abandoned and that's the natural course of things. 3. It is actually good that HTLCs are being abandoned, but 4. We must change the protocol to account for the existence of fake HTLCs and thus make the bulk of the Lightning Network usage viable again. ## See also - [Ripple and the problem of the decentralized commit](nostr:naddr1qqyrxcmzxa3nxv34qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cjrqar6) - [The Lightning Network solves the problem of the decentralized commit](nostr:naddr1qqyx2vekxg6rsvejqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ccs2twc)

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# idea: "numbeo" with satoshis This site has a crowdsourced database of cost-of-living in many countries and cities: <https://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/> and it sells the data people write there freely. It's wrong! Could be an fruitful idea to pay satoshis for people to provide data.

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# gravity IPFS is nice as a personal archiving tool (edit: it's not). You store a bunch of data and make it available to the public. The problem is that no one will ever know you have that data, therefore you need a place to publish it somewhere. Gravity was an attempt of being the tool for this job. It was a website that showcased the collections from users, and it was also a command-line client that used your IPFS keys for authentication and allowed you to paste IPFS URIs and names and descriptions. The site was intended to be easy to run so you could have multiple stellar bodies aggregating content and interact with them all in a standardized manner. It also had an ActivityPub/"fediverse" integration so people could follow Gravity server users from Mastodon and friends and see new data they published as "tweets". - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/gravity> ## See also - [How IPFS is broken](nostr:naddr1qqyxgdfsxvck2dtzqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c8y87ll) - [litepub](nostr:naddr1qqyxzcecxs6x2c3sqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823czz6dgn)

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# notes on "Economic Action Beyond the Extent of the Market", Per Bylund Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7St6pCipCB0> Markets work by dividing labour, but that's not as easy as it seems in the Adam Smith's example of a pin factory, because 1. a pin factory is not a market, so there is some guidance and orientation, some sort of central planning, inside there that a market doesn't have; 2. it is not clear how exactly the production process will be divided, it is not obvious as in "you cut the thread, I plug the head". Dividing the labour may produce efficiency, but it also makes each independent worker in the process more fragile, as they become dependent on the others. This is partially solved by having a lot of different workers, so you do not depend on only one. If you have many, however, they must agree on where one part of the production process starts and where it ends, otherwise one's outputs will not necessarily coincide with other's inputs, and everything is more-or-less broken. That means some level of standardization is needed. And indeed the market has constant incentives to standardization. The statist economist discourse about standardization is that only when the government comes with a law that creates some sort of standardization then economic development can flourish, but in fact the market creates standardization all the time. Some examples of standardization include: * programming languages, operating systems, internet protocols, CPU architectures; * plates, forks, knifes, glasses, tables, chairs, beds, mattresses, bathrooms; * building with concrete, brick and mortar; * money; * musical instruments; * light bulbs; * CD, DVD, VHS formats and others alike; * services that go into every production process, like lunch services, restaurants, bakeries, cleaning services, security services, secretaries, attendants, porters; * multipurpose steel bars; * practically any tool that normal people use and require a little experience to get going, like a drilling machine or a sanding machine; etc. Of course it is not that you find standardization in all places. Specially when the market is smaller or new, standardization may have not arrived. There remains the truth, however, that division of labour has the potential of doing good. More than that: every time there are more than one worker doing the same job in the same place of a division of labour chain, there's incentive to create a new subdivision of labour. From the fact that there are at least more than one person doing the same job as another in our society we must conclude that someone must come up with an insight about an efficient way to divide the labour between these workers (and probably actually implement it), that hasn't happened for all kinds of jobs. But to come up with division of labour outside of a factory, some market actors must come up with a way of dividing the labour, actually, determining where will one labour stop and other start (and that almost always needs some adjustments and in fact extra labour to hit the tips), and also these actors must bear the uncertainty and fragility that division of labour brings when there are not a lot of different workers and standardization and all that. In fact, when an entrepreneur comes with a radical new service to the market, a service that does not fit in the current standard of division of labour, he must explain to his potential buyers what is the service and how the buyer can benefit from it and what he will have to do to adapt its current production process to bear with that new service. That's has happened not long ago with * services that take food orders from the internet and relay these to the restaurants; * hostels for cheap accommodation for young travellers; * Uber, Airbnb, services that take orders and bring homemade food from homes to consumers and similars; * all kinds of software-as-a-service; * electronic monitoring service for power generators; * mining planning and mining planning software; and many other industry-specific services. ## See also * [Profits, not wages, as the originary factor](nostr:naddr1qqyrge3hxa3rqce4qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c7x67pu) * [Per Bylund's insight](nostr:naddr1qqyxvdtzxscxzcenqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cuq3unj)

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# Veterano não é dono de bixete "VETERANO NÃO É DONO DE BIXETE". A frase em letras garrafais chama a atenção dos transeuntes neófitos. Paira sobre um cartaz amarelo que lista várias reclamações contra os "trotes machistas", que, na opinião do responsável pelo cartaz, "não é brincadeira, é opressão". Eis aí um bizarro exemplo de como são as coisas: primeiro todos os universitários aprovam a idéia do trote, apoiam sua realização e até mesmo desejam sofrer o trote -- com a condição de o poderem aplicar eles mesmos depois --, louvam as maravilhas do mundo universitário, onde a suprema sabedoria se esconde atrás de rituais iniciáticos fora do alcance da imaginação do homem comum e rude, do pobre e do filhinho-de-papai das faculdades privadas; em suma: fomentam os mais baixos, os mais animalescos instintos, a crueldade primordial, destroem em si mesmos e nos colegas quaisquer valores civilizatórios que tivessem sobrado ali, ficando todos indistingüíveis de macacos agressivos e tarados. Depois vêm aí com um cartaz protestar contra os assédios -- que sem dúvida acontecem em larguíssima escala -- sofridos pelas calouras de 17 anos e que, sendo também novatas no mundo universitário, ainda conservam um pouco de discernimento e pudor. A incompreensão do fenômeno, porém, é tão grande, que os trotes não são identificados como um problema mental, uma doença que deve ser tratada e eliminada, mas como um sintoma da opressão machista dos homens às mulheres, um produto desta civilização paternalista que, desde que Deus é chamado "o Pai" e não "a Mãe", corrompe a benéfica, pura e angélica natureza do homem primitivo e o torna esta tão torpe criatura. Na opinião dos autores desse cartaz é preciso, pois, continuar a destruir o que resta da cultura ocidental, e então esperar que haja trotes menos opressores.

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# A crappy zk-rollups explanation attempt (Considering the example of zksync.io) (Also, don't believe me on any of this.) 1. They are sidechains. 2. You move tokens to the sidechain by depositing it on an Ethereum contract. Then your account is credited in the sidechain balance. 3. Then you can make payments inside the sidechain by signing transactions and sending them to a central operator. 4. The central operator takes transactions from a bunch of people, computes the new sidechain balances state and publishes a hash of that state to the Ethereum contract. 5. The idea is that a single transaction in the blockchain contains a bunch of sidechain transactions. 6. The operator also sends to the contract an abbreviated list of the sidechain transactions. The trick is making all signatures condensed in a single zero-knowledge proof which is enough for the contract to verify that the transition from the previous state to the new is good. 7. Apparently they can fit 500 sidechain transactions in one mainchain transaction (each is 12 bytes). So I believe it's fair to say all this zk-rollup fancyness could be translated into "a system for aggregating transactions". 8. I don't understand how the zero-knowledge proof works, but in this case it is a SNARK and requires a trusted setup, which I imagine is similar to [this one](https://petertodd.org/2016/cypherpunk-desert-bus-zcash-trusted-setup-ceremony). * [On "zk-rollups" applied to Bitcoin](nostr:naddr1qqyrzd3jvymkxve5qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c2c9rut)

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# Rede Relâmpago Ao se referir à _Lightning Network_ do [O que é Bitcoin?](nostr:naddr1qqrky6t5vdhkjmspz9mhxue69uhkv6tpw34xze3wvdhk6q3q80cvv07tjdrrgpa0j7j7tmnyl2yr6yr7l8j4s3evf6u64th6gkwsxpqqqp65wp3k3fu), nós, brasileiros e portugueses, devemos usar o termo "Relâmpago" ou "Rede Relâmpago". "Relâmpago" é uma palavra bonita e apropriada, e fácil de pronunciar por todos os nossos compatriotas. Chega de anglicismos desnecessários. Exemplo de uma conversa hipotética no Brasil usando esta nomenclatura: – Posso pagar com Relâmpago? – Opa, claro! Vou gerar um boleto aqui pra você. Repare que é bem mais natural e fácil do que a outra alternativa: – Posso pagar com láitenim? – Leite ninho?

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# Haskell Monoids You've seen that `<>` syntax and noticed it is imported from `Data.Monoid`? I've always thought `<>` was a pretty complex mathematical function and it was very odd that people were using it for `Text` values, like `"whatever " <> textValue <> " end."`. It turns out `Text` is a Monoid. That means it implements the Monoid class (or typeclass), that means it has a particular way of being concatenated. Any list could be a Monoid, any abstraction you can think of for which it makes sense to concatenate could be a Monoid, and it would use the same `<>` syntax. What exactly `<>` would do with that value when concatenating depends on its typeclass implementation of Monoid. We can assume, for example, that `Text` implements Monoid by just joining the text bytes, and now we can use `<>` without getting puzzled about it.

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# Truthcoin as a spacechain To be clear, the term "spacechain" here refers only to the general concept of [blindly merge-mined (BMM)](https://gist.github.com/RubenSomsen/5e4be6d18e5fa526b17d8b34906b16a5) chains without a native money-token, not including the ["spacecoins"](https://medium.com/@RubenSomsen/21-million-bitcoins-to-rule-all-sidechains-the-perpetual-one-way-peg-96cb2f8ac302). The basic idea is that for [Truthcoin/Hivemind](https://bitcoinhivemind.com/) to work we need 1. Balances of Votecoin tokens, i.e. a way to keep track of who owns how much of the _oracle corporation_; 2. Bitcoin tokens to be used for buying and selling prediction market shares, i.e. money to gamble; 3. A blockchain, i.e. some timestamping service that emits blocks ordered with transactions and can keep track of internal state and change the state -- including the balances of the Votecoin tokens and of the Bitcoin tokens that are assigned to individual prediction markets according to predefined rules; A spacechain, i.e. a blindly merge-mined chain, gives us 1 and 3. We can just write any logic for that and that should be very easy. It doesn't give us 2, and it also has the problem of how the spacechain users can pay the spacechain miners (which is why the spacecoins were envisioned in the first place, but we don't have spacecoins here). But remember we have votecoins already. Votecoins (VTC) should represent a share in the _oracle corporation_, which means they entitle their holders to some revenue -- even though they also burden their holders with the duty to vote in event outcomes (at the risk of losing part of their own votecoin balance) --, and they can be exchanged, so we can assume they will have _some_ value. So we could in theory use these valuable tokens to pay the spacechain miners. That wouldn't be great because it pervert their original purpose and wouldn't solve the problem 2 from above -- unless we also used the votecoins to bet in which case they wouldn't be just another shitcoin in the planet with no network effect competing against Bitcoin and would just cause harm to humanity. What we can do instead is to create a native mechanism for issuing virtual Bitcoin tokens (vBTC) in this chain, collaterized by votecoins, then we can use these vBTC to both gamble (solve problem 2) and pay miners (fix the hole in the spacechain BMM design). For example, considering the VTC to be worth 0.001 BTC, any VTC holder could put 0.005 VTC and get 0.001 vBTC, then use to gamble or sell to others who want to gamble. The VTC holder still technically owns the VTC and can and must still participate in the oracle decisions. They just have to pay the BTC back before they can claim their VTC back if they want to send it elsewhere. They stand to gain by selling vBTC if there is a premium for vBTC over BTC (i.e. people want to gamble) and then rebuying vBTC back once that premium goes away or reverts itself. For this scheme to work the chain must know the exchange rate between VTC and BTC, which can be provided by the _oracle corporation_ itself.

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# O mito do objetivo O insight [deste cara](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXQPL9GooyI) segundo o qual buscar objetivos fixos, além de matar a criatividade, ainda não consegue atingir o tal objetivo -- que é uma coisa na qual eu sempre acreditei, embora sem muitas confirmações e (talvez por isso) sem dizê-lo abertamente --, combina com a idéia geral de que todas as estruturas sociais que valem alguma coisa surgem do jogo e brincadeira. A seriedade, que é o oposto da brincadeira, é representada aqui pelo objetivo. Pessoas muito sérias com um planejamento e um objetivo final, tudo esquematizado. --- Na verdade esse insight é bem manjado. Até eu mesmo já o tinha mencionado, citando Taleb em [Processos Antifrágeis](nostr:naddr1qqyryv3hxfsnvvm9qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c5jshx7). E finalmente há esta tirinha que eu achei aleatoriamente e que bem o representa: [](https://dilbert.com/strip/2004-04-17)

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# A prediction market as a distributed set of oracle federations See also: [Truthcoin as a spacechain](nostr:naddr1qqyrqcfsxumrsvmpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823chvhy2j). This is not Truthcoin, but hopefully the essence of what makes it good is present here: permissionless, uncensorable prediction markets for fun, profit, making cheap talk expensive and revolutionizing the emergence and diffusion of knowledge in society. ## The idea The idea is just to reuse Fedimint's codebase to implement federated _oracle corporations_ that will host individual prediction markets inside them. Pegging in and out of a federation can be done through Lightning gateways, and once inside the federation users can buy and sell shares of individual markets using a native LMSR market-maker. Then we make a decentralized directory of these bets using something simple like [Nostr](https://github.com/nostr-protocol/nostr) so everybody can just join any market very easily. ## Why? The premise of this idea is that we can't have a centralized prediction market platform because governments will shut it down, but we can instead have a pseudonymous _oracle corporation_ that also holds the funds being gambled at each time in a multisig Bitcoin wallet and hope for the best. Each corporation may exist to host a single market and then vanish afterwards -- its members returning later to form a new corporation and host a new market before leaving again. There is custodial risk, but the fact that the members may accrue reputation as the time passes and that this is not one big giant multisig holding all the funds of everybody but one multisig for each market makes it so this is slightly better. In any case, no massive amounts are expected to be used in this scheme, which defeats some of the use cases of prediction markets (funding public goods, for example), but since these are so advanced and society is not yet ready for them, we can leave them for later and first just try to get some sports betting working. This proto-truthcoin implementation should work just well enough to increase the appetite of bitcoiners and society in general for more powerful prediction markets. ## Why is this better than DLCs? Because DLCs have no liquidity. In their current implementations _and in all future plans from DLC enthusiasts_ they don't even have **order books**. They're not seen very much as general-purpose prediction markets, but mostly as a way to create monetary instruments and derivatives. They could work as prediction markets, but then they would need order books and order books are terrible for liquidity. LMSR market makers are much better. ## But it is custodial! If you make a public order book tied to known oracles using a DLC the oracle may also be considered custodial since it becomes really easy for him to join multiple trades as a counterpart then lie and steal the money. The bets only really "discreet" if they're illiquid meaningless bets between two guys. If they're happening in a well-known public place they're not discreet anymore. DLC proponents may say this can be improved by users using multiple oracles and forming effectively a federation between them, but that is hardly different from choosing a reputable _oracle corporation_ in this scheme and trusting that for the life of the bet. ## But [Hivemind](https://bitcoinhivemind.com) is better! Yes.

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# Liberalismo oitocentista Quando comecei a ler sobre "liberalismo" na internet havia sempre umas listas de livros recomendados, uns Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman e Alexis de Tocqueville. "A Democracia na América". Pra mim parecia estranho aquele papo de democracia quando eu estava interessado era em como funcionaria um mercado livre, sem regulações e tal. Parece que Tocqueville era uma herança do mesmo povo que adorava a expressão "liberalismo clássico". O liberalismo clássico era uma coisa política que ia contra a monarquia e em favor da democracia, e aí Tocqueville se encaixava muito bem. Poucos anos se passaram e tudo mudou. Agora acho que alguém lendo na internet não vai ver menção nenhuma a Tocqueville ou liberalismo clássico, essa chatice de democracia e suas [chatices legalistas](nostr:naddr1qqyr2df58qekxce3qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c0n53d9). O "libertarianismo", também um nome infeliz, tomou conta de tudo, e cresceu muito mais do que o movimento liberal-da-internet jamais imaginou que seria possível. Os libertários brasileiros são anarquistas, detestam a democracia, reconhecem nela um [vetor de ataque](nostr:naddr1qqyrxvtxxf3nse3sqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ccyra4y) dos socialistas a qualquer pontinha de livre-mercado que exista -- e às liberdades individuais dos cidadãos (este aqui ainda um ponto em comum com os liberais oitocentistas). São inclusive muito mais propensos a defender a monarquia do que a democracia. E isso é uma coisa boa. Finalmente uma pessoa pode defender princípios razoáveis de livre-mercado e individualismo sem precisar se associar com o movimento setecentistas e oitocentista que fez coisas boas, mas também foi responsável por coisas horríveis como a revolução francesa e todos os seus absurdos, e de onde saiu todo o movimento socialista. - [Democracia na América](nostr:naddr1qqyrzc3ev3jn2vrpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c8ynvrd)

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# tempreites My first library to get stars on GitHub, was a very stupid templating library that used just HTML and HTML attributes ("DSL-free"). I was inspired by <http://microjs.com/> at the time and ended up not using the library. Probably no one ever did. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/tempreites>

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# Money Supply Measurement What if we measured money supply measured by probability of being spent -- or how near it is to the point in which it is spent? bonds could be money if they're treated as that by their owners, but they are likely to be not near the spendpoint as cash, other assets can also be considered money but they might be even farther.

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 A command line utility to create and manage personal graphs, then write them to dot and make images with graphviz. It manages a bunch of YAML files, one for each entity in the graph. Each file lists the incoming and outgoing links it has (could have listen only the outgoing, now that I'm tihnking about it). Each run of the tool lets you select from existing nodes or add new ones to generate a single link type from one to one, one to many, many to one or many to many -- then updates the YAML files accordingly. It also includes a command that generates graphs with graphviz, and it can accept a template file that lets you customize the `dot` that is generated and thus the graphviz graph. # rel - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/rel>

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# A flexibilidade da doutrina socialista Os fatos da revolução russa mostram que Lênin e seus amigos bolcheviques não eram só psicopatas assassinos: eles realmente acreditavam que estavam fazendo o certo. Talvez depois de um tempo o foco deles tenha mudado mais para o lado de se preocuparem menos com a vida e o bem-estar dos outros do que com eles mesmos, mas não houve uma mudança fundamental. Ao mesmo tempo, a doutrina socialista na qual eles acreditavam era enormemente flexível, assim como a dos esquerdistas de hoje. É a mesma doutrina: uma coleção de slogans que pode ser adaptada para apoiar ou ir contra qualquer outra tese ou ação. Me parece que a justificativa que eles encontraram para fazer tantas coisas claramente ruins vem dessas mesma flexibilidade. Os atos cruéis estavam todos justificados pela mesma coleção de slogans socialistas de sempre, apenas adaptados às circunstâncias. Será que uma doutrina mais sólida se prestaria a essas atrocidades? Se concluirmos que a flexibilidade vem da mente e não da doutrina em si, sim, mas não acho que venha daí, porque é sempre o socialismo que é flexível, nunca nenhuma outra doutrina. Ou, na verdade, o socialismo é tão flexível que ele envolve e integra qualquer outra doutrina que seja minimamente compatível. Talvez a flexibilidade esteja mesmo na mente, mas existe alguma relação entre a mente que desconhece a coerência e a lógica e a mente que se deixa atrair pelos slogans socialistas.

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# "House" dos economistas e o Estado Falta um gênio pra produzir um seriado tipo House só que com economistas. O House do seriado seria um austríaco é o "everybody lies" seria uma premissa segundo a qual o Estado é sempre a causa de todos os problemas. Situações bem cabeludas poderiam ser apresentadas de maneira que parecesse muito que a causa era ganância ou o mau-caratismo dos agentes, mas na investigação quase sempre se descobriria que a causa era o Estado. Parece ridículo, mas se eu descrevesse House assim aqui também pareceria. A execução é que importa.

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# How to attack Bitcoin, Anthony Towns' take In his [Bitcoin in 2021](http://www.erisian.com.au/wordpress/2021/01/07/bitcoin-in-2021) blog post, Anthony Towns lists some strategies that can be used to attack Bitcoin without it looking like an attack: 1. Big companies centralizing funding on them. If a big company like Square, for example, pays most of the development work it can pretty much control the focus of the project and what PRs will be prioritized and what will be ostracized (and they could even make it look like multiple companies are doing it when in fact all the money and power is coming from a single one). 2. Attackers "willing to put in the time to establish themselves as Bitcoin contributors", which is an effort some individuals may be doing, and a big company like Square can fund. 3. Creating changes that seem to improve things but are ultimately unnecessary and introducing deliberate vulnerabilities there. All these vulnerabilities are super hard to spot even by the most experienced reviewers. 4. Creating more and more changes, and making them all pristine and correct, exhausting all the patience of reviewers, just to introduce a subtle bug somewhere in the middle. The more changes happening, more people will need to review. This gets much worse if for every 10 people 6 or 7 are being funded by the same attacker entity to just generate more noise while purposefully leaving the review work to the other, unpaid honest contributors. 5. Moving code around for the sake of modularization gives an attacker the opportunity to change small things without anyone noticing, because reviewers will be looking at the changes expecting them to be just the same old code moved to other places, not changed. Even harder to spot. 6. Another way of gaining control of the repository and the development process is to bribe out honest developers into making other things, so they'll open up space for malicious developers. For example, if a company like Square started giving grants for Bitcoin Core developers to relax a little and start working on cooler projects of their own choices while getting paid much more, they would very likely accept it. 7. Still another way is to make the experience of some honest contributors very painful and annoying or ostracizing them. He cites what might be happening today with LukeDashjr, one of the most important and competent Bitcoin Core developers, who doesn't get any funding from anyone, despite wanting it and signing up for grant programs.

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# idea: Graph subjective reputation as a service The idea more-or-less coded in <https://github.com/fiatjaf/multi-service-reputation-rfc>, but if it is as good as I think it is, it could be sold for websites without any need for information sharing and without it being an open protocol. It could be used by websites just to show subjective reputations inside their own site (as that isn't so trivial to build, but it is still desirable).

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# hyperscript-go A template rendering library similar to [hyperscript](https://github.com/dominictarr/hyperscript) for Go. Better than writing HTML and Golang templates. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/hyperscript-go> ### See also - [tempreites](nostr:naddr1qqyrgvpjxf3kzep3qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cs7qvaw)

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# Bluesky is a scam Bluesky advertises itself as an open network, they say people won't lose followers or their identity, they advertise themselves as a protocol ("atproto") and because of that they are tricking a lot of people into using them. These three claims are false. ## protocolness Bluesky is a company. "atproto" is the protocol. Supposedly they are two different things, right? Bluesky just releases software that implements the protocol, but others can also do that, it's open! And yet, the protocol has an [official webpage](https://archive.is/ObzJQ) with a waitlist and a private beta? Why is the protocol advertised as a company product? Because it is. The "protocol" is just a description of whatever the Bluesky app and servers do, it can and does change anytime the Bluesky developers decide they want to change it, and it will keep changing for as long as Bluesky apps and servers control the biggest part of the network. Oh, so there is the possibility of other players stepping in and then it becomes an actual interoperable open protocol? Yes, but what is the likelihood of that happening? It is very low. No serious competitor is likely to step in and build serious apps using a protocol that is directly controlled by Bluesky. All we will ever see are small "community" apps made by users and small satellite small businesses -- not unlike the people and companies that write plugins, addons and alternative clients for popular third-party centralized platforms. And last, even if it happens that someone makes an app so good that it displaces the canonical official Bluesky app, then that company may overtake the protocol itself -- not because they're evil, but because there is no way it cannot be like this. ## identity According to [their own documentation](https://archive.ph/CTeRZ), the Bluesky people were looking for an identity system that provided _global ids_, _key rotation_ and _human-readable names_. They must have realized that such properties are not possible in an open and decentralized system, but instead of accepting a tradeoff they decided they wanted all their desired features and threw away the "decentralized" part, [quite literally and explicitly](https://archive.ph/7iBLO) (although they make sure to hide that piece in the middle of a bunch of code and text that very few will read). The "DID Placeholder" method they decided to use for their global identities is nothing more than a normal old boring trusted server controlled by Bluesky that keeps track of who is who and can, at all times, decide to ban a person and deprive them from their identity (they dismissively call a "denial of service attack"). They decided to adopt this method as a placeholder until someone else doesn't invent the impossible alternative that would provide all their desired properties in a decentralized manner -- which is nothing more than a very good excuse: "yes, it's not great now, but it will improve!". ## openness Months after launching their product with an aura of decentralization and openness and getting a bunch of people inside that believed, falsely, they were joining an actually open network, Bluesky has decided to [publish a part of their idea of how other people will be able to join their open network](https://archive.ph/tCRe4). When I first saw their app and how they were very prominently things like _follower counts_, _like counts_ and other things that are typical of centralized networks and can't be reliable or exact on truly open networks (like Nostr), I asked myself how were they going to do that once they became and open "federated" network as they were expected to be. Turns out their decentralization plan is to just allow you, as a writer, to host your own posts on "personal data stores", but not really have any control over the distribution of the posts. All posts go through the Bluesky central server, called BGS, and they decide what to do with it. And you, as a reader, doesn't have any control of what you're reading from either, all you can do is connect to the BGS and ask for posts. If the BGS decides to ban, shadow ban, reorder, miscount, hide, deprioritize, trick or maybe even to serve ads, then you are out of luck. Oh, but anyone can run their own BGS!, they will say. Even in their own blog post announcing the architecture they assert that "it’s a fairly resource-demanding service" and "there may be a few large full-network providers". But I fail to see why even more than one network provider will exist, if Bluesky is already doing that job, and considering the fact there are very little incentives for anyone to switch providers -- because the app does not seem to be at all made to talk to multiple providers, one would have to stop using the reliable, fast and beefy official BGS and start using some half-baked alternative and risk losing access to things. When asked about the possibility of switching, one of Bluesky overlords said: ["it would look something like this: bluesky has gone evil. there's a new alternative called freesky that people are rushing to. I'm switching to freesky"](https://staging.bsky.app/profile/pfrazee.com/post/3juyywfeici2c). The quote is very naïve and sounds like something that could be said about Twitter itself: _"if Twitter is evil you can just run your own social network"_. Both are fallacies because they ignore the network-effect and the fact that people will never fully agree that something is "evil". In fact these two are the fundamental reasons why -- for social networks specifically (and not for other things like commerce) -- we need truly open protocols with no owners and no committees.

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# Empreendendorismo de boteco Há no Brasil, não sei se em algum outro país, esse tipo que acha que sabe tudo e, falando alto e com convicção acaba convencendo todos os que sabem não saber nada. Entre os papéis que pode assumir o sabidão, um dos mais nocivos é o do _empreendedor_, o conhecedor de negócios, o que sabe quanto as coisas valem. Você conhece este homem, caro leitor, ele é aquele que, com sua voz alta e convicta, afirma coisas como "isso dá muito dinheiro" ou "tal empresa ganha dinheiro demais". É aquele que tem a fórmula do dinheiro infinito: "se você quiser ganhar dinheiro é só comprar tal coisa e revender", às vezes adicionando o sufixo "simples!". É também o que têm noção da realidade: "se eu tivesse dinheiro pra investir abriria um tal negócio, dá muito dinheiro", ele sabe que não é qualquer um que pode ser milionário: "mas precisa ter muito capital", diz ele. Em suma, é esse tipo que espalha essa idéia, vinda não sei daonde, de que qualquer empreendimento é coisa simples e que os empresários de sucesso são homens que já tinham dinheiro e que não tiveram dificuldade alguma em multiplicá-lo. Hoje, com a invasão dessas pessoas aos cargos públicos, o Estado vive uma grande fase de empreendendorismo, com "investimentos" em empresas de futuro que "dinamizarão" a economia (ah, as "startups" e todo o seu capital estatal!) e, principalmente, com empreendimentos próprios, como foi o caso, por exemplo, dos estádios para a Copa de 2014: além da propaganda de todos os lados, desde os jornalistas infectados pelo empreendendorismo de boteco que repetiam "os estádios darão muito lucro, pois comportam não-sei-quantas pessoas e ainda podem ser usados para eventos" aos próprios técnicos do governo que faziam contratos com administradoras com cláusulas do tipo "o Estado garante aqui um lucro de 20 bilhões por ano, menos que isto a gente completa" e ainda eram aclamados pela mídia por sua certeza de que 20 bilhões eram pouco.

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# A estrutura lógica do livro didático Todos os livros didáticos e cursos expõem seus conteúdos a partir de uma organização lógica prévia, um esquema de todo o conteúdo que julgam relevante, tudo muito organizadinho em tópicos e subtópicos segundo a ordem lógica que mais se aproxima da ordem natural das coisas. Imagine um sumário de um manual ou livro didático. A minha experiência é a de que esse método serve muito bem para ninguém entender nada. A organização lógica perfeita de um campo de conhecimento é o resultado **final** de um estudo, não o seu início. As pessoas que escrevem esses manuais e dão esses cursos, mesmo quando sabem do que estão falando (um acontecimento aparentemente raro), o fazem a partir do seu próprio ponto de vista, atingido após uma vida de dedicação ao assunto (ou então copiando outros manuais e livros didáticos, o que eu chutaria que é o método mais comum). Para o neófito, a melhor maneira de entender algo é através de imersões em micro-tópicos, sem muita noção da posição daquele tópico na hierarquia geral da ciência. * [Revista Educativa](nostr:naddr1qqyxgvfcxajkxe3cqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cfx0trx), um exemplo de como não ensinar nada às crianças. * [Zettelkasten](nostr:naddr1qqyrwwfh8yurgefnqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c7qmjrw), a ordem surgindo do caos, ao invés de temas se encaixando numa ordem preexistentes.

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# Gold is not useless If there's something all common people believe about gold is that it is useless[^1]. Austrian economists and libertarians in general that argue against central banks or defend a primitive gold standard are often charged with that accusation: that gold is useless, it has no use in the industry, it serves no purpose besides ornamental, so it is a silly commodity, a luxurious one, and that it would be almost immoral to have such a thing in a so central position in an economy such as the position of money. I've seen libertarians in general argue such things as: "it is used in some dental operations", which means people make dental prosthesis of gold, something that fits in same category of jewelry, I would say. There's also the argument of electronic connectors. That's something that appears to be true, but wouldn't suffice the anti-gold arguments. The fact remains that, besides its uses as money -- because gold is still considered to be a form money even now that it doesn't have that position formally in any country (otherwise it wouldn't be considered as an "investment" or "value store" everywhere) -- gold is used mainly for ornamental purposes[^2]. All that is a hassle for libertarians in general. Even the Mises Regression Theory wouldn't solve that problem of people skeptical of gold due to its immoral nature. That problem is solved once you read what is written in the chapter 17 from Richard Cantillon's _Essay on Economic Theory[^3]_ (page 103): > Gold and silver are capable of serving not only the same purpose as tin and copper, but also most of the purposes of lead and iron. They have this further advantage over other metals in that they are not consumed by fire and are so durable that they may be considered permanent. It is not surprising, therefore, that the men who found the other metals useful, valued gold and silver even before they were used in exchange. So gold is indeed useful. Everybody should already know that. You can even do forks and spoons with gold. You can do furniture with gold, and many other useful stuff. As soon as you grasp this, gold is useful again. It is an useful commodity. Answering the next question becomes easy: why isn't anyone making gold forks anywhere? The questioner already knows the answer: because it is too expensive for that. And now the Regression Theory comes with its full force: why is it expensive? Because it has gained a lot of value in the process of becoming money. The value of gold as money is much greater than as a metal used in fork production. --- [^1]: see <http://www.salon.com/2014/02/02/ignore_sean_hannity_gold_is_useless_partner/> or all answers on <https://www.quora.com/Why-is-gold-considered-so-precious-and-why-does-it-have-such-high-prices>. [^2]: this <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold#Modern_applications> section on the Wikipedia page for gold is revealing. [^3]: <https://mises.org/library/essay-economic-theory-0>

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# IPFS problems: Inefficiency Imagine you have two IPFS nodes and unique content, created by you, in the first one. From the second, you can connect to the first and everyhing looks right. You then try to fetch that content. After some seconds it starts coming, the progress bar begins to move, that's slow, very slow, doing an rsync would have been 20 times faster. The progress bar halts. You investigate, the second node is not connected to the first anymore. Why, if that was the only source for the file we're trying to fetch? It remains a mistery to this day. You reconnect manually, the progress bar moves again, halts, you're disconnected again. Instead of reconnecting you decide to add the second node to the first node's "Bootstrap" list. I once tried to run an IPFS node on a VPS and store content on S3. There are two S3 datastore plugins available. After fixing some issues in one of them, recompiling go-ipfs, figuring out how to read settings from the IPFS config file, creating an init profile and recompiling again I got the node running. It worked. My idea was to host a bunch of data on that node. Data would be fetched from S3 on demand so there would be cheap and fast access to it from any IPFS node or gateway. IPFS started doing hundreds of calls to S3 per minute – something I wouldn't have known about if I hadn't inserted some log statements in the plugin code, I mean before the huge AWS bill arrived. Apparently that was part of participation on the DHT. Adjusting some settings turned my node into a listen-only thing as I intended, but I'm not 100% sure it would work as an efficient content provider, and I'll never know, as the memory and CPU usage got too high for my humble VPS and I had to turn it down.

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# As valas comuns de Manaus https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/brasil/cidades/manaus-comeca-a-enterrar-em-valas-coletivas,e7da8b2579e7f032629cf65fa27a11956wd2qblx.html  Todo o Estado do Amazonas tem 193 mortos por Coronavirus, mas essa foto de "valas coletivas" sendo abertas em Manaus tem aproximadamente 500 túmulos. As notícias de "calamidade total" já estão acontecendo pelo menos desde o dia 11 (https://www.oantagonista.com/brasil/manaus-sao-paulo-e-rio-de-janeiro-nao-podem-relaxar-com-as-medidas-de-distanciamento/). O comércio está fechado por decreto desde o final de março (embora a matéria diga que as pessoas não estão respeitando).

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# Cadeias, crimes e cidadãos de bem A idéia de ficar dentro duma dessas penitenciárias superlotadas é aterrorizante para qualquer cidadão de bem, logo, nenhum cidadão de bem comete crimes puníveis dessa maneira. Mas os cidadãos de bem já não os cometeriam de qualquer modo, é um outro tipo de gente, que não o cidadão de bem, que comete os piores crimes (não quero dizer que o "cidadão de bem" é melhor do que o outro absolutamente, estou só usando um conceito mais-ou-menos identificável). O problema disso é que todos esses mesmos cidadãos de bem imaginam que a existência da cadeia e da punição-padrão movida pelo Estado afasta do crime milhões de pessoas que, sem isso, cometeriam crimes horríveis, mas que com isso vivem vidas normais. A verdade, me parece, é que quem fica assim tão aterrorizado com a idéia da cadeia e da punição-padrão é a pessoa que já por natureza não cometeria esses crimes.

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# Reasons for miners to not steal See [Drivechain](nostr:naddr1qq9xgunfwejkx6rpd9hqzythwden5te0ve5kzar2v9nzucm0d5pzqwlsccluhy6xxsr6l9a9uhhxf75g85g8a709tprjcn4e42h053vaqvzqqqr4gumtjfnp) for an introduction. Here we'll just have a list of reasons why miners would not steal: - they will lose future fees from that specific drivechain: you can discount all future fees and condense them into a single present number in order to do some mathematical calculation. - they may lose future fees from all other Drivechains, if the users assume they will steal from those too. - Bitcoin will be devalued if they steal, because: - Bitcoin is worth more if it has Drivechains working, because it is more useful, has more use-cases, more users. Without Drivechains it necessarily has to be worth less. - Bitcoin has more fee revenue if has Drivechains working, which means it has a bigger chance of surviving going forward and being more censorship-resistant and resistant to State attacks, therefore it has to worth more if Drivechains work and less if they don't. - Bitcoin is worth more if the public perception is that Bitcoin miners are friendly and doing their work peacefully instead of being a band of revolted peons that are constantly threating to use their 75% hashrate to do evil things such as: - double-spending attacks; - censoring of transactions for a certain group of people; - selfish mining. - if Bitcoin is devalued its price is bound to fall, meaning that miners will lose on - their future mining rewards; - their ASIC investiment; - the same coins they are trying to steal from the drivechain. - if a mining pool tries to steal, they will risk losing their individual miners to other pools that don't. - whenever a steal attempt begins, the coins in the drivechain will lose value (if the steal attempt is credible their price will drop quite substantially), which means that if a coalition of miners really try to steal, there is an incentive for another coalition of miners to buy some devalued coins and then stop the steal.

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# jq-web I took [`jq`](https://stedolan.github.io/jq/)'s C code and compiled it with [Emscripten](http://kripken.github.io/emscripten-site/), then added a wrapper so it would run on a browser with either `asm.js` or WebAssembly. I believe I needed it for [requesthub.xyz](nostr:naddr1qqyxxdf38ycrswfcqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cal6jdg) but I'm not sure I ever used it there. I also intended to use it on another (secret) project that relied on heavy data manipulation on the client, but it turned out to be too slow for that so I opted to use JavaScript directly. Later I used it for a client-side [Etleneum](nostr:naddr1qqyrjcny8qcn2ve4qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823crwzz2w) simulator, but removed it later as it was impossible to replicate most of the Etleneum functionality on the client so the simulator was too broken and confusing. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/jq-web> ## See also -

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# Software ## 2013 - [tempreites](nostr:naddr1qqyrgvpjxf3kzep3qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cs7qvaw) ## 2014 - [contratos.alhur.es](nostr:naddr1qqyrjde3xd3xgvtrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cg7tgqg) - [microanalytics](nostr:naddr1qqyr2cfcv56nvdtyqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ct57qq4) - [doulas.club](nostr:naddr1qqyxxdec8yerwce4qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823csucsny) - [rosetta.alhur.es](nostr:naddr1qqyxvdmzxu6nscfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c8zu03s) - [Webvatar](nostr:naddr1qqyrje348qexgc3sqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cgqmsck) ## 2015 - [Gerador de tabelas de todos contra todos](nostr:naddr1qqyxxwf58qckvd3jqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cza9wzl) - [questo.email](nostr:naddr1qqyrvvpnveskzvnrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ce8mca6) - [jekmentions](nostr:naddr1qqyrvcmxxgmn2cnpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823crzww00) - [Websites For Trello](nostr:naddr1qqyrydpkvverwvehqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c9d4yku) - [Temperos](nostr:naddr1qqyrvvpevgurzwfeqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cvyhzdz) - [Trello Attachment Editor](nostr:naddr1qqyrzv35vf3ngefsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cl4cxff) - [WelcomeBot](nostr:naddr1qqyrqv3nx4skzdpnqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c8q7km6) - [Classless Templates](nostr:naddr1qqyxyv35vymk2vfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cqwgdau) ## 2016 - [Module Linker](nostr:naddr1qqyx2cejxfnrxwrpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c3w8fr0) - [Boardthreads](nostr:naddr1qqyxvwfk8p3xvdmrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ceq46m6) - [Batch for Trello](nostr:naddr1qqyxxep4vsckydpcqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cqun23v) - [Custom spreadsheets](nostr:naddr1qqyxgvenxycxgcesqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823caghvd9) - [SummaDB](nostr:naddr1qqyxvefkx4jxzv35qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cl55g3s) - [Flowi.es](nostr:naddr1qqyxycn9x5crweryqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c9nlf3h) - [Trelew](nostr:naddr1qqyxgvnxvvunsetrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cku8e7a) - [Washer](nostr:naddr1qqyxgwtzxpnrwv3nqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cseh7t7) - [hyperscript-go](nostr:naddr1qqyxzwpnxyukzvtyqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cmh22hw) - [jiq](nostr:naddr1qqyrqvfjv33rxcenqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cd86z7d) - [busca múltipla na estante virtual](nostr:naddr1qqyrvdt9xq6r2dp5qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cnlqqm3) - [Splitpages](nostr:naddr1qqyxgeryve3nxerrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cdeke65) - [requesthub.xyz](nostr:naddr1qqyxxdf38ycrswfcqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cal6jdg) ## 2017 - [trackingco.de](nostr:naddr1qqyxgwt9xuck2dn9qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cqnzcdc) - [jq-web](nostr:naddr1qqyrzvrzxqcx2dfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c90hqwz) - [Filemap](nostr:naddr1qqyrwcekv33rze3kqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c23ya8a) - [IPFS-dropzone](nostr:naddr1qqyrjvrx8p3xyvesqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cwpfruw) - [sitio](nostr:naddr1qqyrjctyxg6nvepnqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ccsaa3c) - [rel](nostr:naddr1qqyrxvecx43r2wfhqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823crt09d2) ## 2018 - [ijq](nostr:naddr1qqyxzcfhv4jx2vfhqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cyanqcm) - [sitios.xyz](nostr:naddr1qqyrsep48qckyetyqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cdnzkwk) - [hledger-web](nostr:naddr1qqyrsefkvvck2efkqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cffvz7c) - [LessPass remoteStorage](nostr:naddr1qqyrsctpxfjnqepeqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cfa6z2z) - [TiddlyWiki remoteStorage](nostr:naddr1qqyxxve4x33nqerrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cat32d3) - [fieldbook-to-sql](nostr:naddr1qqyrzcmxv4snvvpnqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cj2xnqd) - [jq-finder](nostr:naddr1qqyryvejvycn2cnpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ccw20rx) - [jiq-web](nostr:naddr1qqyxxcf5x33rse3kqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cyttamq) - [superform.xyz](nostr:naddr1qqyx2wpe8p3nzdpkqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c077s2q) - [piln](nostr:naddr1qqyxve3svsmrvwtxqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c29s0he) - [gravity](nostr:naddr1qqyxyet9v5mr2vfkqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cjfzxgy) - [howoldis](nostr:naddr1qqyxge3jvvcr2vejqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ctyq8wc) - [litepub](nostr:naddr1qqyxzcecxs6x2c3sqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823czz6dgn) ## 2019 - [Etleneum](nostr:naddr1qqyrjcny8qcn2ve4qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823crwzz2w) - [@lntxbot](nostr:naddr1qqyrydpex4jnwetxqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cmkr70c) - [mcldsp](nostr:naddr1qqyrvcmyx3skzdpjqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cph0s0j) - [Sparko](nostr:naddr1qqyx2vpnvs6nze3jqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c362tx2) ## 2020 - [lnchannels](nostr:naddr1qqyx2vtrxymxgvt9qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c8wq3qm) - [trustedcoin](nostr:naddr1qqyx2wp4vgekgwfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c04z53s) - [localchat](nostr:naddr1qqyxyetrxcmrjc3cqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cj6vucg)

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# UBI calculations The United States population (counting only people more than 25 years old) is `222098080 people`, the United States GDP is `20807000000000 USD`. The Federal government has received `5845968000000` in taxes in 2019. The standard UBI plan (from Andrew Yang) is to give $1000 to each person every month, which means a total annual expenditure of `2665176960000 USD`, or `12.81%` of the GDP and `45.59%` of all tax money received from the federal government. Mandatory spending (which includes healthcare and social security) corresponds to $2.7 trillion, or `46.18%` of annual receipts. Discretionary spending (which includes education and military stuff) corresponds to $1.3 trillion, or `22.23%` of annual receipts. ## Does it fit? If you are capable of cutting more-or-less all spending in social security (`17.10%` of federal receipts), all military (`11.56%`), all education, transportation, housing, veterans benefits and most other things the federal government does (`11.30%`) and parts of Medicare and Medicaid (`26.17%`) then it will be possible to fit UBI. Welcome to the leftist paradise, one in which the government budget has to be drastically cut in every possible (cruel?) way. ### Data sources - <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States> - <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_United_States#Structure> - <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_spending_in_the_United_States> - <https://www.bea.gov/tools/> - <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-would-andrew-yang-give-americans-1000-per-month-with-this-tax>

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# Como não houve resposta, estou enviando de novo Recebi um email assim, dizendo a mesma coisa repetida. Eu havia recebido já da primeira vez, mas como era só uma informação já esperada, julguei que não precisava responder dizendo "chegou, obrigado!" e não o fiz. Reconheço, porém, que dada a instabilidade desses serviços de email nunca ninguém sabe se a mensagem chegou ou não. Ela pode ter sido jogada na lixeira do spam, ou pode ter falhado por outros motivos, e aí não existe um jeito garantido de saber se houve falha, é um enorme problema sempre. Por isso a necessidade de uma resposta "chegou, obrigado!". Mas não podemos parar por aí. A resposta "chegou, obrigado!" também está sujeita aos mesmos trâmites e riscos da mensagem original. Seria necessário, porém, que assim que a outra pessoa recebesse o "chegou, obrigado!" deveria então responder com um "recebi a sua confirmação". Caso não o fizesse, eu poderia achar que a minha mensagem não havia chegado e dias depois enviá-la de novo: "como não houve resposta à minha confirmação, estou enviando de novo". E assim por diante (eu ia escrever mais um parágrafo só pelo drama, mas desisti. Já deu pra entender). --- - [Ripple and the problem of the decentralized commit](nostr:naddr1qqyrxcmzxa3nxv34qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cjrqar6), esta situação que acabo de viver é mais um exemplo prático disto.

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# GraphQL vs REST Today I saw this: https://github.com/stickfigure/blog/wiki/How-to-(and-how-not-to)-design-REST-APIs And it reminded me why GraphQL is so much better. It has also reminded me why HTTP is so confusing and awful as a protocol, especially as a protocol for structured data APIs, with all its status codes and headers and bodies and querystrings and content-types -- but let's not talk about that for now. People complain about GraphQL being great for frontend developers and bad for backend developers, but I don't know who are these people that apparently love reading guides like the one above of how to properly construct ad-hoc path routers, decide how to properly build the JSON, what to include and in which circumstance, what status codes and headers to use, all without having any idea of what the frontend or the API consumer will want to do with their data. It is a much less stressful environment that one in which we can just actually perform the task and fit the data in a preexistent schema with types and a structure that we don't have to decide again and again while anticipating with very incomplete knowledge the usage of an extraneous person -- i.e., an environment with GraphQL, or something like GraphQL. By the way, I know there are some people that say that these HTTP JSON APIs are not the real REST, but that is irrelevant for now.

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# Sparko This started as a reimplementation of the [Spark Wallet](https://github.com/shesek/spark-wallet) server (which also included the client app, copied directly) because NodeJS isn't a proper way to distribute software to end users and it was also a pain for me to install. I could do a program that ran as a single binary. Then when [c-lightning](https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/) released their plugin infrastructe I made this a plugin. And then introduced fine-grained method authorization for multiple keys, and full-blown [SSE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server-sent_events)-based subscriptions for plugin events. It is a now a single wrapper that can be used to develop apps that talk to a Lightning layer very easily, as well as a simple wallet. It is integrated into [Zeus](https://zeusln.app/), [LNbits](https://github.com/lnbits/lnbits) and <https://tip.bigsun.xyz/>. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/sparko> ## See also - [trustedcoin](nostr:naddr1qqyx2wp4vgekgwfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c04z53s)

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# Google, Uber e ostracismo Pensando sobre como o Google poderia implementar uma solução "pure software" para o problema dos programinhas de carona paga -- já que agora parece que o Waze vai virar tipo um Uber -- me vi pensando em que poderia haver punições bastante severas e para-legais para infratores dos regulamentos internos do serviço. Digamos, por exemplo, que é proibido pelas regras do serviço que o motorista ou o passageiro agridam um ao outro de qualquer maneira. Para ser qualificado como um potencial usuário, tanto o motorista quanto o passageiro devem ser usuários de longa data dos serviços do Google, possuir um email no Gmail com trocentas mensagens sendo recebidas e enviadas todos os dias, um enorme arquivo, coisas guardadas no Google Drive e/ou outros serviços do Google sendo usados. Caso o sujeito agrida o motorista, roube-o ou faça qualquer outra coisa não-permitida, o Google pode, imediatamente, cancelar seu acesso a todos os serviços. Depois, com mais calma, pode-se tentar alguma coisa por meio da justiça estatal, mas essa punição seria tão imediata e tão incondicional (bom, poderia haver um julgamento interno dentro do Google para avaliar o que aconteceu mesmo, mas pronto, nada de milanos na justiça penal e depois uma punição fajuta qualquer.) Esse tipo de punição imediata já desencorajaria a maioria dos infratores, imagino eu. É a própria idéia anarquista da punição por ostracismo. O cara fica excluído da sociedade até que a sociedade (neste caso, o Google) decida perdoá-lo por qualquer motivo. A partir daí é possível imaginar que os outros vários "silos" deste mundo -- Facebook, Vivo, Diamond Mall, SuperNosso -- possam também aderir, caso concordem com o julgamento do Google, e vice-versa, e também impedirem o infrator de usar os seus serviços. Mas o grande tchans disto aqui é que esse processo pode começar com um único agente, desde que ele seja grande o suficiente para que a sua ostracização, sozinha, já seja uma punição quase suficiente para o infrator.

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# Sol e Terra A Terra não gira em torno do Sol. Tudo depende do ponto de referência e não existe um ponto de referência absoluto. Só é melhor dizer que a Terra gira em torno do Sol porque há outros planetas fazendo movimentos análogos e aí fica mais fácil para todo mundo entender os movimentos tomando o Sol como ponto de referência.

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# Problemas com Russell Kirk A idéia central da “política da prudência[^1]” de Russell Kirk me parece muito correta, embora tenha sido melhor formulada pior no seu enorme livro do que em uma pequena frase do joanadarquista Lucas Souza: “o conservadorismo é importante, porque tem muita gente com idéia errada por aí, e nós podemos não saber distingüi-las”. Porém, há alguns problemas que precisam ser esclarecidos, ou melhor explicados, e que me impedem de enxergar os seus argumentos como refutação final do meu já tão humilde (embora feroz) anarquismo. São eles: I Percebo alguma coisa errada, não sei bem onde, entre a afirmação de que toda ideologia é ruim, ou “todas as ideologias causam confusão[^2]”, e a proposta conservadora de “conservar o mundo da ordem que herdamos, ainda que em estado imperfeito, de nossos ancestrais[^3]”. Ora, sem precisar cair em exemplos como o do partido conservador inglês -- que conservava a política inglesa sempre onde estava, e se alternava no governo com o partido trabalhista, que a levava cada vez mais um pouco à esquerda --, está embutida nessa frase, talvez, a idéia, que ao mesmo tempo é clara e ferrenhamente combatida pelos próprios conservadores, de que a história é da humanidade é uma história de progresso linear rumo a uma situação melhor. Querer conservar o mundo da ordem que herdamos significa conservar também os vários erros que podem ter sido cometidos pelos nossos ancestrais mais recentes, e conservá-los mesmo assim, acusando toda e qualquer tentativa de propôr soluções a esses erros de ideologia? Ou será que conservar o mundo da ordem é escolher um período determinado que seja tido como o auge da história humana e tentar restaurá-lo em nosso próprio tempo? Não seria isto ideologia? Ou, ainda, será que conservar o mundo da ordem é selecionar, entre vários períodos do passado, alguns pedaços que o conservador considerar ótimos em cada sociedade, fazer dali uma mistura de sociedade ideal baseada no passado e então tentar implementá-la? Quem saberia dizer quais são as partes certas? II Sobre a questão do que mantém a sociedade civil coesa, Russell Kirk, opondo-a à posição libertária de que o nexo da sociedade é o autointeresse, declara que a posição conservadora é a de que “a sociedade é uma comunidade de almas, que une os mortos, os vivos e os ainda não nascidos, e que se harmoniza por aquilo que Aristóteles chamou de amizade e os cristãos chamam de caridade ou amor ao próximo”. Esta é uma posição muito correta, mas me parece estar em contradição com a defesa do Estado que ele faz na mesma página e na seguinte. O que me parece errado é que a sociedade não pode ser, ao mesmo tempo, uma “comunidade baseada no amor ao próximo” e uma comunidade que “requer não somente que as paixões dos indivíduos sejam subjugadas, mas que, mesmo no povo e no corpo social, bem como nos indivíduos, as inclinações dos homens, amiúde, devam ser frustradas, a vontade controlada e as paixões subjugadas” e, pior, que “isso somente pode ser feito por um poder exterior”. Disto aí podemos tirar que, da mesma forma que Kirk define a posição libertária como sendo a de que o autointeresse é que mantém a sociedade civil coesa, a posição conservadora seria então a de que essa coesão vem apenas do Estado, e não de qualquer ligação entre vivos e mortos, ou do amor ao próximo. Já que, sem o Estado, diz, ele, citando Thomas Hobbes, a condição do homem é “solitária, pobre, sórdida, embrutecida e curta”? [^1]: este é o nome do livro e também um outro nome que ele dá para o próprio conservadorismo (p.99). [^2]: p. 101 [^3]: p. 102

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# mcldsp A tool that migrates data from a [c-lightning](https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/) SQLite3 database into PostgreSQL so one can keep Lightning channels and everything but change the underlying database. It's a mostly manual thing, and I keep following changes in the database schema on c-lightning's GitHub repo so I can update the migration specs whenever needed. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/mcldsp> ## See also - [Sparko](nostr:naddr1qqyx2vpnvs6nze3jqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c362tx2) - [trustedcoin](nostr:naddr1qqyx2wp4vgekgwfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c04z53s)

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# Lightning channels without HTLCs ` **DISCLAIMER**: the following design is flawed and kept only for the history. What follows is a way to design Lightning channels that don't use standalone HTLCs at all: instead the hashlocks _are_ the Settlement transactions themselves, so instead of a Settlement have as many outputs as pending HTLCs, instead they always have 2 outputs: the 2 peers in the channel, but there are as many pairs of Update/Settlement transactions as there are combinations of payments in-flight. It assumes Eltoo exists and there are Update transactions that can attach to any previous Update transaction or to the funding transaction, and Settlement transactions, spendable after a CSV, one for each Update transaction. Instead of explaining more, I'll give some examples. Examples ======== In the following super-simplified notation I'll just treat the combination of Update+Settlement as one "state", otherwise this would be a mess. Consider that Alice and Bob have a channel with a total of 100 BTC. When at rest, their channel state reads as follows: s1[Alice 50 | Bob 50] This is the initial state of the channel. `s1` here means the sequence of this Update/Settlement according to odd SIGHASH_NOINPUT CLTV rules which are abstracted away. In the following cases there will be `s2`, `s3` and so on. Simple case of routed payment ----------------------------- Alice tries to route a payment of 7 BTC through this channel using the hash `h1` = H(`p1`). The previous state is discarded and replaced with the following: - current design: s2[Alice 43 | HTLC(if `p1` then Bob else Alice after some time) 7 | Bob 50] -- where `p1` is the preimage if the payment is fulfilled, Alice gets `p1`, a new state is created as s3[Alice 43 | Bob 57]; if it's canceled the state is replaced with s3[Alice 50 | Bob 50]; if Bob disappears and the timeout expires Alice closes the channel as s2[43|7 to Alice|50]; if Bob has `p1`, Alice disappears and the timeout expires Bob closes the channel as s2[43|7 to Bob|50]. - proposed design Instead of a single state that includes an HTLC as an output, we have two states that both peers will keep: s2[Alice 50 | Bob 50] s3[if `p1` then [Alice 43| Bob 57]] if the payment is fulfilled, Alice gets `p1`, a new state is created as s4[Alice 43 | Bob 57]; if it's canceled the state is replaced with s4[Alice 50 | Bob 50]; if Bob disappears and the timeout expires Alice closes the channel as s2[50|50]; if Bob has `p1`, Alice disappears and the timeout expires Bob closes the channel as s3[43|57]; if Alice closes the channel without talking to Bob, but Bob has `p1`, he publishes s3 after her publishing s2; if Bob closes the channel without talking to Alice she sees `p1` as broadcasted and is fine. A case with 2 payments in-flight -------------------------------- What happens if besides the payment described above Alice then tries to route a new payment of 20 BTC using `h2` = H(`p2`) while the previous is still pending. - current design: I'll skip this as it's basically the same thing but with a new HTLC and everybody knows it. - proposed design: Now the parties have to hold 4 transactions: s2[Alice 50 | Bob 50] s3[if `p1` then [Alice 43 | Bob 57]] s3[if `p2` then [Alice 30 | Bob 70]] s4[if `p1` and `p2` then [Alice 23 | Bob 77]] If one of the payments is fulfilled, or none, the scenarios are basically the same as in the previous case; If Alice gets `p1` and publishes s3[43|57] without waiting for `p2`, then later `p2` comes, Bob can publish s4[23|77] and don't be harmed; Other scenarios should be similar to the previous case. A case with one pending payment in each direction ------------------------------------------------- Now imagine that while Alice is routing the first payment of 7 BTC another payment comes in the opposite direction, for 11 BTC using `h3` = H(`p3`). - current design: I'll skip this as it's basically the same thing but with a new HTLC and everybody knows it. - proposed design: s2[Alice 50 | Bob 50] s3[if `p1` then [Alice 43 | Bob 57]] s3[if `p3` then [Alice 61 | Bob 39]] s4[if `p1` and `p3` then [Alice 54 | Bob 46]] If one of the payments is fulfilled, or none, the scenarios are basically the same as in the previous cases; If Bob gets `p1` and publishes s3[43|57] without waiting for `p3`, then later `p3` comes to Alice, she can publish s4[54|66] and don't be harmed; Other scenarios should be similar to the previous case. A case with 4 pending payments (you can stop reading now) --------------------------------------------------------- Consider now that there are two payments going to one direction and two in the other direction. And now we're going to specify the delay for each payment. The delay means the time for which we'll wait for each to be fulfilled or canceled. `h1`: 7 BTC from Alice to Bob -- delay: 10 blocks `h2`: 20 BTC from Alice to Bob -- delay: 20 blocks `h3`: 11 BTC from Bob to Alice -- delay: 30 blocks `h4`: 5 BTC from Bob To Alice -- delay: 40 blocks Now there are 16 transactions to be stored. The CSV values are given on the Settlement transaction of each of these states, such that Settlements with higher sequence numbers have always time to be published. Since the next payment expiring is the first, which will expire in 10 blocks, this entire "batch of states" have only that time to live. If it doesn't get updated with the fulfillment and/or cancellation of at least one of the pending payments and thus rewritten then the channel must be closed, probably with s2[50|50], to prevent loss of funds. s2[Alice 50 | Bob 50] -- CSV 50 s3[if `p1` then [Alice 43 | Bob 57]] -- CSV: 40 s3[if `p2` then [Alice 30 | Bob 70]] -- CSV: 40 s3[if `p3` then [Alice 61 | Bob 39]] -- CSV: 40 s3[if `p4` then [Alice 65 | Bob 55]] -- CSV: 40 s4[if `p1` and `p2` then [Alice 23 | Bob 77]] -- CSV: 30 s4[if `p1` and `p3` then [Alice 54 | Bob 46]] -- CSV: 30 s4[if `p1` and `p4` then [Alice 48 | Bob 52]] -- CSV: 30 s4[if `p2` and `p3` then [Alice 41 | Bob 59]] -- CSV: 30 s4[if `p2` and `p4` then [Alice 35 | Bob 65]] -- CSV: 30 s4[if `p3` and `p4` then [Alice 66 | Bob 44]] -- CSV: 30 s5[if `p1` and `p2` and `p3` then [Alice 34 | Bob 66]] -- CSV: 20 s5[if `p1` and `p2` and `p4` then [Alice 28 | Bob 72]] -- CSV: 20 s5[if `p1` and `p3` and `p4` then [Alice 59 | Bob 41]] -- CSV: 20 s5[if `p2` and `p3` and `p4` then [Alice 46 | Bob 54]] -- CSV: 20 s6[if `p1` and `p2` and `p3` and `p4` then [Alice 39 | Bob 61]] -- CSV: 10 As in the previous cases, if at any time one peer tries to publish any of the Updates without waiting for remaining payments to be either canceled or fulfilled, the other peer can just wait for the missing preimage to arrive, gather the preimages they already know or which were broadcasted with the transaction and fulfill an Update that is higher in its sequence number. Comments ======== Advantages: * Any payment, no matter how small, is taken into account in the balance, no more trustfulness * My understanding is quite poor, but I feel it's simpler than the current channels and even simpler than Eltoo channels. Drawbacks: * The number of needed stored transactions is 2^n for n payments in-flight. * Big scripts in Settlement transactions that check many hashes are terrible if they ever have to be published. Is it possible to turn them into a single adaptor-signature-magic scriptless script? I hope it is, but have no idea.

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# Ethereum Just bad things. - [Drivechain comparison with Ethereum](nostr:naddr1qqyx2dp58qcx2wpjqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cane7px) - [A crappy zk-rollups explanation attempt](nostr:naddr1qqyxgwfjvsckyc3cqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ckssjjf)

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# questo.email This was a thing done in a brief period I liked the idea of "indiewebcamp", a stupid movement of people saying everybody should have their site and post their lives in it. From the GitHub postmortem: > questo.email was a service that integrated email addresses into the indieweb ecosystem by providing email-to-note and email-to-webmention triggers, which could be used for people to comment through webmention using their email addresses, and be replied, and also for people to send messages from their sites directly to the email addresses of people they knew; Questo also worked as an **IndieAuth** provider that used people's email addresses and **Mozilla Persona**. > > It was live from December 2014 through December 2015. Here's how the home page looked:  - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/questo.email> ### See also - [jekmentions](nostr:naddr1qqyrvcmxxgmn2cnpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823crzww00), another thing related to "indieweb"

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# Etleneum A programmable escrow for satoshis with self-contained stateful micro-apps defined with Lua anyone can create and call to deposit money while simultaneously changing their state. Also known as "the centralized smart contract platform", in opposition to the supposedly "decentralized" Ethereum platform. The "smart contracting" features of Etleneum are very similar to the ones on Ethereum. - <https://etleneum.com/> - <https://www.coindesk.com/why-this-dev-built-a-centralized-ethereum-on-top-of-bitcoins-lightning-network>

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# jekmentions This was a service that took [webmentions][webmentions], an "indiewebcamp" thing and turned them into notes on a special directory of a GitHub repo so they would be turned into rendered comments on a GitHub website rendered by the default Jekyll generator. I ran a server for some time and there were some 2 or 3 people using it besides me. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/jekmentions> [webmentions]: <https://indieweb.org/Webmention>

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# Websites For Trello Names like _"blablabla for trello"_ were the official recommendation from Trello for anyone doing services that integrated with it. This one generated websites from cards and lists on a board. The websites were generated from a fixed HTML template that were possible to be styled using the standard for CSS and JS plugins I've created, [classless](nostr:naddr1qqyxyv35vymk2vfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cqwgdau). It was very complex, used RabbitMQ, a Python tasker that constantly rebuilt the sites on a Postgres database, Trello webhooks, a Go server that just sent the data to the client, I don't remember, but it was terrible design, although it was fun to think of the many branches and complexities of it, but also a huge amount of mostly wasted work. It had some few paying users for a time. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/websites-for-trello> - <https://websitesfortrello.com/> ### See also - [Boardthreads](nostr:naddr1qqyxvwfk8p3xvdmrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ceq46m6)

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# The Lightning Network solves the problem of the decentralized commit Before reading this, see [Ripple and the problem of the decentralized commit](nostr:naddr1qqyrxcmzxa3nxv34qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cjrqar6). The Bitcoin Lightning Network can be thought as a system similar to Ripple: there are conditional IOUs (HTLCs) that are sent in "prepare"-like messages across a route, and a secret `p` that must travel from the final receiver backwards through the route until it reaches the initial sender and possession of that secret serves to prove the payment as well as to make the IOU hold true. The difference is that if one of the parties don't send the "acknowledge" in time, the other has a trusted third-party with its own clock (that is the clock that is valid for everybody involved) to complain immediately at the timeout: the Bitcoin blockchain. If C has `p` and B isn't acknowleding it, C tells the Bitcoin blockchain and it will force the transfer of the amount from B to C. ## Differences (or 1 upside and 3 downside) 1. The Lightning Network differs from a "pure" Ripple network in that when we send a "prepare" message on the Lightning Network, unlike on a pure Ripple network we're not just promising we will owe something -- instead we are putting the money on the table already for the other to get if we are not responsive. 2. The feature above removes the trust element from the equation. We can now have relationships with people we don't trust, as the Bitcoin blockchain will serve as an automated escrow for our conditional payments and no one will be harmed. Therefore it is much easier to build networks and route payments if you don't always require trust relationships. 3. However it introduces the cost of the capital. A ton of capital must be made available in channels and locked in HTLCs so payments can be routed. This leads to potential issues like the ones described in <https://twitter.com/joostjgr/status/1308414364911841281>. 4. Another issue that comes with the necessity of using the Bitcoin blockchain as an arbiter is that it may cost a lot in fees -- much more than the value of the payment that is being disputed -- to enforce it on the blockchain.[^closing-channels-for-nothing] ## Solutions Because the downsides listed above are so real and problematic -- and much more so when attacks from malicious peers are taken into account --, some have argued that the Lightning Network must rely on at least some trust between peers, which partly negate the benefit. The introduction of [purely trust-backend channels](https://gist.github.com/btcontract/d4122a79911eef2620f16b3dfe2850a8) is the next step in the reasoning: if we are trusting already, why not make channels that don't touch the blockchain and don't require peers to commit large amounts of capital? The reason is, again, the ambiguity that comes from [the problem of the decentralized commit](nostr:naddr1qqyrxcmzxa3nxv34qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cjrqar6). Therefore [hosted channels](https://gist.github.com/btcontract/d4122a79911eef2620f16b3dfe2850a8) can be good when trust is required only from one side, like in the final hops of payments, but they cannot work in the middle of routes without eroding trust relationships between peers (however they can be useful if employed as channels between two nodes ran by the same person). The next solution is [a revamped pure Ripple network](nostr:naddr1qqr8yatdwpkx2qg3waehxw309anxjct5dfskvtnrdaksygpm7rrrljungc6q0tuh5hj7ue863q73qlheu4vywtzwhx42a7j9n5psgqqqw4rsfyk3p9), one that solves the problem of the decentralized commit in a different way. [^closing-channels-for-nothing]: That is even true when, for reasons of the payment being so small that it doesn't even deserve an actual HTLC that can be enforced on the chain (as per the protocol), even then the channel between the two nodes will be closed, only to make it very clear that there was a disagreement. Leaving it online would be harmful as one of the peers could repeat the attack again and again. This is a proof that [ambiguity, in case of the pure Ripple network](nostr:naddr1qqyrxcmzxa3nxv34qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cjrqar6), is a very important issue.

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# Boardthreads This was a very badly done service for turning a Trello list into a helpdesk UI. Surprisingly, it had more paying users than [Websites For Trello](nostr:naddr1qqyrydpkvverwvehqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c9d4yku), which I was working on simultaneously and dedicating much more time to it. The Neo4j database I used for this was a very poor choice, it was probably the cause of all the bugs.  -<https://github.com/fiatjaf/boardthreads>

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# The P2SH Wars [This article on the history of P2SH implementation on Bitcoin][battle-for-p2sh] has two valuable lessons and illustrates the benefits of [`bitcoind` decentralization](nostr:naddr1qqyxzcfevscxzvnrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823chus9ym): 1. The benefits of multiple codebases: Russell O’Connor found the bug in `OP_EVAL` while working on it in his alternative Bitcoin software implementation. 2. The dangers of a single master repository with a restricted set of owners: Gavin Andresen committed code for a broken `OP_EVAL` first, then pushed an evil miner activation signaling mechanism that defaulted to his personal preferred P2SH version (to signal the opposite miners would have to edit the code and recompile) and won the battle against a much [better and saner][lukes-tweet] approach (Luke Jr's [`OP_CHECKHASHVERIFY`][bip-17]) by the sole power of inertia: things were already merged and working [so no one bothered to fight][p2sh-votes] for what seemed to be a minor and maybe irrelevant improvement but that later was proven to be substantially better. The second lesson can actually be split in 4 different lessons: a. Maintainer committing a bug and no one noticing it; b. Maintainer committing evil signaling mechanism; c. Everybody going along with everything because it's hard to take a public stand about a central thing everybody loves and the _status quo_ bias exists and is strong; d. Things that look good now may look bad later and vice-versa, no amount of expert "eyes on code" can fix that. [battle-for-p2sh]: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/the-battle-for-p2sh-the-untold-story-of-the-first-bitcoin-war [bip-17]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0017.mediawiki [lukes-tweet]: https://twitter.com/LukeDashjr/status/1138196760290111488 [p2sh-votes]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/P2SH_Votes

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# A violência é uma forma de comunicação A violência é uma forma de comunicação: um serial killer, um pai que bate no filho, uma briga de torcidas, uma sessão de tortura, uma guerra, um assassinato passional, uma briga de bar. Em todos esses se pode enxergar uma mensagem que está tentando ser transmitida, que não foi compreendida pelo outro lado, que não pôde ser expressa, e, quando o transmissor da mensagem sentiu que não podia ser totalmente compreendido em palavras, usou essa outra forma de comunicação. Quando uma ofensa em um bar descamba para uma briga, por exemplo, o que há é claramente uma tentativa de uma ofensa maior ainda pelo lado do que iniciou a primeira, a briga não teria acontecido se ele a tivesse conseguido expressar em palavras tão claras que toda a audiência de bêbados compreendesse, o que estaria além dos limites da linguagem, naquele caso, o soco com o mão direita foi mais eficiente. Poderia ser também a defesa argumentativa: "eu não sou um covarde como você está dizendo" -- mas o bar não acreditaria nessa frase solta, a comunicação não teria obtido o sucesso desejado. A explicação para o fato da redução da violência à medida em que houve progresso da civilização está na melhora da eficiência da comunicação humana: a escrita, o refinamento da expressão lingüística, o aumento do alcance da palavra falada com rádio, a televisão e a internet. Se essa eficiência diminuir, porque não há mais acordo quanto ao significado das palavras, porque as pessoas não estão nem aí para se o que escrevem é bom ou não, ou porque são incapazes de compreender qualquer coisa, deve aumentar proporcionalmente a violência.

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# Mises' interest rate theory Inspired by [Bob Murphy's thesis](http://consultingbyrpm.com/uploads/Dissertation.pdf) against the "pure time preference theory" (see also this [series of podcasts](https://www.bobmurphyshow.com/episodes/ep-31-capital-and-interest-in-the-austrian-tradition-part-3-of-3/)) -- or blatantly copying it -- here are some thoughts on Mises' most wrong take: * Mises asserts that the market rate of interest is _not_ the originary rate of interest, because the market rate involves entrepreneurial decisions, risk, uncertainty etc. No one lends money with 100% guarantee that it will be paid back in the market and so. But if that is true, where can we see that originary interest? We're supposed to account for its existence and be sure that it is logically there in every trade between present and future, because it's a _category of action_. But then it seems odd to me that it has anything to do with the actual interest. * Mises criticizes the notion of "profit" from classical economists because it mashed together gains deriving from speculation, risk, other stuff and originary interest -- but that's only because he assumes originary interest as a given (because it's a category of action and so on). If he didn't he could have just not cited originary interest in the list of things that give rise to "profit" and all would be fine. * Mixing the two points above, it seems very odd to think that we should look for interest as a component of profit. It seems indeed to be very classifical-economist take. It would be still compatible with Mises'sworldview -- indeed more compatible -- that we looked for profit as a component of interest: when someone lends some 100 and is paid 110 that is profit. Plain simple. Why he did that and why the other person paid isn't for the economist to analyse, or to dissect the extra 10 into 9 interest, 1 risk remuneration or anything like that. If the borrower hadn't paid it would be a 100 loss or a 109 loss? * In other moments, Mises talks about the originary rate of interest being the same for all things: apples and bicycles and anything else. But wasn't each person supposed to have its own valuation of each good -- including goods in the present and in the future? Is Mises going to say that it's impossible for someone to value an orange in the future more than a bycicle in the future in comparison with these same goods in the present? (The very "more" in the previous sentence shows us that Mises was incurring in cardinal value calculations when coming up with this theory -- and I hadn't noticed it until after I finished typing the phrase.) In other words: what if someone prefers orange, bycicle, bycicle in the future, orange in the future? That doesn't seem to fit. What is the rate of interest? * Also, on the point above, what if someone has different rates of interest for goods in different timeframes? For example, someone may prefer a bycicle now a little more than a bycicle tomorrow, but very very much more than a bycicle in two days. That also breaks the notion of "originary interest" as an universal rate. * Now maybe I misunderstood everything, maybe Mises was talking about originary interest as a rate defined by the market. And he clearly says that. That if the rate of interest is bigger on some market entrepreneurs will invest capital in that one until it equalizes with rates in other markets. But all that fits better with the plain notion of profit than with this poorly-crafted notion of originary interest. If you're up to defining and (Mises forbid?) measuring the neutral rate of interest you'll have to arbitrarily choose some businesses to be part of the "market" while excluding others. * By the way, wasn't originary interest a category of action? How can a category of action be defined and ultimately _fixed_ by entrepreneurial action in a market?

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# Channels without HTLCs HTLCs below the dust limit are not possible, because they're uneconomical. So currently whenever a payment below the dust limit is to be made Lightning peers adjust their commitment transactions to pay that amount as fees in case the channel is closed. That's a form of reserving that amount and incentivizing peers to resolve the payment, either successfully (in case it goes to the receiving node's balance) or not (it then goes back to the sender's balance). SOLUTION I didn't think too much about if it is possible to do what I think can be done in the current implementation on Lightning channels, but in the context of Eltoo it seems possible. Eltoo channels have UPDATE transactions that can be published to the blockchain and SETTLEMENT transactions that spend them (after a relative time) to each peer. The barebones script for UPDATE transactions is something like (copied from the paper, because I don't understand these things): ``` OP_IF # to spend from a settlement transaction (presigned) 10 OP_CSV 2 As,i Bs,i 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY OP_ELSE # to spend from a future update transaction <Si+1> OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY 2 Au Bu 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY OP_ENDIF ``` During a payment of 1 satoshi it could be updated to something like (I'll probably get this thing completely wrong): ``` OP_HASH256 <payment_hash> OP_EQUAL OP_IF # for B to spend from settlement transaction 1 in case the payment went through # and they have a preimage 10 OP_CSV 2 As,i1 Bs,i1 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY OP_ELSE OP_IF # for A to spend from settlement transaction 2 in case the payment didn't went through # and the other peer is uncooperative <now + 1day> OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY 2 As,i2 Bs,i2 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY OP_ELSE # to spend from a future update transaction <Si+1> OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY 2 Au Bu 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY OP_ENDIF OP_ENDIF ``` Then peers would have two presigned SETTLEMENT transactions, 1 and 2 (with different signature pairs, as badly shown in the script). On SETTLEMENT 1, funds are, say, 999sat for A and 1001sat for B, while on SETTLEMENT 2 funds are 1000sat for A and 1000sat for B. As soon as B gets the preimage from the next peer in the route it can give it to A and them can sign a new UPDATE transaction that replaces the above gimmick with something simpler without hashes involved. If the preimage doesn't come in viable time, peers can agree to make a new UPDATE transaction anyway. Otherwise A will have to close the channel, which may be bad, but B wasn't a good peer anyway.

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# Bolo It seems that from 1987 to around 2000 there was a big community of people who played this game called ["Bolo"][wikipedia]. It was a game in which people controlled a tank and killed others while trying to capture bases in team matches. Always 2 teams, from 2 to 16 total players, games could last from 10 minutes to 12 hours. I'm still trying to understand all this. The game looks silly from some [videos][videos] you can find today, but apparently it was very deep in strategy because people developed [strategy][strategy-guide] [guides][pillbox-guide] and [wrote][letter-1] [extensively][letter-2] about it and [Netscape even supported `bolo:` URLs][clickable-links] out of the box. > The two most important elements on the map are pillboxes and bases. Pillboxes are originally neutral, meaning that they shoot at every tank that happens to get in its range. They shoot fast and with deadly accuracy. You can shoot the pillbox with your tank, and you can see how damaged it is by looking at it. Once the pillbox is subdued, you may run over it, which will pick it up. You may place the pillbox where you want to put it (where it is clear), if you've enough trees to build it back up. > Trees are harvested by sending your man outside your tank to forest the trees. Your man (also called a builder) can also lay mines, build roads, and build walls. Once you have placed a pillbox, it will not shoot at you, but only your enemies. Therefore, pillboxes are often used to protect your bases. That quote was taken from this ["augmented FAQ"][augmented-faq] written by some user. Apparently there were many FAQs for this game. A FAQ is after all just a simple, clear and direct to the point way of writing about anything, previously known as [summa][summa][^summa-k], it doesn't have to be related to any actually frequently asked question. More unexpected Bolo writings include [an etiquette guide][etiquette], an [anthropology study][anthropology] and [some wonderings on the reverse pill war tactic][reverse-pill]. [videos]: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=winbolo [wikipedia]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolo_(1987_video_game) [clickable-links]: http://web.archive.org/web/19980214020327/http://boloweb.stanford.edu/BoloWeb.html [faq]: https://web.archive.org/web/20070518233700/http://bishop.mc.duke.edu/bolo/guides/stuartfaq.html [letter-1]: http://web.archive.org/web/19961214060949/http://rost.abo.fi/~gpappas/Bolo/News/mikael-bl.html [letter-2]: http://web.archive.org/web/19961214060959/http://rost.abo.fi/~gpappas/Bolo/News/mikael-kev.html [strategy-guide]: http://web.archive.org/web/19961214052754/http://rost.abo.fi/~gpappas/Bolo/guide.html [etiquette]: http://web.archive.org/web/19961214052805/http://rost.abo.fi/~gpappas/Bolo/etiquette.html [pillbox-guide]: http://web.archive.org/web/19961214052818/http://rost.abo.fi/~gpappas/Bolo/PBguide/pbguide1.html [anthropology]: http://web.archive.org/web/19961214052830/http://rost.abo.fi/~gpappas/Bolo/anthropology.html [reverse-pill]: http://web.archive.org/web/19990428023004/http://powered.cs.yale.edu:8000/%7Ebayliss/bolo.html [augmented-faq]: http://web.archive.org/web/19970118071637/http://rost.abo.fi/~gpappas/Bolo/faq.html [summa]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Summa [^summa-k]: It's not the same thing, but I couldn't help but notice the similarity.

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# As estrelas As estrelas são buracos nas esferas celestiais, buracos através dos quais nos é permitido ver a brilhante luz dos céus. (_Rome_, a série.)

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# idea: An open log-based HTTP database for any use case A single, read/write open database for everything in the world. * A hosted database that accepts anything you put on it and stores it in order. * Anyone can update it by adding new stuff. * To make sense of the data you can read only the records that interest you, in order, and reconstruct a local state. * Each updater pays a fee (anonymously, in satoshis) to store their piece of data. * It's a single store for everything in the world. ### Cost and price estimates Prices for guaranteed storage for 3 years: 20 satoshis = 1KB 20 000 000 = 1GB <https://www.elephantsql.com/> charges $10/mo for 1GB of data, 3 600 000 satoshis for 3 years If 3 years is not enough, people can move their stuff to elsewhere when it's time, or pay to keep specific log entries for more time. ### Other considerations * People provide a unique id when adding a log so entries can be prefix-matched by it, like `myapp.something.random` * When fetching, instead of just fetching raw data, add (paid?) option to fetch and apply a `jq` map-reduce transformation to the matched entries

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# Um algoritmo imbecil da evolução Suponha que você queira escrever a palavra BANANA partindo de OOOOOO e usando só alterações aleatórias das letras. As alterações se dão por meio da multiplicação da palavra original em várias outras, cada uma com uma mudança diferente. No primeiro período, surgem BOOOOO e OOOOZO. E então o ambiente decide que todas as palavras que não começam com um B estão eliminadas. Sobra apenas BOOOOO e o algoritmo continua. É fácil explicar conceber a evolução das espécies acontecendo dessa maneira, se você controlar sempre a parte em que o ambiente decide quem vai sobrar. Porém, há apenas duas opções: 1. Se o ambiente decidir as coisas de maneira aleatória, a chance de você chegar na palavra correta usando esse método é tão pequena que pode ser considerada nula. 2. Se o ambiente decidir as coisas de maneira pensada, caímos no //design inteligente//. Acredito que isso seja uma enunciação decente do argumento ["no free lunch"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_free_lunch_in_search_and_optimization) aplicado à crítica do darwinismo por William Dembski. A resposta darwinista consiste em dizer que não existe essa BANANA como objetivo final. Que as palavras podem ir se alterando aleatoriamente, e o que sobrar sobrou, não podemos dizer que um objetivo foi atingido ou deixou de sê-lo. E aí os defensores do design inteligente dirão que o resultado ao qual chegamos não pode ter sido fruto de um processo aleatório. BANANA é qualitativamente diferente de AYZOSO, e aí há várias maneiras de "provar" que sim usando modelos matemáticos e tal. Fico com a impressão, porém, de que essa coisa só pode ser resolvida como sim ou não mediante uma discussão das premissas, e chega um ponto em que não há mais provas matemáticas possíveis, apenas subjetividade. Daí eu me lembro da minha humilde solução ao problema do cão que aperta as teclas aleatoriamente de um teclado e escreve as obras completas de Shakespeare: mesmo que ele o faça, nada daquilo terá sentido sem uma inteligência de tipo humano ali para lê-las e perceber que não se trata de uma bagunça, mas sim de um texto com sentido para ele. O milagre se dá não no momento em que o cão tropeça no teclado, mas no momento em que o homem olha para a tela. Se o algoritmo da evolução chegou à palavra BANANA ou UXJHTR não faz diferença pra ela, mas faz diferença para nós, que temos uma inteligência humana, e estamos observando aquilo. O homem também pensaria que há //algo// por trás daquele evento do cão que digita as obras de Shakespeare, e como seria possível alguém em sã consciência pensar que não?

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# O caso da Grêmio TV enquanto vinha se conduzindo pela plataforma superior daquela arena que se pensava totalmente preenchida por adeptos da famosa equipe do Grêmio de Porto Alegre, viu-se, como por obra de algum nigromante - dos muitos que existem e estão a todo momento a fazer más obras e a colocar-se no caminhos dos que procuram, se não fazer o bem acima de todas as coisas, a pelo menos não fazer o mal no curso da realização dos seus interesses -, o discretíssimo jornalista a ser xingado e moído em palavras por uma horda de malandrinos a cinco ou seis passos dele surgida que cantavam e moviam seus braços em movimentos que não se pode classificar senão como bárbaros, e assim cantavam: Grêmio TV pior que o SBT !

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# A list of things artificial intelligence is not doing If AI is so good why can't it: - write good glue code that wraps a documented HTTP API? - make good translations using available books and respective published translations? - extract meaningful and relevant numbers from news articles? - write mathematical models that fit perfectly to available data better than any human? - play videogames without cheating (i.e. simulating human vision, attention and click speed)? - turn pure HTML pages into pretty designs by generating CSS - predict the weather - calculate building foundations - determine stock values of companies from publicly available numbers - smartly and automatically test software to uncover bugs before releases - predict sports matches from the ball and the players' movement on the screen - continuously improve niche/local search indexes based on user input and and reaction to results - control traffic lights - predict sports matches from news articles, and teams and players' history This was posted first on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/fiatjaf/status/1477942802805837827).

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# Método científico o método científico não pode ser aplicado senão numa meia dúzia de casos, e no entanto ei-nos aqui, pensando nele para tudo. "formule hipóteses e teste-as independentemente", "obtenha uma quantidade de dados estatisticamente significante", teste, colete dados, mensure. não é que de repente todo mundo resolveu calcular desvios-padrão, mas sim que é comum, para as pessoas mais cultas, nível Freakonomics, acharem que têm que testar e coletar dados, e nunca jamais confiar na sua "intuição" ou, pior, num raciocínio que pode parecer certo, mas na verdade é enormemente enganador. sim, é verdade que raciocínios com explicações aparentemente sensatas nos são apresentados todos os dias -- para um exemplo fácil é só imaginar um comentarista de jornal, ou até uma matéria inocente de jornal, aliás, melhor pensar num comentarista da GloboNews --, e sim, é verdade que a maioria dessas explicações é falsa. o que está errado é achar que só o que vale é testar hipóteses. você não pode testar a explicação aparentemente sensata que o taxista te fornece sobre a crise brasileira, deve então anotá-la para testar depois? mantê-la para sempre no cabedal das teorias ainda por testar? e a explicação das redinhas que economizam água quando instaladas na torneira? essa dá pra testar, então você vai comprar um relógio de água e deixar a torneira ligada lá 5 horas com a redinha, depois 5 horas sem a redinha? obviamente não vai funcionar se você abrir o mesmo tanto, você vai precisar de um critério melhor: a satisfação da pessoa que está lavando as mãos com o resultado final _versus_ a quantidade de água gasta. daí você precisaria de muitas pessoas, mas satisfação é uma coisa imensurável, nem adianta tentar fazer entrevistas antes e depois com as pessoas. o certo então, é o quê? procurar um estudo científico publicado numa revista **de qualidade** (porque tem aquelas revistas que aceitam estudos gerados por computador, então é melhor tomar cuidado) que fala sobre redinhas? como saber se a redinha é a mesma que você comprou? e agora que você já comprou, o resultado do experimento importa? (claro: pode ser que a redinha faça gastar mais água, você nunca saberá até que faça o experimento). por que não, ao invés de condenar todos os raciocínios como enganadores e mandar que as pessoas façam experimentos científicos, ensinar a fazer raciocínios certos?

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# idea: Patreon, but simple, and without subscription Basically instead of a subscription and becoming member of something, you just get a forum for your inner circle and people get lnurl-pay codes they can use to donate. Some amount of donations is required to remain in the group (like x per month), but if you donate more than that on the beginning you can stay until your credits expire. Every time someone donates a notice is posted in the group page. Perhaps that could be an [@lntxbot](https://t.me/lntxbot) feature.

@ 3bf0c63f:aefa459d

# The illusion of note-taking Most ideas come to me while I'm nowhere near a computer, so it's impossible to note them all down. Even this one -- the realization of the illusion that many people have, including me, that it's possible to note down all our ideas in a ["zettelkasten"][797984e3] that will contain the history of all our insights -- is only noted later, with great distress since I forgot the other thoughts that lead to it and now am wasting time mentioning these unknowns forever lost.

@ 3bf0c63f:aefa459d

# On Bitcoin Bounties The [HRF](https://twitter.com/gladstein/status/1586098031501447169) has awarded two bounties yesterday. The episode exposes some of the problems of the bounties and grants culture that exists on Bitcoin. First, when the bounties were announced, almost an year ago, I felt they were very hard to achieve (and also very useless, but let's set that aside). The first, "a wallet that integrates bolt12 so it can receive tips noncustodially", could be understood as a bounty for mobile wallets only, in which case the implementation would be hacky, hard and take a lot of time; or it could be understood as being valid for any wallet, in which case it was already implemented in CLN (at the time called "c-lightning"), so the bounty didn't make sense. The second, a wallet with a noncustodial US dollar balance, is arguably impossible, since there is no way to achieve it without trusted oracles, therefore it is probably invalid. If one assumed that trust was fine, then it was already implemented by [StandardSats](https://standardsats.github.io) at the time. It felt it was designed to use some weird construct like DLCs -- and Chris Steward did publish a guide on how to implement a wallet that would be eligible for the bounty using DLCs, therefore the path seemed to be set there, but this would be a very hard and time-intensive thing. The third, a noncustodial wallet with optional custodial _ecash_ functionality, seemed to be targeting Fedimint directly, which already existed at the time and was about to release exactly these features. Time passed and apparently no one tried to claim any of these bounties. My explanation is that, at least for 1 and 2, it was so hard to get it done that no one would risk trying and getting rejected. It is better for a programmer to work on something that interests them directly if they're working for free. For 3 I believe no one even tried anything because the bounty was already set to be given to Fedimint. Fast-forward to today and bounties 1 and 3 were awarded to two projects that were created by the sole interest of the developers with no attempt to actually claim these bounties -- and indeed, the two winners strictly do not qualify according to the descriptions from last year. What if someone was working for months on trying to actually fulfill the criteria? That person would be in a very bad shape now, having thrown away all the work. Considering this it was a very good choice for everyone involved to not try to claim any of the bounties. The winners have merit only in having pursued their own interests and in creating useful programs as the result. I'm sure the bounties do not feel to them like a deserved payment for the specific work they did, but more like a token of recognition for having worked on Bitcoin-related stuff at all, and an incentive to continue to work. [What is better than bounties and grants?](nostr:naddr1qqyrwvfnxyekywfcqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cdhttgp)

@ 3bf0c63f:aefa459d

# idea: a website for feedback exchange I thought a community of people sharing feedback on mutual interests would be a good thing, so as always I broadened and generalized the idea and mixed with my old criticue-inspired idea-feedback project and turned it into a "token". You give feedback on other people's things, they give you a "point". You can then use that point to request feedback from others. This could be made as an [Etleneum](nostr:naddr1qqyrjcny8qcn2ve4qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823crwzz2w) contract so these points were exchanged for satoshis using the shitswap contract (yet to be written). In this case all the Bitcoin/Lightning side of the website must be hidden until the user has properly gone through the usage flow and earned points. If it was to be built on Etleneum then it needs to emphasize the login/password login method instead of the lnurl-auth method. And then maybe it could be used to push lnurl-auth to normal people, but with a different name.

@ 3bf0c63f:aefa459d

# The problem with DIDs _Decentralized Identifiers_ are supposedly a standard that will allow anyone (or anything) to have an online identity. The DID is a URI like `did:<method>:<data>` in which `<method>` determines how to interpret the `<data>`. The data is generally a public key in some cryptographic system or shitcoin blockchain, or a naked key, or a DNS-backed web address. Some of the DID proponents argue that this is for maximum interoperability, since any new system can be supported under the same standard, i.e. supposedly an application could "support DIDs" (as some would say) and that would allow anyone to just paste their DID string there and that would refer to something. There are [a gazillion](https://w3c.github.io/did-spec-registries/#did-methods) of different DID "methods", most of them are probably barely used. What does it mean for an application to "support" DIDs, then? For the interoperability argument to make any sense that must mean that the application must understand all the "methods" -- which involves understanding all cryptographic protocols and reading and interpreting data from a gazillion different blockchains and also understanding the specifics of each method, since the data of each blockchain or website and so on must also be interpreted according to the rules of the method. It must be clear from the paragraph above that the DID goal is is unimplementable and therefore will either fail horribly by lack of adoption; or it will have to be changed to something else (for example everybody will start accepting just `did:key` and ignore others and that will _be_ the standard); or it will become a centralized thing with all supporting applications using a single set of libraries that have built-in support for all methods by calling centralized servers that return the final product of processing the DID data for each method. ## See also: - [The problem with ION](nostr:naddr1qqyrvcnrvfjkvvf3qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823czjscmz)

@ 3bf0c63f:aefa459d

# O que é Bitcoin? Todo guia infeliz sobre Bitcoin começa com esta pergunta manjada, e normalmente já vai respondendo que é uma "moeda virtual"[^moeda_virtual], um conceito estúpido que não esclarece nada. Esqueça esse papo. Bitcoin não é uma moeda. Bitcoin é um protocolo[^protocolo]. Por que então dizem que é uma moeda? Porque essas pessoas muito apressadinhas gostam de dizer que tudo que é facilmente divisível e transferível, e cujas várias unidades são idênticas umas às outras, é uma moeda. Então, nesse sentido, Bitcoin é uma moeda, mas ignore esse papo de moeda. O protocolo Bitcoin diz que existem "créditos" (ou "pontos", ou "unidades") que podem ser transferidas entre os participantes, e vários computadores, cada um operando independentemente do outro, desde que sigam o protocolo (ou seja: que estejam todos rodando o mesmo programa, ou programas compatíveis), estarão sempre em acordo a respeito de quem gastou cada crédito e como gastou. É basicamente essa a idéia: um monte de "pontos virtuais" que são transferidos de uns para outros, sem que exista uma entidade organizadora, "o dono do Bitcoin", "o chefe supremo do Bitcoin", que controle nada, coordene nada, ou tenha poder sobre essas transferências. ## Como funciona Imagine vários computadores rodando o mesmo programa (ou programas compatíveis). Agora imagine que esses programas se comunicam entre si através da internet: eles enviam mensagens uns para os outros e esperam respostas. De vez em quando a resposta não vem, ou vem num formato que o programa não entende, isso significa que o outro computador saiu do ar, ou está rodando uma versão incompatível do programa, e aí todos os outros vão ignorá-lo. Mas em geral a resposta vem certinha e todos conseguem falar com todos. Agora que você imaginou isso, fica fácil imaginar, por exemplo, que cada um desses computadores mantém uma lista de todos os bitcoins existentes e quem tem cada um. Eles pegam a lista dos outros computadores na rede e depois a vão atualizando à medida que novas transações vão sendo feitas. Toda vez que alguém quer fazer alguma transação, ele deve fazê-la por meio de um desses computadores, a pessoa chega no computador que está rodando o programa e diz: "sou fulano, tenho x bitcoins, e quero enviá-los para tal lugar", o programa vai lá e envia essa mensagem para os outros computadores, que atualizam a sua lista. Fim. Essa seria uma versão ingênua do protocolo, que funcionaria se todos os participantes fossem muito honestos e ninguém jamais tentasse gastar os bitcoins que não têm. Pra uma coisa dessas funcionar no mundo real teve de entrar a grande invenção do Bitcoin, o insight genial do Satoshi Nakamoto, que é a tal cadeia de blocos, conhecida por aí como _blockchain_. Funciona assim: ao invés de cada computador manter uma lista de onde está cada bitcoin, cada computador mantém a tal cadeia de blocos. Um "bloco" é só um nome bonitinho para um conjunto de dados. Cada bloco é composto por uma referência ao bloco anterior e uma lista de transações. Como eles contém uma referência ao anterior, existe uma seqüência, uma fila indiana, e o computador pode ficar tranqüilo sabendo a ordem das transações (as transações que aconteceram no terceiro bloco são posteriores às que aconteceram no segundo bloco, por exemplo) e saber que os mesmos bitcoins não foram gastos duas vezes seguidas pela mesma pessoa, o que seria inválido. Quando aparece um novo bloco, é só todos os computadores conferirem se não existe nenhuma transação inválida ali e, caso exista, rejeitarem aquele bloco por inteiro e esperarem que o próximo descarte aquela transação inválida e venha certinho. ## Quem faz os blocos Em tese, qualquer um dos computadores pode fazer o próximo bloco. A idéia é que cada pessoa que queira fazer uma transação vai lá e usa um computador da rede para enviar a sua proposta de transação ("quero transferir bitcoins para tal lugar e tal") para todos os demais, e que, quando alguém for fazer um bloco, pegue todas essas propostas de transação que forem válidas e as coloque no bloco que então será aceito por todos os outros computadores e incluído na cadeia global de blocos. Essa cadeia global tem que ser exatamente igual em todos os computadores. Na prática, existe uma regra que faz com que nem todos consigam fazer blocos: é que o _hash_ dos dados do bloco + um número mágico deve ser menor do que um valor muito pequeno `x`. O número mágico é um número qualquer que o computador que está tentando fazer o bloco pode ajustar, por tentativa e erro, para que o _hash_ saia de um jeito que ele queira. O `x` pode ser maior ou menor de acordo com a freqüência dos últimos blocos produzidos. Quanto menor for `x`, mais estatisticamente difícil é encontrar um número mágico que, junto com os dados do bloco, tenha um _hash_ menor do que `x`. Ou seja: para fazer um bloco, muitos números mágicos diferentes devem ser tentados até que seja encontrado algum que satisfaça as condições. **O que é um _hash_?** Um hash é uma função matemática que é fácil fazer para um lado e difícil de fazer para o outro. A multiplicação, por exemplo, é fácil de fazer e fácil de fazer, e sua operação contrária, a divisão, também (tanto é que qualquer um com papel e caneta consegue, tem aquela coisa de ir passando os números pra baixo e subtraindo e tal). Já uma operação de exponenciação -- um número elevado a 1000, por exemplo -- é fácil de fazer, mas pra desfazer só com tentativa e erro (e é por tentativa e erro que o computador ou a calculadora fazem). No caso do Bitcoin, o computador que está tentando produzir um bloco tem que achar um número tal que `(esse número mágico + fatores predeterminados do bloco) elevados a 50` resultem num valor menor do que `fator de dificuldade`, um outro fator predeterminado pelo estado geral da cadeia de blocos. Suponha que um computador acha um número `1798465042647412146620280340569649349251249`, por exemplo, e ele é menor do que o `fator de dificuldade`. Ele então diz para os outros: "aqui está meu bloco, o hash do meu bloco é `1798465042647412146620280340569649349251249`, os fatores `predeterminados do bloco` são `4` (esses fatores todo mundo pode conferir), e meu número mágico é `3`. `(4 + 3) elevado a 50` é `1798465042647412146620280340569649349251249`, como todos podem conferir, então meu bloco é válido". Então todos aceitam aquele bloco como válido e começam a tentar achar o número mágico para o próximo bloco (e desta vez os fatores do bloco são diferentes, já que um novo bloco foi adicionado à cadeia e fez com que tudo mudasse). As regras para a definição de `x` fazem com que na média cada novo bloco fique pronto em 10 minutos. Logo, se há apenas um computador tentando produzir blocos, o protocolo dirá que `x` seja relativamente alto, de modo que esse computador conseguirá, em 10 minutos, na média, encontrar um número mágico. Se, porém, milhares de computadores superpotentes estiverem tentando produzir blocos, `x` será ajustado para um valor muito mais baixo, de modo que o esforço de todos esses computadores fazendo milhares de tentativas-e-erros por segundo só conseguirá encontrar um número mágico a cada 10 minutos. Hoje existem computadores feitos especialmente para procurar números mágicos que conseguem calcular hashes muito mais rápido do que o seu computador caseiro, o que torna inviável que qualquer pessoa não especializada tente produzir blocos, veja este gráfico da evolução da quantidade de hashes que são tentados a cada segundo. Por algum motivo convencionou-se chamar os computadores que se empenham em fazer novos blocos de "mineradores". ## Se dois computadores da rede fizerem blocos ao mesmo tempo, qual dos dois vale? Se você já sabe quem faz os blocos fica fácil imaginar que isso é um pouco improvável. Mas mesmo assim pode acontecer. Mesmo que os blocos não fiquem prontos exatamente no mesmo instante, problemas podem acontecer porque os outros computadores da rede receberão os dois novos blocos em ordens diferentes, e aí não vai dar pra determinar qual vale ou qual deixa de valer assim, pela ordem. Os computadores então ficam num estado de indeterminação acerca das duas cadeias de blocos possíveis, A e B, digamos, ambas idênticas até o bloco de número 723, mas diferentes no que diz respeito ao bloco 724, para o qual há duas alternativas. O protocolo determina que a cadeia que tenha mais trabalho realizado é a que vale, mas durante algum tempo podemos ter um estado em que alguns computadores da rede só sabem da existência do bloco A, enquanto outros só sabem da existência do bloco B, o que é uma grande confusão que só pode ser resolvida pelo advento do próximo bloco, o 725. Como cada bloco se refere a um bloco anterior, é necessário que um desses dois blocos 724 seja escolhido pelos mineradores para ser o "pai" do bloco 725 quando o número mágico for encontrado e ele for feito. Mesmo que cada minerador escolha um pai diferente, desse processo sairá provavelmente apenas um bloco 725, e quando ele for espalhado ele determinará, pela sua ascendência, qual foi o bloco 724 que ficou valendo. Caso dois ou mais blocos 725 sejam produzidos ao mesmo tempo, o sistema continua nesse estado de indecisão até o 726, e assim por diante. Por este motivo não se deve confiar que uma transação está concretizada pra valer mesmo só porque ela foi incluída num bloco. Você não tem como saber se existe um outro bloco alternativo que será preferido ao seu até que pelo menos mais alguns blocos tenham sido adicionados. # Transações Muitas pessoas acreditam que existem endereços e que esses endereços têm um dono e ele é o dono dos bitcoins. Esta crença errônea é resultado de uma analogia com bancos tradicionais e contas bancárias (as contas são endereços que têm um dono e guardam dinheiro). Na verdade assim que as transações são incluídas num bloco elas não "ficam em um endereço", mas vagando num grande limbo de transações. Deste limbo elas podem ser retiradas por qualquer pessoa que cumpra as condições que foram previamente especificadas pelo criador da transação. Uma analogia mais útil do que a analogia das contas bancárias é a analogia do dinheiro: imagine que você tem uma nota de 20 dinheiros e você quer usá-la pra pagar 10 dinheiros a outrem. Você precisa quebrar aquela nota de 20 em duas de 10 e aí uma fica com você e a outra com a outra pessoa, ou, se você tiver duas notas de 5, você pode juntar as duas e dar para a outra pessoa. Todas essas notas que você está gastando têm uma história prévia: elas vieram de algum lugar em algum momento para o seu controle. Transações com Bitcoin também são assim: você precisa mencionar especificamente uma transação anterior. Por exemplo, 1. Carlos paga 10 bitcoins a Dandara, Dandara agora tem uma transação no valor de 10 2. Elisa paga 17 bitcoins a Dandara, Dandara tem uma transação no valor de 10 e uma no valor de 17 3. Dandara paga 23 bitcoins a Felipe, ela junta suas duas transações e faz duas novas, uma no valor de 23, que vai para o controle de Felipe, e outra no valor de 4, que volta para o seu controle, Dandara agora tem uma transação no valor de 4, Felipe tem uma transação no valor de 23 4. Felipe paga 14 bitcoins a Geraldo, ele divide sua transação em duas, uma no valor de 14 e outra no valor de 9, e assim por diante Uma diferença, porém, é que no Bitcoin ninguém sabe quem é o dono da nota, você apenas sabe que pode gastá-la, caso você realmente possa (se uma transação prévia especifica uma condição que você pode cumprir, você deve cumprir aquela condição no momento em que estiver mencionando a transação prévia). Por isso uma carteira Bitcoin pode dizer que você "tem" um número x de bitcoins: a carteira sabe quais chaves privadas você controla e quais transações, dentre todas as transações não-gastas de toda a blockchain, podem ser gastas usando aquela chave. Uma forma comum de transação é que especifica a condição `qualquer pessoa que tiver a chave privada capaz de assinar a chave pública cujo hash vai aqui dito pode gastar esta transação`. Outras condições comuns são as que especificam `n` chaves, das quais `m` precisam assinar a transação para que ela seja gasta (por exemplo, entre Fulano, Beltrano e Ciclano, quaisquer dois deles precisam concordar, mas não um só), o famoso _multisig_. ## Canal de pagamento Um _payment channel_, ou _via de pagamento_, ou _canal de pagamento_ é uma seqüência de promessas de pagamento feitas entre dois usuários de Bitcoin que não precisam ser publicados na blockchain e por isso são instantâneas e grátis. Antes que você se pergunte o que acontece se alguém descumprir a promessa, devo dizer que "promessa" é um termo ruim, porque promessas de verdade podem ser quebradas, mas estas promessas são auto-cumpríveis, elas são transações assinadas que podem ser resgatadas a qualquer momento pelo destinatário bastando que ele as publique na blockchain. A idéia é que na maioria das vezes você não vai precisar disso, e pode continuar fazendo transações novas que invalidam as antigas até que você decida publicar a última transação válida. Deste modo seu dinheiro está seguro numa via de pagamento O grande problema é que caso a outra parte decida roubar e publicar uma transação antiga, você precisa aparecer num espaço de tempo razoável (isto depende do combinado entre os dois usuários, mas acho que o padrão é 24 horas) e publicar a última transação. Existem incentivos para impedir que alguém tente roubar (por exemplo, quem tentar roubar e for pego perde todo o dinheiro que estava naquela via) e outros mecanismos, como as atalaias que vigiam as vias de pagamentos dos outros pra ver se ninguém está roubando. Exemplo: 1. Ângela e Bóris decidem criar uma via de pagamento, pois esperam realizar muitos pagamentos de pequeno valor entre eles, tanto de ida quanto de volta, ao longo de vários meses 2. Ângela cria uma transação para um endereço compartilhado entre ela e Bóris, no valor de 1000 satoshis, e desse endereço ela e Bóris criam uma transação devolvendo os 1000 para Ângela 3. Ao resolver pagar 200 satoshis para Bóris, eles criam uma nova transação que transfere 800 para Ângela e 200 para Bóris 4. Agora Bóris quer pagar 17 satoshis para Ângela, eles criam uma nova transação que transfere 817 para Ângela e 173 para Bóris 5. E assim por diante eles vão criando novas transações que invalidam as anteriores e vão alterando o "saldo" da via de pagamento. Quando qualquer um dos dois quiser sacar o dinheiro que tem no saldo é só publicar a última transação e pronto. A [rede Relâmpago](nostr:naddr1qqyr2wp4x3jkxvnpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c2tt64h) é uma grande rede de canais de pagamento que permite que pessoas façam pagamentos para pessoas não diretamente ligadas a elas por canais diretos, mas através de uma rota que percorre vários canais de outrem e ajusta seus saldos. # Existem outras criptomoedas além do Bitcoin? Pra começar, jamais use essa palavra de novo. "criptomoeda" é ainda pior do que "moeda virtual"[^moeda_virtual]. Agora, respondendo: sim, de certo modo existem, são chamadas as "altcoins" ou "shitcoins" ("moedas de cocô", tradução amigável), porque elas são, de fato, grandes porcarias. De outro modo, pode-se dizer que elas não são comparáveis ao Bitcoin, porque só pode haver uma moeda num livre mercado de moedas, e esse posto já é do Bitcoin, e também porque o Bitcoin é livre, sem donos, sem grandes poderes que o controlam, o que não se pode dizer de nenhuma altcoin. Depois que o Bitcoin foi inventado e seu _insight_ genial foi assimilado pela comunidade interessada, milhares de pessoas copiaram o protocolo, com pequenas modificações, para criar suas próprias moedas. Assim surgiram Litecoin, Ethereum e muitas outras. No fundo são apenas cópias do Bitcoin que tentam melhorá-lo de algum modo ou adicionar outras funções. # Veja também: * [Aos poucos, e aí tudo de uma vez](https://fiatjaf.com/aos-poucos.html), Parker Lewis * [Não tem solução](nostr:naddr1qqyrswtxxdnxgdtrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823csj44kn) * [A podridão](nostr:naddr1qqyrydehxscrxvfkqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cy2fdqc) * [O Bitcoin como um sistema social humano](nostr:naddr1qqyrwdfcx5ek2c3eqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cafzf9f) * [Rede Relâmpago](nostr:naddr1qqyr2wp4x3jkxvnpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c2tt64h) --- [^protocolo]: Neste contexto, um protocolo é um conjunto de regras (inventadas arbitrariamente ou surgidas dos usos e costumes ao longo do tempo) que permitem que dois computadores diferentes se entendam e saibam que tipo de mensagens e comportamentos esperar dos demais. [^moeda_virtual]: Virtual? Virtual era pra significar uma coisa que não é ainda "atual", ou seja, que ainda não se concretizou na realidade. Mas como nossos amigos falantes da língüa portuguesa quiseram que isso passasse também a significar qualquer coisa que aconteça em um computador, "moeda virtual" ficou sendo uma moeda que existe no computador. O Bitcoin claramente é uma moeda que existe no computador, mas mesmo assim esse conceito é confuso. Uma transferência bancária tradicional também não é "dinheiro virtual"? Ela acontece no computador, mas você ainda não pegou as notas de papel ali na sua mão, então é virtual. Chamar só o Bitcoin de moeda virtual pode talvez criar a impressão de que é o Bitcoin é um brinquedinho, como por exemplo as moedas virtuais que existem dentro do universo de jogos de simulação, como, sei lá, World of Warcraft.

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# Família e propriedade A idéia tradicional de família está associada a propriedades imobiliárias fixas, passadas de geração a geração. Com propriedades sendo partidas, desfeitas, vendidas e divididas entre os filhos a idéia de família -- um nome associado a um lugar -- torna-se vaga e perde-se no ar. Acho que isso não vale apenas para a nobreza medieval, mas mesmo para as famílias plebéias, e não valeu quase nunca para as sociedades do novo mundo. Acho que até seria compatível com a compra e venda de terras, que seriam compreendidas como uma família mudando de lugar, mas não com a divisão igualitária das propriedades da família entre vários filhos e assim sucessivamente. Nunca antes tinha-me ocorrido este excelente e quase-óbvio insight que está escrito em "A Democracia na América", de Alexis de Tocqueville.

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# Reclamações - [Como não houve resposta, estou enviando de novo](nostr:naddr1qqyx2wfhvy6r2vejqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ct53y8g) - [Democracia na América](nostr:naddr1qqyrzc3ev3jn2vrpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c8ynvrd) - [A "política" é a arena da vitória do estatismo](nostr:naddr1qqyx2wpnxdsnyvmpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ccp2rh9) - [A biblioteca infinita](nostr:naddr1qqyryd3hv5crywp5qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ce8r2jh) - [Família e propriedade](nostr:naddr1qqyrwwpnxesnqvmrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c4s2ruz) - [Memórias de quando eu aprendi a ler](nostr:naddr1qqyrjve4vgunwctyqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cfdtahp) - [A chatura Kelsen](nostr:naddr1qqyr2df58qekxce3qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c0n53d9) - [O VAR é o grande equalizador](nostr:naddr1qqyxxwf5vesnywrpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c7j5n5x) - [Não tem solução](nostr:naddr1qqyrswtxxdnxgdtrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823csj44kn) - [A estrutura lógica do livro didático](nostr:naddr1qqyrxv3j8qenxe3eqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ctyr464) - ["House" dos economistas e o Estado](nostr:naddr1qqyxxdfnv5cxyef4qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cdlmhy7) - [Revista Educativa](nostr:naddr1qqyxgvfcxajkxe3cqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cfx0trx) - [Cultura Inglesa e aprendizado extra-escolar](nostr:naddr1qqyr2errxcursvmzqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c8yqzwv) - [Veterano não é dono de bixete](nostr:naddr1qqyxvdm9v5ex2dmyqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823crahz92) - [Personagens de jogos e símbolos](nostr:naddr1qqyr2ctpv5crxdnpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c60jj0x) - [Músicas grudentas e conversas](nostr:naddr1qqyr2etyvcunxve5qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cu35467) - [Obra aqui do lado](nostr:naddr1qqyxgd33vs6kzvf5qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c8vsd0u) - [Propaganda](nostr:naddr1qqyxgvtrxpjxgdtxqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cyzfj30) - [Ver Jesus com os olhos da carne](nostr:naddr1qqyrjdek8q6ngcfhqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c0zzevd) - [Processos Antifrágeis](nostr:naddr1qqyryv3hxfsnvvm9qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c5jshx7) - [Cadeias, crimes e cidadãos de bem](nostr:naddr1qqyrydt9xsuxxwryqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cgq9tqq) - [Castas hindus em nova chave](nostr:naddr1qqyrzcnyxyexxetpqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cqsz60h) - [Método científico](nostr:naddr1qqyr2wf3vgmx2dmrqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823chtnaca) - [Xampu](nostr:naddr1qqyx2wphvccngwfeqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c5lczq3) - [Thafne venceu o Soletrando 2008.](nostr:naddr1qqyrgef5vdskvvr9qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cwxwyt5) - [Empreendendorismo de boteco](nostr:naddr1qqyrgc33v56kzdesqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cx5t67v) - [Problemas com Russell Kirk](nostr:naddr1qqyxzct9v33rjvp4qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cu9j032) - [Pequenos problemas que o Estado cria para a sociedade e que não são sempre lembrados](nostr:naddr1qqyrzdpexajkzenzqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823ck07uru)

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# WelcomeBot The first bot ever created for Trello. It invited to a public board automatically anyone who commented on a card he was added to. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/welcomebot> - <https://trello.com/welcomebot>

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# nostr - Notes and Other Stuff Transmitted by Relays The simplest open protocol that is able to create a censorship-resistant global "social" network once and for all. It doesn't rely on any trusted central server, hence it is resilient; it is based on cryptographic keys and signatures, so it is tamperproof; it does not rely on P2P techniques, therefore it works. ## Very short summary of how it works, if you don't plan to read anything else: Everybody runs a client. It can be a native client, a web client, etc. To publish something, you write a post, sign it with your key and send it to multiple relays (servers hosted by someone else, or yourself). To get updates from other people, you ask multiple relays if they know anything about these other people. Anyone can run a relay. A relay is very simple and dumb. It does nothing besides accepting posts from some people and forwarding to others. Relays don't have to be trusted. Signatures are verified on the client side. ## This is needed because other solutions are broken: ### The problem with Twitter - Twitter has ads; - Twitter uses bizarre techniques to keep you addicted; - Twitter doesn't show an actual historical feed from people you follow; - Twitter bans people; - Twitter shadowbans people. - Twitter has a lot of spam. ### The problem with Mastodon and similar programs - User identities are attached to domain names controlled by third-parties; - Server owners can ban you, just like Twitter; Server owners can also block other servers; - Migration between servers is an afterthought and can only be accomplished if servers cooperate. It doesn't work in an adversarial environment (all followers are lost); - There are no clear incentives to run servers, therefore they tend to be run by enthusiasts and people who want to have their name attached to a cool domain. Then, users are subject to the despotism of a single person, which is often worse than that of a big company like Twitter, and they can't migrate out; - Since servers tend to be run amateurishly, they are often abandoned after a while — which is effectively the same as banning everybody; - It doesn't make sense to have a ton of servers if updates from every server will have to be painfully pushed (and saved!) to a ton of other servers. This point is exacerbated by the fact that servers tend to exist in huge numbers, therefore more data has to be passed to more places more often; - For the specific example of video sharing, ActivityPub enthusiasts realized it would be completely impossible to transmit video from server to server the way text notes are, so they decided to keep the video hosted only from the single instance where it was posted to, which is similar to the Nostr approach. ### The problem with SSB (Secure Scuttlebutt) - It doesn't have many problems. I think it's great. In fact, I was going to use it as a basis for this, but - its protocol is too complicated because it wasn't thought about being an open protocol at all. It was just written in JavaScript in probably a quick way to solve a specific problem and grew from that, therefore it has weird and unnecessary quirks like signing a JSON string which must strictly follow the rules of [_ECMA-262 6th Edition_](https://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/6.0/#sec-json.stringify); - It insists on having a chain of updates from a single user, which feels unnecessary to me and something that adds bloat and rigidity to the thing — each server/user needs to store all the chain of posts to be sure the new one is valid. Why? (Maybe they have a good reason); - It is not as simple as Nostr, as it was primarily made for P2P syncing, with "pubs" being an afterthought; - Still, it may be worth considering using SSB instead of this custom protocol and just adapting it to the client-relay server model, because reusing a standard is always better than trying to get people in a new one. ### The problem with other solutions that require everybody to run their own server - They require everybody to run their own server; - Sometimes people can still be censored in these because domain names can be censored. ## How does Nostr work? - There are two components: __clients__ and __relays__. Each user runs a client. Anyone can run a relay. - Every user is identified by a public key. Every post is signed. Every client validates these signatures. - Clients fetch data from relays of their choice and publish data to other relays of their choice. A relay doesn't talk to another relay, only directly to users. - For example, to "follow" someone a user just instructs their client to query the relays it knows for posts from that public key. - On startup, a client queries data from all relays it knows for all users it follows (for example, all updates from the last day), then displays that data to the user chronologically. - A "post" can contain any kind of structured data, but the most used ones are going to find their way into the standard so all clients and relays can handle them seamlessly. ## How does it solve the problems the networks above can't? - **Users getting banned and servers being closed** - A relay can block a user from publishing anything there, but that has no effect on them as they can still publish to other relays. Since users are identified by a public key, they don't lose their identities and their follower base when they get banned. - Instead of requiring users to manually type new relay addresses (although this should also be supported), whenever someone you're following posts a server recommendation, the client should automatically add that to the list of relays it will query. - If someone is using a relay to publish their data but wants to migrate to another one, they can publish a server recommendation to that previous relay and go; - If someone gets banned from many relays such that they can't get their server recommendations broadcasted, they may still let some close friends know through other means with which relay they are publishing now. Then, these close friends can publish server recommendations to that new server, and slowly, the old follower base of the banned user will begin finding their posts again from the new relay. - All of the above is valid too for when a relay ceases its operations. - **Censorship-resistance** - Each user can publish their updates to any number of relays. - A relay can charge a fee (the negotiation of that fee is outside of the protocol for now) from users to publish there, which ensures censorship-resistance (there will always be some Russian server willing to take your money in exchange for serving your posts). - **Spam** - If spam is a concern for a relay, it can require payment for publication or some other form of authentication, such as an email address or phone, and associate these internally with a pubkey that then gets to publish to that relay — or other anti-spam techniques, like hashcash or captchas. If a relay is being used as a spam vector, it can easily be unlisted by clients, which can continue to fetch updates from other relays. - **Data storage** - For the network to stay healthy, there is no need for hundreds of active relays. In fact, it can work just fine with just a handful, given the fact that new relays can be created and spread through the network easily in case the existing relays start misbehaving. Therefore, the amount of data storage required, in general, is relatively less than Mastodon or similar software. - Or considering a different outcome: one in which there exist hundreds of niche relays run by amateurs, each relaying updates from a small group of users. The architecture scales just as well: data is sent from users to a single server, and from that server directly to the users who will consume that. It doesn't have to be stored by anyone else. In this situation, it is not a big burden for any single server to process updates from others, and having amateur servers is not a problem. - **Video and other heavy content** - It's easy for a relay to reject large content, or to charge for accepting and hosting large content. When information and incentives are clear, it's easy for the market forces to solve the problem. - **Techniques to trick the user** - Each client can decide how to best show posts to users, so there is always the option of just consuming what you want in the manner you want — from using an AI to decide the order of the updates you'll see to just reading them in chronological order. ## FAQ - **This is very simple. Why hasn't anyone done it before?** I don't know, but I imagine it has to do with the fact that people making social networks are either companies wanting to make money or P2P activists who want to make a thing completely without servers. They both fail to see the specific mix of both worlds that Nostr uses. - **How do I find people to follow?** First, you must know them and get their public key somehow, either by asking or by seeing it referenced somewhere. Once you're inside a Nostr social network you'll be able to see them interacting with other people and then you can also start following and interacting with these others. - **How do I find relays? What happens if I'm not connected to the same relays someone else is?** You won't be able to communicate with that person. But there are hints on events that can be used so that your client software (or you, manually) knows how to connect to the other person's relay and interact with them. There are other ideas on how to solve this too in the future but we can't ever promise perfect reachability, no protocol can. - **Can I know how many people are following me?** No, but you can get some estimates if relays cooperate in an extra-protocol way. - **What incentive is there for people to run relays?** The question is misleading. It assumes that relays are free dumb pipes that exist such that people can move data around through them. In this case yes, the incentives would not exist. This in fact could be said of DHT nodes in all other p2p network stacks: what incentive is there for people to run DHT nodes? - **Nostr enables you to move between server relays or use multiple relays but if these relays are just on AWS or Azure what’s the difference?** There are literally thousands of VPS providers scattered all around the globe today, there is not only AWS or Azure. AWS or Azure are exactly the providers used by single centralized service providers that need a lot of scale, and even then not just these two. For smaller relay servers any VPS will do the job very well.

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# Músicas novas e conhecidas Quando for ouvir música de fundo, escolha músicas bem conhecidas. Para ouvir músicas novas, reserve um tempo e ouça-as com total atenção. Uma coisa similar é dirigir por caminhos conhecidos versus dirigir em lugares novos. a primeira opção te permite fazer coisas enquanto dirige "de fundo", a segunda requer atenção total. Com músicas, tenho errado constantemente em achar que posso conhecer músicas novas ao mesmo tempo em que me dedico a outras tarefas. ## See also: * [Músicas que você já conhece](nostr:naddr1qqyxxvn9xquxgcn9qyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c839sxv)

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# IPFS-dropzone Instead of uploading the dropped files to an URL, this subclass of [Dropzone.js](http://www.dropzonejs.com/) publishes them to [IPFS](https://ipfs.io/) with [js-ipfs](https://github.com/ipfs/js-ipfs) (no running local nodes needed). - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/ipfs-dropzone> ## See also - [How IPFS is broken](nostr:naddr1qqyxgdfsxvck2dtzqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c8y87ll)

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# ijq An interactive REPL for `jq` with smart helpers (for example, it automatically assigns each line of input to a variable so you can reference it later, it also always referenced the previous line automatically). - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/ijq> ## See also - [jiq](nostr:naddr1qqyrqvfjv33rxcenqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823cd86z7d) - [jq-web](nostr:naddr1qqyrzvrzxqcx2dfsqyghwumn8ghj7enfv96x5ctx9e3k7mgzyqalp33lewf5vdq847t6te0wvnags0gs0mu72kz8938tn24wlfze6qcyqqq823c90hqwz)

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# sitio A static site generator that works with imperative code instead of declarative templates and directory structures. It assumes nothing and can be used to transform anything into HTML pages. It uses React so it can be used to generate single-page apps too if you want -- and normal sites that work like single-page apps. It also provides helpers for reading Markdown files, like all static site generator does. A long time after creating this and breaking it while trying to add too many features at once I realized Gatsby also had an imperative engine underlying the default declarative interface that could be used and it was pretty similar to `sitio`. That both made me happy to have arrived at the same results of such an acclaimed tool and sad for the same reason, as Gatsby is the worse static site generator ever created considering user experience. - <https://github.com/fiatjaf/sitio>